Vaccaro v. Security Bank
Decision Date | 13 July 1900 |
Docket Number | 795. |
Citation | 103 F. 436 |
Parties | VACCARO et al. v. SECURITY BANK OF MEMPHIS et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
The firm of A. Vaccaro & Co. was composed of three brothers-- A Vaccaro, B. Vaccaro, and A. B. Vaccaro. A. Vaccaro died August 7, 1899, and the Memphis Trust Company qualified as his administrator. The surviving partners, B. and A. B Vaccaro, continued in possession of the partnership stock and assets, and were engaged in closing up the business, until August 24, 1899, when, under a proceeding instituted by the administrator of the deceased partner in the chancery court of Shelby county, Tenn., a receiver was appointed for the purpose of liquidating the partnership affairs, who immediately took possession of the firm assets. In this condition of affairs certain creditors of the firm holding provable debts aggregating about $10,000 filed a petition in bankruptcy against said B. and A. B. Vaccaro as surviving partners of the said partnership of A. Vaccaro & Co., praying that they be declared bankrupts. The petition, as amended by leave of the court, set out a number of alleged acts of bankruptcy, only three of which were relied upon at the final hearing. These acts, as averred, were as follows: (1) That said A. Vaccaro & Co. were insolvent, and that within four months preceding the date of the filing of their petition the (2) 'That said firm of B. and A. B. Vaccaro, surviving partners, while insolvent, permitted its property, viz. its stock of goods and merchandise, to be removed and concealed with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud its creditors, in this: that on the 24th day of August, 1899, said firm did permit its stock of merchandise to be transferred and removed to O. B. Polk, receiver, hereinbefore set out.' (3) 'That said firm of A. Vaccaro & Co., by B. Vaccaro and A. B. Vaccaro, surviving partners, while insolvent, within four months next preceding the filing of the petition herein, did, on August 23, 1899, with intent to prefer on A. J. Vaccaro over other creditors of said firm, transfer to said A. J. Vaccaro, who was then a creditor of said firm to the amount of $400, evidenced by a promissory note, not then due, a large amount of whisky and other liquors, to the value of $400. ' The said B. and A. B. Vaccaro answered, and denied that they had made any general assignment within the meaning of the bankrupt act; admitted that they had not contested the bill filed by the administrator of A. Vacarro; admitted that the firm assets of A. Vaccaro & Co. were insufficient to pay the firm debts, to pay all the firm debts not paid by firm assets. They denied that they had procured the said equity bill to be filed, or that they had procured the appointment of a receiver. They insisted that the proceeding was in invitum as to them, and had been started and conducted in the general interest of the estate of A. Vaccaro, and that they had not contested the matter because they saw no object to be gained by such contest. They denied that they had permitted the firm property to be 'removed or concealed' 'with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,' within the meaning of the law, and denied the insolvency of the firm of A. Vaccaro & Co. They denied that they had transferred goods to A. J. Vaccaro with intent to prefer him over the other creditors, and again denied that A. Vaccaro & Co. were insolvent within the meaning of the bankrupt act. Much evidence was taken upon the issue thus formed. Upon a final hearing the bankrupt court adjudged the said B. and A. B. Vaccaro to be bankrupts 'individually and as partners.' From this adjudication both B. and A. B. Vaccaro have perfected this appeal.
Josiah Patterson, for appellants.
Thomas M. Scruggs, for appellees.
Before LURTON, DAY, and SEVERENS, Circuit Judges.
LURTON Circuit Judge, having made the foregoing statement of the case, .
1. The great bulk of the evidence found in the transcript of the record relates to the question of the solvency or insolvency of the firm of A. Vaccaro & Co. at the date of the commission of the alleged acts of bankruptcy. The fact of solvency or insolvency is of no moment in respect to the alleged 'general assignment' made August 24, 1899. If the appointment of a receiver under the bill of the Memphis Security Company, administrator of A. Vaccaro, was, as charged, 'a general assignment,' within the meaning of subdivision 4 of section 3 of the bankrupt act of 1898, it was an act of bankruptcy, whether the firm was solvent or insolvent. West Co. v. Lea, 174 U.S. 590, 19 Sup.Ct 836, 43 L.Ed. 1098. Was the fact that a receiver was appointed in an uncontested suit the making of a general assignment? The situation was this: A. Vaccaro had died, leaving an estate worth at a fair valuation about $115,000. He owed practically not individual debts. The firm assets, at a fair valuation, amounted to $55,000, though nominally nearly double that sum. The individual estates of B. and A. B. Vaccaro, after paying individual debts, are valued at $30,000. The firm indebtedness on August 24, 1899, was, in round figures, $124,000. Of this firm indebtedness $53,000 was secured by a mortgage upon realty owned by A. Vaccaro and by pledge of personal securities owned by him individually. It was to pay firm debts, and that, after applying such assets, about $69,000 of firm debts would remain unpaid. It was also clear from the facts stated that the estate of A. Vaccaro would have to bear a much greater part of the burden of the firm debts than its proportion. When the administrator of A. Vaccaro ascertained this situation, it determined in the interest of the estate, and for the purpose of adjusting the equities between the partners, to apply for the appointment of a receiver and the liquidation of the partnership affairs under the orders of the chancery court. A bill was accordingly prepared, which...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
BancoKentucky Co.'s Receiver v. National Bank of Kentucky's Receiver
...... out." He states that he received this information at. board meetings and did not know that ostensible security on. the Murray Rubber Company item had been released by the Bank,. although the Bank examiners had made a written report to the. board of ... property within the meaning of section 3466. **". . . Much. stress is laid by Chemical on Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 6. Cir., 103 F. 436. It is urged that this is in opposition. to the last mentioned Federal cases holding that a consent. ......
-
Bancoky. Co's Rec'R v. Nat'L Bk. of Ky.'s Rec'R
...to a voluntary assignment of all its property within the meaning of Section 3466. * * *" Much stress is laid by Chemical on Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 6 Cir., 103 F. 436. It is urged that this is in opposition to the last mentioned Federal cases holding that a consent receivership is equival......
-
In re Bertenshaw
...... Brewer, now Mr. Justice Brewer of the Supreme Court, said in. 1876 in Cross v. National Bank, 17 Kan. 340:. . . . 'Where. one joins a partnership, as in this case, he makes ... the meaning of the act of 1898, unless all its members are. insolvent. Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 103 F. 436, 43. C.C.A. 279; In re Perley & Hays, 15 Am.Bankr.Rep. 54, 56, ......
-
Hewitt v. Hayes
......369, 34 N.E. 205, 20. L. R. A. 566, 34 Am. St. Rep. 463; Wilson v. International Bank, 125 A.D. 568, 109 N.Y.S. 1027,. quoting and following Williams v. Whedon, 109 N.Y. 333, 16 N.E. ...Rep. 655, 66 N.Y.S. 600, 32 Misc. 406; In re Daggett, 3 Dill. 83, Fed. Cas. No. 3,536;. Vaccaro v. Security Bank, 103 F. 436, 43 C. C. A. 279; In re Mercur, 122 F. 384, 58 C. C. A. 472;. In re ......