Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren
Decision Date | 17 June 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 16-1275,16-1275 |
Citation | 139 S.Ct. 1894 |
Parties | VIRGINIA URANIUM, INC., et al., Petitioners v. John WARREN, et al. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Charles J. Cooper, Washington, DC, for the petitioners.
Solicitor General Noel J. Francisco, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the court, supporting the petitioners.
Solicitor General Toby J. Heytens, for the respondents.
Charles J. Cooper, Michael W. Kirk, John D. Ohlendorf, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, Washington, DC, for petitioners.
Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Stephen A. Cobb, Deputy Attorney General, Paul Kugelman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Toby J. Heytens, Solicitor General, Matthew R. McGuire, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Michelle S. Kallen, Deputy Solicitor General Designate, Office of the Virginia Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for respondents.
Justice GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice THOMAS and Justice KAVANAUGH join.
Virginia Uranium insists that the federal Atomic Energy Act preempts a state law banning uranium mining, but we do not see it. True, the AEA gives the Nuclear Regulatory Commission significant authority over the milling, transfer, use, and disposal of uranium, as well as the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. But Congress conspicuously chose to leave untouched the States’ historic authority over the regulation of mining activities on private lands within their borders. Nor do we see anything to suggest that the enforcement of Virginia’s law would frustrate the AEA’s purposes and objectives. And we are hardly free to extend a federal statute to a sphere Congress was well aware of but chose to leave alone. In this, as in any field of statutory interpretation, it is our duty to respect not only what Congress wrote but, as importantly, what it didn’t write.
I
Virginia Uranium thought its plan was pretty straightforward. First, the company wanted to use conventional mining techniques to extract raw uranium ore from a site near Coles Hill, Virginia. Next, it intended to mill that ore into a usable form. Typically performed at the mine site, milling involves grinding the ore into sand-sized grains and then exposing it to a chemical solution that leaches out pure uranium. Once dried, the resulting mixture forms a solid "yellowcake," which the company planned to sell to enrichment facilities that produce fuel for nuclear reactors. Finally, because the leaching process does not remove all of the uranium from the ore, the company expected to store the leftover "tailings" near the mine to reduce the chances of contaminating the air or water.
But putting the plan into action didn’t prove so simple. Pursuant to the AEA, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. , the NRC regulates milling and tailing storage activities nationwide, and it has issued an array of rules on these subjects. See, e.g. , 10 C.F.R. § 40 et seq. (2018). None of those, though, proved the real problem for Virginia Uranium. The company hit a roadblock even before it could get to the point where the NRC’s rules kick in: State law flatly prohibits uranium mining in Virginia. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 45.1–161.292:30, 45.1–283 (2013) ; 848 F. 3d 590, 593–594 (CA4 2017).
To overcome that obstacle, Virginia Uranium filed this lawsuit. The company alleged that, under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the AEA preempts state uranium mining laws like Virginia’s and ensconces the NRC as the lone regulator in the field. And because the NRC’s regulations say nothing about uranium mining, the company continued, it remains free to mine as it will in Virginia or elsewhere.
Both the district court and a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit rejected the company’s argument. The courts acknowledged that the AEA affords the NRC considerable authority over the nuclear fuel life cycle. But both courts found missing from the AEA any hint that Congress sought to strip States of their traditional power to regulate mining on private lands within their borders. Given the significance of the question presented, we granted review. 584 U. S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 2023, 201 L.Ed.2d 277 (2018).
II
The Supremacy Clause supplies a rule of priority. It provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof," are "the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Art. VI, cl. 2. This Court has sometimes used different labels to describe the different ways in which federal statutes may displace state laws—speaking, for example, of express, field, and conflict preemption. But these categories "are not rigidly distinct." Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council , 530 U. S. 363, 372, n. 6, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). And at least one feature unites them: Invoking some brooding federal interest or appealing to a judicial policy preference should never be enough to win preemption of a state law; a litigant must point specifically to "a constitutional text or a federal statute" that does the displacing or conflicts with state law. Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp. , 485 U. S. 495, 503, 108 S.Ct. 1350, 99 L.Ed.2d 582 (1988) ; see also 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1831, p. 694 (1st ed. 1833) ().
Before us, Virginia Uranium contends that the AEA (and only the AEA) unseats state uranium mining regulations and that it does so under the doctrines of both field and conflict preemption. We examine these arguments about the AEA’s preemptive effect much as we would any other about statutory meaning, looking to the text and context of the law in question and guided by the traditional tools of statutory interpretation. Here, no more than in any statutory interpretation dispute, is it enough for any party or court to rest on a supposition (or wish) that "it must be in there somewhere."
A
We begin with the company’s claim that the text and structure of the AEA reserve the regulation of uranium mining for the purpose of addressing nuclear safety concerns to the NRC alone—and almost immediately problems emerge.
Unlike many federal statutes,1 the AEA contains no provision preempting state law in so many words. Even more pointedly, the statute grants the NRC extensive and sometimes exclusive authority to regulate nearly every aspect of the nuclear fuel life cycle except mining. Companies like Virginia Uranium must abide the NRC’s rules and regulations if they wish to handle enriched uranium, to mill uranium ore or store tailings, or to build or run a nuclear power plant. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2111(a), 2113(a), 2073. But when it comes to mining, the statute speaks very differently, expressly stating that the NRC’s regulatory powers arise only "after [uranium’s] removal from its place of deposit in nature." § 2092 (emphasis added). As the government itself has conceded, this means that "uranium mining" lies "outside the NRC’s jurisdiction," Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14, and the agency’s grip takes hold only "at the mill, rather than at the mine," In re Hydro Resources , Inc. , 63 N. R. C. 510, 512 (2006).
What the text states, context confirms. After announcing a general rule that mining regulation lies outside the NRC’s jurisdiction, the AEA carves out a notably narrow exception. On federal lands, the statute says, the NRC may regulate uranium mining. § 2097. And if the federal government wants to control mining of uranium on private land, the AEA tells the NRC exactly what to do: It may purchase or seize the land by eminent domain and make it federal land. § 2096. Congress thus has spoken directly to the question of uranium mining on private land, and every bit of what it’s said indicates that state authority remains untouched.
Later amendments to the AEA point to the same conclusion. Some years after the statute’s passage, Congress added a provision, currently codified in § 2021, allowing the NRC to devolve certain of its regulatory powers to the States. Unsurprisingly, Congress indicated that the NRC must maintain regulatory control over especially sensitive activities like the construction of nuclear power plants. § 2021(c). But under § 2021(b) the NRC may now, by agreement, pass to the States some of its preexisting authorities to regulate various nuclear materials "for the protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards." Out of apparent concern that courts might (mis)read these new provisions as prohibiting States from regulating any activity even tangentially related to nuclear power without first reaching an agreement with the NRC, Congress added subsection (k):
"Nothing in this section [that is, § 2021] shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."
Section 2021, thus, did nothing to extend the NRC’s power to activities, like mining, historically beyond its reach. Instead, it served only to allow the NRC to share with the States some of the powers previously reserved to the federal government. Even then, the statute explained in subsection (k) that States remain free to regulate the activities discussed in § 2021 for purposes other than nuclear safety without the NRC’s consent. Indeed, if anything, subsection (k) might be described as a non-preemption clause.
Virginia Uranium’s case hinges on a very different construction of subsection (k). The company suggests that, properly read, the provision greatly expands the preemptive effect of the AEA and demands the displacement of any state law (touching on mining or any other subject) if that law was enacted for the purpose of protecting the public against "radiation hazards." And, the company adds,...
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