Valadez v. City of Des Moines, 67174

• Decision Date: 29 September 1982
• Docket Number: No. 67174,67174
• Citation: 324 N.W.2d 475
• Parties: Chavez Paul VALADEZ, Appellee, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa, Dean Emary, Richard Schaffer, John Meeker and Lonnie Spanswick, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 475

324 N.W.2d 475

Chavez Paul VALADEZ, Appellee, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa, Dean Emary, Richard Schaffer, John Meeker and Lonnie Spanswick, Appellants.

No. 67174.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Sept. 29, 1982.

Loren J. Braud, Asst. City Atty., Des Moines, for appellants.

John F. Sprole, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP, McGIVERIN and CARTER, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Justice.

This case involves the single issue of the propriety of trial court's denial of defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict after the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $300 actual damages and $3500 punitive damages in a false imprisonment action. We find the court erred in overruling the motion and therefore reverse its order and remand for entry of judgment for defendants.

The events giving rise to this action began with the warrantless arrest of plaintiff Chavez Paul Valadez by officers of the Des Moines police department on August 25, 1978. He was arrested at 9:00 p. m. for striking an unattended motor vehicle and assault on a police officer. He was taken to the Des Moines city jail and booked at approximately 9:40 p. m. Valadez claimed to be suffering from stomach pains and was taken to Broadlawns Hospital at 11:10 p. m. He was returned to the jail at 1:30 a. m. on August 26. Plaintiff's father and wife posted bond at 7:00 a. m. on August 26 and Valadez was released within a few minutes. He subsequently pled guilty to striking an unattended motor vehicle and was fined.

Valadez became incensed by the treatment he allegedly had received in connection with his arrest, detention and release. Accordingly, he filed a petition in district court which alleged the following causes of action against defendants, the City of Des Moines and several of its police officers: 1) assault and battery; 2) false arrest; 3) false imprisonment; 4) negligence of the City in training and supervising its police officers; and 5) infringement of civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants on all causes of action except for false imprisonment. ¹ Plaintiff was awarded $300 in actual damages and $3,500 in punitive damages for false imprisonment.

During trial, the court had overruled defendants' timely motion for directed verdict and objections to instructions submitting the false imprisonment claim to the jury. The court overruled defendants' motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict which incorporated the reasons for the prior motion and objections. Defendants appeal, asserting the court erred in submitting the false imprisonment claim and in overruling the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. More specifically, defendants contend Valadez has not shown by substantial evidence that he was unlawfully detained after his arrest and therefore has no valid claim. Plaintiff has not cross-appealed.

I. False Imprisonment Elements. "False imprisonment is the unlawful restraint of an individual's personal liberty or freedom of locomotion." Sergeant v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., 244 Iowa 185, 196, 52 N.W.2d 86, 92 (1952); see Fox v. McCurnin, 205 Iowa 752, 757, 218 N.W. 499, 501 (1928); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35 (1965); 32 Am.Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 1 at 58 (1982). The two essential elements of the action are: "(1) detention or restraint against one's will and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention or restraint." Sergeant, 244 Iowa at 196, 52 N.W.2d at 93; 32 Am.Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 5 at 62 (1982).

An action for false imprisonment lies for an unreasonable delay in taking the person arrested before a magistrate. E.g., Andersen v. Spencer, 229 Iowa 595, 596-97, 294 N.W. 904, 905 (1940); Norton v. Mathers, 222 Iowa 1170, 1176-78, 271 N.W. 321, 325 (1937); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 966, 971 (1964); 32 Am.Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 25 at 78-79 (1982); 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 30 at 675-76 (1960).

The action for false imprisonment also may be brought for an unreasonable delay in giving an arrestee the opportunity to post bond. ² Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d at 1031; 32 Am.Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 30 at 87-88 (1982); see Andersen, 229 Iowa at 598, 294 N.W. at 905; Rosenberg v. Bax, 258 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Ky.1953).

