Valcaniant v. Detroit Edison Co.

• Decision Date: 19 May 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 121141, Calendar No. 2.
• Parties: Steven J. VALCANIANT and Kathleen A. Valcaniant, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee and De Angelis Landscape, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

679 N.W.2d 689

470 Mich. 82

Steven J. VALCANIANT and Kathleen A. Valcaniant, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee and De Angelis Landscape, Inc., Defendant.

Docket No. 121141, Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued December 11, 2003.

Decided May 19, 2004.

Kohl, Harris, Nolan & McCarthy P.C. (by Malcolm A. Harris, Michael J. Nolan, and William M. Ogden), Metamora, MI, for the plaintiff.

John P. Jacobs, P.C. (by John P. Jacobs and Lincoln G. Herweyer), and Kirsten L DeGeer, Detroit, MI, for the Detroit Edison Company.

PER CURIAM.

We granted leave to appeal to consider whether Detroit Edison Company owed plaintiff¹ a legal duty to de-energize an overhead power line that was severed by equipment being operated under plaintiff's direction. Relying on Groncki v. Detroit Edison Co., 453 Mich. 644, 557 N.W.2d 289 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that Edison had no reason to foresee plaintiff's injury because it had no reason to foresee that plaintiff was the cause of the fault and, as a result, did not owe a legal duty to plaintiff.² We affirm.

I

In 1974, plaintiff purchased a four-acre gravel lot in Imlay City; in 1987, he opened a used car business. At all times, uninsulated power lines owned by Edison existed along the back property line. These lines were suspended more than twenty-five feet in the air. Plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the lines and the danger they posed.

On, August 15, 1995, plaintiff was injured while giving directions to the driver of a dump truck delivering fill dirt to the back portion of his property. As the truck became free of the weight of its load, it rose upward and its highest edge severed an overhead power line. The ground was wet, and the electricity that flowed through the truck continued through the ground to plaintiff, who was standing six or seven feet away, knocking him unconscious.

A sensor known as an automatic reclosure device detected the fault in the severed line almost immediately, and momentarily stopped the current flow. Because many faults are temporary, the sensor is designed to restart the current flow three times within a period of six seconds, checking each time to see whether the fault remains. If the fault has cleared, the sensor will allow the line to remain energized. If, after these three cycles, the fault remains, the sensor will completely de-energize the line. By using this sensor, Edison can avoid unnecessary interruptions of its customers' service that would be caused by faults occasioned by a power line's fleeting contact with objects like tree limbs and small animals.

Here, the sensor operated as intended; it restarted the current three times and then de-energized the line when the fault failed to clear. Plaintiff suffered second-degree burns to his back and arm from the shocks that he received while the sensor completed its cycles.

II

Plaintiff and his wife sued Edison, alleging that the company was liable in tort.³ Edison moved for summary disposition, arguing that it owed no legal duty to plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed the motion by arguing that Edison owed it a legal duty to de-energize the severed power line immediately. Plaintiff asserted that Edison should have foreseen that its use of the sensor could cause injury. The trial court agreed with plaintiff and denied Edison's motion. The Court of Appeals granted Edison's application for leave for interlocutory appeal and reversed the decision of the trial court. After considering this Court's opinion in Groncki, it concluded that Edison owed no legal duty to plaintiff and was entitled to summary disposition.

We granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal. 468 Mich. 868, 661 N.W.2d 231 (2003).

III

We review de novo appeals relating to summary disposition. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). The existence of a legal duty is a question of law.⁴ Groncki, 453 Mich. at 649, 557 N.W.2d 289; Beaudrie v. Henderson, 465 Mich. 124, 130, 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001). In determining whether a legal duty exists, courts examine a variety of factors, including "foreseeability of the harm, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of connection between the conduct and injury, moral blame attached to the conduct, policy of preventing future harm, and ... the burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting liability for breach." Buczkowski v. McKay, 441 Mich. 96, 101 n. 4, 490 N.W.2d 330 (1992) (citing Prosser & Keaton, Torts [5th ed.], § 53, p. 359 n. 24). See also Schultz v. Consumers Power Co., 443 Mich. 445, 450, 506 N.W.2d 175 (1993).

