Valandingham v. Bojorquez
| Decision Date | 18 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1926,ASPC-F,87-1926 |
| Citation | 866 F.2d 1135 |
| Parties | Ervin T. VALANDINGHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S.G. BOJORQUEZ, Law Library Officer at, in his individual and official capacity; Randy Moen, Law Library Officer at, in his individual and official capacity; Lloyd Bramlett, Warden at the Central Unit, in his individual and official capacity; Jim Adams, Assistant Deputy Warden at ASPC- F, in his individual and official capacity; Frank Terry, Major in the Central Unit, in his individual and official capacity; Sam Lewis, Director at ADOC, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Ervin T. Valandingham, Florence, Ariz., pro se.
Mariannina E. Preston, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
Before PREGERSON, CANBY and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Valandingham, a prisoner in custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections, brought a Sec. 1983 civil rights action against various employees of the Department in which he alleged that because he had petitioned prison and government officials for redress of his grievances, prison officers S.G. Bojorquez and Randy Moen had conspired to label Valandingham a "snitch" and thereby subject him to life-threatening retaliation by fellow inmates. C.R. 1 at 3-6. Valandingham also alleged that he had been denied legal materials; prohibited from communicating with other prisoners in the prison law library; threatened with disciplinary action if he discussed legal matters with other prisoners; and threatened with disciplinary action if he provided affidavits to or received affidavits from other prisoners. Id. at 6. Finally, he alleged that the Warden (Lloyd Bramlett), the Assistant Deputy Warden (Jim Adams), and the Major (Frank Terry), had conspired with Moen and Bojorquez to label Valandingham a "snitch" in retaliation for his legal endeavors on behalf of himself and other prisoners. Id. at 7.
Defendants moved to dismiss Valandingham's complaint. The district court ordered that defendants' motion to dismiss be treated as a motion for summary judgment, and on February 27, 1987 entered an Order dismissing the action. C.R. 28.
The district court's Order stated: "For all the reasons set forth in defendants' motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, and their reply to the response, the motion will be granted." C.R. 28 at 1. The court added: (A list of 9 lawsuits, dating from September 1984 to December 1986, followed.) Id. at 1-2. These statements represented all of the court's explanation for its ruling.
After the district court denied Valandingham's subsequent motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal, he brought this appeal. He is proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se.
The court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo. Levin v. Knight, 780 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir.1986). See also Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir.1987). The reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Id.
Valandingham argues that the district court dismissed his action because it found that he had not been denied the use of the prison law library. Valandingham points out that he never alleged that defendants had denied him use of the prison law library. He therefore argues that the district court based its dismissal of his action on its rejection of an allegation that Valandingham never made.
In support of this argument, Valandingham points to the court's observation that "While plaintiff complains that he is unable to use the prison law library and has been denied legal materials, it is interesting to note that he has not been inhibited in his litigation activities." C.R. 28 at 1.
Valandingham is correct in pointing out that he never alleged that he was "unable to use the prison law library." He is wrong, however, in asserting that the district court's grant of summary judgment was premised on its belief that Valandingham had in fact been able to use the library. The court, in its Order, clearly stated that it was granting defendants' summary judgment motion "[f]or all the reasons set forth in defendants' motion to dismiss ... and their reply to the response...." C.R. 28 at 1. We must therefore decide whether these two documents justified the district court's entry of summary judgment.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In addition, Rule 56 provides:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleadings, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court "must view the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion...." Jewel Companies v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, 741 F.2d 1555, 1559 (9th Cir.1984). We will affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment if, viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, we determine that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d at 138.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that neither the district court nor defendants established that Valandingham's claim of retaliation failed to state a cause of action cognizable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See C.R. 28 (Order); C.R. 13 ("Motion to Dismiss"); C.R. 26 (). They did not mention the elements of a cause of action under section 1983, much less discuss whether Valandingham's claim articulated those elements. Rather, the defendants, and the district court in resting its holding on defendants' arguments, merely asserted that the incidents described by Valandingham either never took place or were misdescribed by Valandingham. The defendants nowhere argued that even if the facts Valandingham alleged and subsequently supported by affidavit were true, no cause of action under section 1983 would exist. Therefore, the only possible reason for dismissal on a motion for summary judgment would have been that Valandingham failed to show the existence a genuine issue of material fact. However, as discussed below, Valandingham in fact made such a showing.
In his complaint, Valandingham alleged that because he had petitioned prison and government officials for redress of his grievances, Bojorquez and Moen had conspired to label him a "snitch" and thereby subject him to retaliation by inmates. C.R. 1 at 3-6. He further alleged that on or about September 27, 1986, he was approached by fellow prisoners and threatened with harm because Bojorquez and Moen had told other inmates in the law library that Valandingham was a snitch. Id. at 6. Valandingham alleged that Bojorquez and Moen labeled him a "snitch" with the intent of having Valandingham killed by inmates. Id. at 9.
These allegations may support a cause of action under section 1983. If the facts alleged by Valandingham are true, he may have a claim under section 1983 not only for violation of his right to be protected from violence while in custody, but also for violation of his right of access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Thus, on the facts alleged in Valandingham's complaint, there is no basis for dismissal. For dismissal to have been appropriate, therefore, the subsequent papers filed by defendants and Valandingham must have shown that there was "no genuine issue of material fact" in dispute.
In their Motion to Dismiss, defendants offered their version of one of the incidents in which Valandingham alleges that he was labeled a "snitch."
On September 11, 1986, [Randy] Moen and Valandingham had a disagreement over when particular documents should be photocopied. While in Moen's office the plaintiff stated he would complain to Deputy Warden Adams and Warden Bramlett. Moen responded by telling the plaintiff "not to act like a snitch." The plaintiff then left the office and yelled in the presence of other inmates to Moen, "Are you calling me a 'snitch'?"
C.R. 13 at 2. Defendants also asserted that despite Valandingham's contention that he had been threatened with harm as a result of being labeled a "snitch," Valandingham had never reported such an incident to prison authorities nor sought protection. Id.
In an affidavit attached to defendants' motion to dismiss, Randy Moen, supervisor of the prison law library, stated that he has "never called inmate Ervin T. Valandingham a snitch nor ... created any conditions which would place him in a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Quiroga v. Graves
...to petition the government may support a 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 5527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). As discussed by the Ninth Circuit in Watison v. Carter:"A retaliat......
-
Mendez v. United States
...intent"). In terms of the third prerequisite, filing a grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). With respect to the fourth prong, "[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amen......
-
Sharp v. Essex Ins. Co. (In re C.M. Meiers Co.), Case No.: 1:12-bk-10229-MT
...drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Valadingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, the interpretation of an insurance contract presents a question of law. Stanford Ranch, Inc. v. Maryland C......
-
Alarcon v. Davey
...are the rights to speech or to petition the government, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant took adverse actio......