Vadurro v. Yellow Cab Co. of Camden

• Decision Date: 18 December 1950
• Docket Number: No. A--50,A--50
• Citation: 6 N.J. 102,77 A.2d 459
• Parties: VADURRO et al. v. YELLOW CAB CO. OF CAMDEN.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 102

6 N.J. 102

77 A.2d 459

VADURRO et al. v. YELLOW CAB CO. OF CAMDEN.

No. A--50.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 27, 1950.

Decided Dec. 18, 1950.

Meyer L. Sakin, Camden, argued the cause for appellant.

Joseph Tomaselli, Camden, argued the cause for respondents (Malandra & Tomaselli, Camden, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

The judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict in an automobile negligence case is the subject of attack in this appeal brought here by the granting of the defendant's petition for certification.

The three plaintiffs were passengers in a cab owned by the defendant and driven by its employee. At about 3:15 on the morning of May 4, 1947 the cab was crossing the Delaware River Bridge from Camden going west toward Philadelphia. It was struck on the left-hand side by an eastbound station wagon which thereafter struck another car. The station wagon had been stolen and after the second crash its driver disappeared and has not been apprehended.

As a result of the collision, the defendant's cab ended up astride the middle of the bridge partly in the westbound lane and partly in the eastbound, with its headlights still lighted. Two of the plaintiffs, Meloni and D'Alesandro, got out of the cab and stood with the driver on the eastward or Camden side of it. The third plaintiff, Vadurro, had been knocked unconscious by the impact and remained in the cab. A police officer came along in a jeep and, seeing the wrecked car, parked his jeep in the eastbound lane about fifty or sixty feet on the Philadelphia side of the cab and lighted the flashing blinker signal on top of it to warn eastbound traffic.

The driver and the two plaintiffs had been standing outside the cab for three to five minutes when an eastbound Chevrolet came along, ignored the warning of the police jeep and crashed into the cab, impelling it against the two plaintiffs, who were thrown to the ground.

Several actions were originally instituted by these plaintiffs. In their suit against the owner and driver of the Chevrolet, they took a voluntary dismissal, and an action against two others, whose participation in the events complained of is not shown in the record, was dismissed on motion. The two remaining suits, brought against the present defendant, were consolidated for trial.

The cause was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict of $3500 in favor of the plaintiff Vadurro, $200 in favor of Meloni and $100 in favor of D'Alesandro. The case was appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the judgment, and then certified here.

The defendant urges error in the denial of its motion for judgment made at the close of the plaintiffs' case and again at the close of the defendant's case. It also urges error in the court's charge to the jury and the refusal to permit the introduction of certain evidence, and claims the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

The first ground advanced for reversal relates to the occurrence of the second accident in which the eastbound Chevrolet struck the cab as it stood astride the traffic lanes. The defendant asserts there was no causal connection between the first and second accidents and no proof of any negligence on its part which led to the happening of the later collision.

The motion made at the trial was, however, not so limited in scope as the argument made on appeal. It was not confined to so much of the complaints as related to the injuries sustained in the second accident but was directed to the complaints in toto, asking that they be dismissed.

On a motion for a direction of verdict, evidence will not be weighed but all the proofs which support the claim of the party against whom the motions are made must be accepted as true and he is entitled to the benefit of all legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Where fairminded men might honestly differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the proofs, the questions at issue should be submitted to the jury. Schwartz v. Rothman, 1 N.J. 206, 62 A.2d 684 (1948); Fischetto Paper Mill Supply, Inc., v. Quigley Co., Inc., 3 N.J. 149, 69 A.2d 318 (1949); Visaggi v. Frank's Bar & Grill, Inc., 4 N.J. 93, 71 A.2d 638 (1950); McKinney v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 4 N.J. 229, 72 A.2d 326 (1950).

Putting aside, for the moment, consideration of the second collision, there was evidence in this case from which a jury might find negligence on the part of the defendant which contributed to the happening of the first accident. The motion for a judgment in the defendant's favor was therefore properly denied.

The defendant next alleges error in the court's charge to the jury, basing its argument on this point on the part of the charge underlined in the following excerpt: 'Now, the cab, admittedly, after the collision was stopped in the eastbound lane, in its wrong lane, and then another collision occurred and the plaintiffs, or two of them, were further hurt. Now, there is where the question of proximate cause comes in again. If the defendant was negligent in the first accident then he had no right to be where he was in the second accident, because a person coming across the bridge on his right side of the road, where he belongs, has a right to assume it is clear of obstructions, and that a vehicle is not parked or stopped in his lane of traffic, either facing in the opposite direction or partially in the opposite direction. So if you should find that the cab company was guilty of negligence and that some or all of these three plaintiffs were hurt at that time, and then if they were hurt again by reason of the second accident, it is...