In this case, plaintiff does not argue that Edison failed to inspect the power lines, or that the lines were in disrepair.⁵ Instead, plaintiff argues that Edison had a legal duty to de-energize the power line immediately and completely after it was severed by the dump truck. This Court addressed a power company's legal duty to de-energize a power line in Groncki. That case consolidated three lawsuits brought against Edison by individuals who were injured when equipment they were using outdoors came into contact with overhead power lines.⁶ 453 Mich. at 650-653, 557 N.W.2d 289 (opinion by Brickley, C.J.). In the lead opinion, Chief Justice Brickley concluded that the injuries suffered by the three plaintiffs were not foreseeable and that Edison owed them no legal duty. He added that public policy considerations, including the "public's need for electric power at a reasonable cost," further militated against imposing a legal duty under the circumstances. Id. at 661, 557 N.W.2d 289.⁷ Similar considerations are implicated in this case. However, we need not reach the balancing required by Buczkowski. See Buczkowski, supra at 101, 490 N.W.2d 330 ("Other considerations may be, and usually are, more important [than foreseeability]."). The circumstances surrounding plaintiff's injury fail to satisfy even the lowest threshold requirement—that the harm incurred was foreseeable. See Brown v. Michigan Bell Telephone, Inc., 459 Mich. 874, 585 N.W.2d 302 (1998).

Edison had no obligation to anticipate that the dump truck operated under plaintiff's direction would sever an overhead power line that was suspended more than twenty-five feet above the ground, much less that plaintiff would be standing on wet ground several feet away. As a result, Edison had no legal duty to anticipate that plaintiff might be injured when the sensor device briefly re-energized the line, as it was designed to do, or to take other steps to prevent plaintiff's injury. Because we conclude that plaintiff's injuries were unforeseeable as a matter of law, we need not consider other variables that might militate against the imposition of a legal duty where harm is foreseeable. See Buczkowski, supra at 102, 490 N.W.2d 330.⁸

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals opinion reversing the decision of the trial court and remanding this case for entry of an order of summary disposition in favor of Edison. MCR 7.302(G)(1).

CORRIGAN, MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, WEAVER, TAYLOR, YOUNG and MARKMAN, JJ., concur.

MARILYN J. KELLY, J. (concurring in result only).

The majority concludes that defendant Detroit Edison Company has no duty to de-energize an electrical line that is accidentally severed by another's negligence. I find its analysis flawed.

As Justice Levin recognized in Groncki v. Detroit Edison Co.,⁹ this Court continues to confuse duty and proximate causation with respect to electric utility companies. The result has been that these companies are now exempt from a broad duty to exercise due care for the welfare of others. Because I cannot agree that this should be the law, I must dissent from the analysis.

CLARIFYING TORT LIABILITY

Traditionally, there are four elements to a tort: duty, breach, causation, and damages. Case v. Consumers Power Co., 463 Mich. 1, 6, 615 N.W.2d 17 (2000). All but the last are at issue in this case.

Whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff is a question of law. Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648, 655, 532 N.W.2d 842 (1995). Recognition of a duty implicates various considerations: the relationship between the parties, the nature and foreseeability of the risk to be avoided, and the burdens and benefits of recognition. See Buczkowski v. McKay, 441 Mich. 96, 101-103, 490 N.W.2d 330 (1992). Among strangers who lack a special relationship to one another, the duty owed is most basic, that of reasonable conduct under the circumstances. Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 443, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977), citing Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 283.

Whether a defendant fulfilled or whether it breached its duty in a given case is a question of fact. Murdock v. Higgins, 454 Mich. 46, 53, 559 N.W.2d 639 (1997). In a controversy among strangers who lack a special relationship, the trier of fact must decide whether the defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others.

The element of causation addresses whether a defendant's breach of its duty caused the plaintiff's injury. Causation has two components. The first is actual causation: whether the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's breach of its duty toward the plaintiff. It is a question of fact, which is also resolved by the trier of fact.

The second component is proximate or legal cause. A defendant's breach of duty is said to have proximately caused a plaintiff's injury only where the defendant reasonably could have foreseen the kind of harm that befell the plaintiff. It is unnecessary that the exact mechanism or sequence of events leading to the harm be reasonably foreseeable. Dobbs, Torts, Proximate Cause, ch. 10, § 180, p. 444 (2001). The foreseeability requirement arises from the principles that liability should be limited in a practical manner and should comport with notions of justice. Dobbs, § 181, p. 446. Proximate cause is a question of law. Moning at 440, 254 N.W.2d 759.

The effect of foreseeability on...