Valante v. Valante

Decision Date13 May 1980
Citation180 Conn. 528,429 A.2d 964
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesHarry VALANTE v. Sarah E. VALANTE.

Andrew Chulick, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant).

Abraham I. Gordon, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, were Richard S. Scalo and David M. Spinner, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, PETERS and PARSKEY, JJ.

PARSKEY, Justice.

In this action for a dissolution of marriage, the trial court rendered a decree dissolving the marriage and awarded custody of the two minor children to their mother, the defendant, while the plaintiff was ordered to pay child support of $120 per week. The decree further provided for the sale of the jointly owned family home when the youngest child attains the age of 18, with equal division of the proceeds, and equal division of all personal property not needed by the children for their personal use. In the event the parties could not agree upon the division of the personal property the family relations division of the Superior Court was ordered to decide the division. No alimony was awarded. In her appeal the defendant claims that, in determining the disposition of property and the question of periodic alimony, the court failed to give adequate consideration to the criteria set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82. She also claims that the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority when it reserved certain personal property for the children's use and when it delegated to the family relations divisions the authority to divide the other personal property if the parties could not reach an agreement.

The defendant first contends that the court could not properly decide the questions of periodic alimony and the assignment of property because it lacked sufficient information respecting the value of the plaintiff's interest in a closely held corporation, in his life insurance policies and in his pension rights. This position is curious. In addition to having access to the plaintiff's financial affidavit the defendant was given a full opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff at length regarding his financial circumstances. Further, the defendant had the opportunity to explore the plaintiff's financial circumstances through a variety of discovery procedures. Optimal use of the resources might well have generated additional pertinent facts for the court's consideration. From the defendant's failure to elicit such information, however, it in no way follows that the court acted on insufficient evidence. Reviewing the record in this regard, we find that there was sufficient financial information before the court for it to fashion the appropriate orders on the financial aspects of the case.

The defendant next argues that the court did not give sufficient consideration to the statutory criteria established by §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82. The court ordered the proceeds of a future sale of the family residence divided equally, an equal division in kind of the personal property and no periodic alimony. The thrust of the defendant's argument is that had the court given sufficient weight to, inter alia, the length of the marriage, the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the defendant's limited employability and the defendant's condition of health, it would have either made a more favorable distribution of the family assets in the defendant's favor or would have ordered periodic alimony.

To begin with, our alimony statute does not recognize an absolute right to alimony. General Statutes § 46b-82; Thomas v. Thomas, 159 Conn. 477, 486, 271 A.2d 62 (1970). "This court has reiterated time and again that awards of financial settlements ancillary to a marital dissolution rest in the sound discretion of the trial court." Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 572, 427 A.2d 406 (1980). Although the court is required to consider the statutory criteria of length of marriage, causes for dissolution, the age, health, station in life, occupation, amount and sources of income, assets and opportunity for future acquisition of assets of each of the parties; Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 179, 425 A.2d 592 (1979); no single criterion is preferred over all the others. In weighing the factors in a given case the court is not required to give equal weight to each of the specified items. Nevertheless, it is rather obvious that in making financial determinations the financial circumstances, both actual and potential, are entitled to great weight.

In this case the defendant has employable talents. She is regularly employed as a comprimario or secondary lead singer at the Metropolitan Opera Company. In addition to her regular income, the defendant receives compensation when she goes on tour and when she appears on television and radio. Although the defendant claims that...

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45 cases
  • Lopiano v. Lopiano, (SC 15899)
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 29 Diciembre 1998
    ...accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar circumstances of each case. Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 531, 429 A.2d 964 (1980)." Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 740-41, 453 A.2d 1151 (1982). In dividing up property, the court must take m......
  • Marina Bornemann v. Bornemann
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 21 Julio 1998
    ...each case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 174, 553 A.2d 612 (1989); see Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 531, 429 A.2d 964 (1980). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court's award of one half of the fourth flight of stock options to the plaintif......
  • Weinstein v. Weinstein
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 13 Junio 1989
    ...is properly a part of the judicial function and can be done only by one clothed with judicial authority. See Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 532-33, 429 A.2d 964 (1980); Cotton v. Cotton, 11 Conn.App. 189, 194-95, 526 A.2d 547 (1987). The trial court's orders empowering Whitehead to reso......
  • LaRue v. LaRue
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 25 Mayo 1983
    ...Makar v. Makar, 398 So.2d 717 (Ala.Civ.App.1981); Neely v. Neely, 115 Ariz. 47, 563 P.2d 302 (1977) (no relation); Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 429 A.2d 964 (1980); Turpin v. Turpin, 403 A.2d 1144 (D.C.App.1979); Farias v. Farias, 58 Haw. 227, 566 P.2d 1104 (1977); Matter of Marriage ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Survey of 1989 Developments in Connecticut Family Law
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 64, 1989
    • Invalid date
    ...B.J. 484 (1982). 115. 18 Conn. App. 622,561 A.2d 443 (1989). 116. Id. at 627. 117 Id. at 628-29. The Court cited Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 532-33, 429 A.2d 904 (1980), where the Supreme Court found error in a trial court's delegation of personal property decision making to the fami......

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