Valadez v. Graham, 78-16-Civ-Oc.

Citation474 F. Supp. 149
Decision Date18 June 1979
Docket NumberNo. 78-16-Civ-Oc.,78-16-Civ-Oc.
PartiesChris VALADEZ et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert GRAHAM et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida

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Sheldon H. Laskin, Marcia E. Bove, Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc., Winter Haven, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Gene T. Sellers, Counsel, State Board of Education, Tallahassee, Fla., Stanley E. Marable, Leesburg, Fla., for defendants.

OPINION

CHARLES R. SCOTT, Senior District Judge.

This suit was instituted by migratory school children attending Groveland Junior/Senior High School against local and state education officials1 alleging that the educational programs provided them are in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. The Court is presently confronted with defendants' motion for summary judgment2 and plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment, both of which were orally argued before the Court on April 25, 1979.

The controversy arises out of plaintiffs' unique position as children of migratory agricultural workers. Each year, plaintiffs travel to other parts of the country with their parents to engage in the harvest of various agricultural products. By necessity, due to the northern harvest in the fall of the year, plaintiffs return to Lake County after commencement of the academic school year. Although most of the plaintiffs return within the first week of classes, some cannot enroll until after the first nine-week grading period has been completed. Those who do return later are confronted with the difficult task of making up the work missed.

Although subsequently modified, the amended complaint alleges the existence of policies at Groveland Junior/Senior High School which operate to undermine plaintiffs' ability to participate in a meaningful educational process. These policies allegedly (1) deny plaintiffs the opportunity to make up work missed and fail to offer programs helping them to make up such work, (2) subject plaintiffs to an arbitrary attendance/grading system resulting in automatic failure if five or more weeks of the quarter are missed, and (3) prevent plaintiffs from transferring credit earned while in attendance at other schools.

Plaintiffs claim that these alleged policies give rise to five causes of action. First, plaintiffs contend that defendants' policies and practices fail to meet the obligations created by Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Programs for Migratory Children, 20 U.S.C. § 241c-2, now 20 U.S.C. § 2762. Secondly, it is alleged that defendants have unlawfully discriminated against plaintiffs in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The third and fourth counts of the complaint allege that defendants have violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, it is contended that defendants have acted under color of state law to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. These five counts of the complaint have survived motions to dismiss,3 and the case has been certified as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).4

The relief sought is in the form of a judgment declaring defendants' actions to be violative of the statutory and constitutional requirements, ordering defendants to alter their policies and practices, restraining defendants from failing to abide by the statutory constitutional mandates, and awarding plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343.

In their motion for summary judgment, local defendants contend that the undisputed facts show that plaintiffs' claims are without merit. Defendants have, throughout the suit, argued that the policies which plaintiffs attack have never been in existence. Moreover, defendants contend that the policies which are in effect fully comply with any statutory or constitutional requirements. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, seek summary judgment on the first and second count of the complaint, arguing that the educational programs presently available to the migrant students fail to provide the academic assistance called for by Title I, 20 U.S.C. § 2762, and Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

The standard by which a motion for summary judgment must be tested is whether from the evidence presented by the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). The purpose of a summary judgment is not to cut litigants off from their right to a trial, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464, 468, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458, 461 (1962), but rather, to avoid a useless trial where there are no issues to try, Broadway v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 530 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1976) and to avoid the waste of time and resources of both the litigants and the court where a trial would be useless. Zweig v. Hearst Corporation, 521 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1975). The summary judgment procedure is designed to provide a speedy and expeditious disposal of those cases in which there is no genuine need for a trial. Tanner v. McCall, 441 F.Supp. 503, 506 (M.D.Fla.1977). Additionally, summary judgment may be appropriate even when constitutional issues are raised. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1970). Where the court is both the fact-finder and the law-applier, summary judgment is available. Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1970).

The threshold determination that the Court must make is whether the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. A material fact for purposes of a motion for summary judgment is one which is determinative of the parties' duties or rights. Atkinson v. Jory, 292 F.2d 169, 171 (10th Cir. 1961). A genuine issue precluding a summary judgment is one that requires a judge or jury to resolve the parties' differing versions of truth at trial. Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam Management Company, Inc., 553 F.2d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 1977); Allen v. Carlotti, 400 F.Supp. 1037-39 (S.D.Fla.1975). Despite the parties' contentions to the contrary, however, if the affidavits and other materials submitted by the parties in support of their motions present no dispute as to the material facts, the court should render judgment for the party so entitled. Central Oil & Supply Corporation v. United States, 557 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir. 1977).

Irrelevant and immaterial evidence cannot be used to create a genuine issue as to any fact in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment. McKeithen v. S.S. Frosta, 430 F.Supp. 899, 901 (E.D.La. 1977). Indeed, only that evidence which could properly be admitted at trial can be relied upon to raise a dispute as to the facts of the case. Munoz v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 563 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1977).

With these principles in mind, a review of the entire record discloses no genuine dispute as to a material fact which would preclude the entry of a summary judgment. Although there is dispute as to many factual contentions, none are of the materiality which would alter the duties, obligations, or rights of the parties. Consequently, application of the law to those facts which are material, yet undisputed, supports the entry of a judgment without the necessity of a trial.

I. Constitutional Claims
A. Equal Protection

Counts III and IV of plaintiffs' amended complaint allege violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Equal Protection claim alleges that, through the school attendance/grading and course credit policies, defendants interfered with plaintiffs' fundamental rights to education, interstate travel, and familial privacy. Count III also alleges that defendants intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs as a class of Mexican-American migrant students.

While it is well established that individuals of Mexican decent are as much entitled to the benefits of the Equal Protection Clause as anyone else, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954); United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 852 (5th Cir. 1972); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 459 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1971), the entitlement alone does not support the claim. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent arbitrary and invidious discrimination directed toward any individual or group by state action. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, 607 (1976); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 94 S.Ct. 2416, 41 L.Ed.2d 304 (1974).

Whether a class of individuals sharing the same characteristic such as race, color, or national origin has been singled out to be treated differently may be indicated by numerical compilations showing that a disproportionate number of that group are affected. However, state action which affects a greater proportion of one group more than another, standing alone, is not invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 91 S.Ct. 1331, 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971). There must be a showing that the facially neutral legislation or policy has the purpose and intent to invidiously discriminate against the disproportionately affected group. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450, 464 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239, 96 S.Ct. at 2047, 48...

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