Vaillancourt v. Latifi
Decision Date | 17 February 2004 |
Docket Number | (AC 23942) |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | SCOTT D. VAILLANCOURT v. VAHEEM LATIFI ET AL. |
Dranginis, DiPentima and Hennessy, Js.
Mark D. Malley, with whom, on the brief, was Stephen R. Turner, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).
Rosemarie T. Weber, with whom were Mary Ambrogio Cashman and, on the brief, Joel M. Fain and Tracey M. Lane, for the appellee (defendant Waterbury Young Men's Christian Association).
The issue in this personal injury action is whether the organizer of a recreational athletic league is liable for the injuries a competitor sustains during the heat of the game. Under the facts alleged in the complaint, the organizer of the league is not responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, as nothing it did or did not do was the legal cause of those injuries. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff, Scott D. Vaillancourt, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered on the granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Waterbury Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA). On appeal, the plaintiff claims that it was improper for the court to conclude that the YMCA did not owe him a duty of care and that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved at trial. He also claims that the court abused its discretion by denying his request to amend the complaint. We disagree.
The following procedural history is relevant to our resolution of the appeal. In July, 2000, the plaintiff commenced an action for injuries he allegedly sustained while he was playing softball in a league organized by the YMCA. The complaint sounded in five counts against three defendants,1 but only the fifth count is relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff alleged that in March, 1998, the YMCA solicited teams for its industrial softball league (league). Teams were required to register and to pay a fee to participate in the league. During a league game on July 15, 1998, the plaintiff, the catcher for his team, was attempting to tag the defendant Vaheem Latifi,2 who was running to home plate from third base. Latifi ran into the plaintiff and caused him to fall to the ground. The plaintiff alleged that Latifi acted with intent and malice. As a result of the collision, the plaintiff suffered injuries, primarily a broken arm. The fifth count also alleged that in exchange for the fee paid by each team, the YMCA was obligated to provide competitors with facilities, organization and instruction "to run a safe league."
In its answer, the YMCA denied, among other things, that it was obligated to provide a safe league and that it had been negligent. The YMCA thereafter filed a motion claiming that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the umpire on the date of the game was an independent contractor,3 it did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care and nothing that it did or did not do was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that there was no evidence before it regarding the scope of the duty, either direct or vicarious, that the YMCA owed the plaintiff or that it had breached its duty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit on different grounds,4 as we conclude that nothing the YMCA did or did not do was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that it was improper for the court to conclude that the YMCA did not owe him an independent or vicarious duty of care and that there were no genuine issues of material fact in that regard. As a matter of law, the YMCA did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care, as nothing alleged in the complaint was the legal cause of his injuries.
The standard of review for a challenge to the granting of a motion for summary judgment is well established. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 262 Conn. 248, 253, 811 A.2d 1266 (2002). "The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haesche v. Kissner, 229 Conn. 213, 217, 640 A.2d 89 (1994).
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mountaindale Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Zappone, 59 Conn. App. 311, 315, 757 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 947, 762 A.2d 903 (2000). "The purpose of the complaint is to limit the issues to be decided at the trial of a case and is calculated to prevent surprise." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, 40 Conn. App. 740, 747, 673 A.2d 567 (1996), aff'd, 240 Conn. 49, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997). The allegations contained in paragraph nine of count five of the complaint are those that are key to the motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff's cause of action "invokes the well established proposition that a tortfeasor is liable for all damages proximately caused by its negligence." First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., 247 Conn. 597, 604, 724 A.2d 497 (1999). The elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach, proximate cause and injury. RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24-25, 734 A.2d 85 (1999).
(Citations omitted.) First Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of Rochester v. Charter Appraisal Co., supra, 247 Conn. 604.
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 405, 696 A.2d 332 (1997).
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 406.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that the very nature of athletic competition makes it reasonably foreseeable that competitors may be injured during the contest. Id., 407. Id., 407-408.
The issue in Jaworski was the duty of care owed by one participant to another to prevent injuries from occurring during competition. Our Supreme Court appreciated the tension between promoting vigorous athletic competition and protecting competitors. As a matter of policy, it concluded that a balance between the two objectives can be achieved "by allowing a participant in an athletic contest to maintain an action against a coparticipant only for reckless or intentional conduct and not for merely negligent conduct." Id., 409.
Although Jaworski concerned soccer players, it is equally foreseeable to us that injuries will occur to competitors in a game of...
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