II. Review of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. After the jury rendered its verdict in favor of plaintiff on the false imprisonment claim, defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Iowa R.Civ.P. 243. Rule 243 provides, in part:

Any party may, on motion, have judgment in his favor despite an adverse verdict, or the jury's failure to return any verdict: * * * (b) If the movant was entitled to have a verdict directed for him at the close of all the evidence, and moved therefor, and the jury did not return such a verdict, the court may then either grant a new trial or enter judgment as though it had directed a verdict for the movant.

Our comments in Watson v. Lewis, 272 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1978), apply with equal force to the present case:

A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule of Civil Procedure 243 must stand on grounds raised in the directed verdict motion. Dutcher v. Lewis, 221 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Iowa 1974); and on appeal from such judgment, review by an appellate court is limited to those grounds raised in the directed verdict motion. Meeker v. City of Clinton, 259 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Iowa 1977). When considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, in this case, the plaintiff. Winter v. Honeggers' & Co., 215 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Iowa 1974).

If, under this view of the evidence, there is substantial evidence in support of each element of plaintiff's claim, the motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. Wernimont v. State, 312 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Iowa 1981); Larsen v. United Federal Savings and Loan Association, 300 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa 1981) ("If reasonable minds could differ on the issue it was properly submitted to the jury."); Poulsen v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 1981) ("In ruling on [a] motion for directed verdict or to withdraw [an] issue from the jury ... trial court first determines whether the plaintiff has presented substantial evidence on each element of the claim to determine if a reasonable trier of fact could find for the plaintiff"). Conversely, if there is no substantial evidence in support of each element of plaintiff's claim, a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict in defendants' favor is appropriate.

III. Lawfulness of Detention. We find that although there was substantial evidence supporting the first element of plaintiff's false imprisonment claim, "detention or restraint against one's will," there was no substantial evidence in support of the second element, "the unlawfulness of such detention or restraint." Sergeant, 244 Iowa at 196, 52 N.W.2d at 93. Thus it was error for trial court to submit the false imprisonment issue to the jury, Poulsen, 300 N.W.2d at 297, and defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, like their motion for directed verdict, should have been sustained.

There was no evidence adduced at trial that the detention of Valadez was in any way unlawful. Section 804.22, The Code, provides in part: "When an arrest is made without a warrant, the person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the judicial district in which such arrest was made ...." ³ Similarly, Iowa R.Crim.P. 2(1) provides in part: "An officer making an arrest with or without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a committing magistrate as provided by law." Iowa R.Crim.P. 1(2)(c) provides: " 'Unnecessary delay' is any unexcused delay longer than twenty-four hours, and consists of a shorter period whenever a magistrate is accessible and available."

Defendants premised their motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence on the fact that they had complied with section 804.22 and that the delay in releasing Valadez was neither unreasonable nor unnecessary. The record shows that Valadez was released at 7:10 a. m. on August 26 after his relatives posted his bail based on a bonding schedule under police department regulations. ⁴ The evidence was uncontroverted that the magistrate was not available for rule 2 initial appearances until 7:30 a. m. at the earliest. Plaintiff presented no evidence that a magistrate was "accessible and available" at an earlier time. We hold that plaintiff was required to present substantial evidence that a magistrate was accessible and available at the time of the alleged false imprisonment to make a prima facie case for the jury on the second element of false imprisonment. Rounds v. Bucher, 137 Mont. 39, 43, 349 P.2d 1026, 1028 (1960).

Even if Valadez had been held for the additional twenty minutes and then presented to a magistrate who became "available" and "accessible" at 7:30 a. m., his detention would not have been unlawful. The delay would not have been "unnecessary" as defined in rule 1(2)(c), because a magistrate was not "available" until 7:30 a. m. In other words, when a magistrate is not present for initial appearances, as is often the case during the late hours of an evening or the early-morning hours, he is not available as defined in rule 1(2)(c). Therefore, there is no unnecessary delay in waiting for the magistrate to preside over initial appearances until his regular courtroom hours, subject to the twenty-four hour maximum of rule 1(2)(c). Since there was no unnecessary delay in the present case, there was no unlawful detention and defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted.

A. Similar rule in other...