Valdez v. Heckler
| Decision Date | 25 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. C 83-20085 RPA.,C 83-20085 RPA. |
| Citation | 616 F. Supp. 933 |
| Parties | Maria del Carmen Adrade VALDEZ, Plaintiff, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
N. Michael Rucka, Salinas, Cal., for plaintiff.
Chris G. Stoll, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for defendant.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff seeks review of a final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services disallowing plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits under §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment reversing the Secretary's decision, or, in the alternative, for remand. Defendant, in turn, moves for summary judgment affirming the decision of the Secretary.
Having received, read, and considered all the papers submitted by counsel, the Court finds that the Secretary's decision must be affirmed.
Proof of disability requires a showing of "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An "impairment" for purposes of this definition "results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). In addition, a person will be found to be disabled only if his impairment is of such severity as to preclude not only performance of his previous work, but also, considering his age, education, and work experience, performance of "any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Under the law of this circuit, the burden is upon the claimant to prove disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1980); Hall v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir.1979). After a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability by showing inability to perform his or her previous employment, however, the burden shifts to the Secretary to prove that the claimant can engage in other types of substantial gainful work that exist in the national economy. Giampaoli, at 1192; Johnson v. Harris, 625 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir.1980); Hall, at 1375. In meeting this burden, the Secretary must take into consideration the requirements of specified jobs as well as the claimant's age, education, and background. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Johnson, at 312; Hall, at 1377.
The Secretary's findings of fact are conclusive on this court if supported by substantial evidence. Johnson, at 312; Hall, at 1374. Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,'" Walker v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir.1976), quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971), and "the reviewing court must `look at the record as a whole and not merely at the evidence lending support to a finding.'" Cox v. Califano, 587 F.2d 988, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1978), quoting Walker, at 818. This restriction on judicial review applies to the Secretary's findings of fact as well as reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir.1965).
With these standards in mind, the Court has reviewed this case and concludes that the Secretary must be affirmed.
Plaintiff, Maria del Carmen Andrade Valdez, is 50 years old. She completed a third or fourth grade education in Mexico (T.R. 138, 57), is illiterate in Spanish, her native language, and is unable to communicate in English (T.R. 133). Plaintiff was employed as an agricultural field worker from 1971 until 1980 (T.R. 85).
On July 28, 1979, plaintiff slipped and fell while at work, twisting and thereby injuring her right knee. On July 30, 1979 plaintiff began treatment with Dr. Pemberton, a chiropractor. After conservative treatment, plaintiff continued to experience pain and was referred in August of 1979 to Dr. Robert Badke, an orthopedist (T.R. 105). On September 27, 1979 plaintiff was hospitalized by Dr. Badke at the Alisal Community Hospital for an arthroscopic examination of her right knee. The arthroscopy revealed severe chondromalacia of the femoral condyles and patella (T.R. 105).
Plaintiff continued to have symptoms and on March 27, 1980, Dr. Badke performed an arthroscopic mechanical resection of the chondromalacia on the undersurface of her right patella. At this time Dr. Badke restricted plaintiff's activities and felt that she could not return to her previous occupation as a field laborer. Dr. Badke attributed her inability to return to her former job to the "progressive nature of the chondromalacia and her gross overweight" (T.R. 109). Dr. Badke felt that plaintiff's knee condition was aggravated by her field labor job.
In June of 1980 Dr. Badke stated that he regarded plaintiff as falling under Category D of the State Worker's Compensation work capacity guidelines (T.R. 109). Category D refers to a disability precluding repeated bending, stooping and heavy lifting. The individual thus classified is given a 25% standard disability rating and is considered to possess 50% of their pre-injury capacity for bending, stooping and heavy lifting. This classification would approximate a light work residual functional capacity rating as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4. Dr. Badke initially rated plaintiff's complaints of pain as "minimal," (T.R. 109), and then later as "moderate to moderately severe" (T.R. 108).
On November 3, 1980, plaintiff was seen by Dr. David Chittendon, an orthopedist, for examination of her right knee, which continued to cause her discomfort. Dr. Chittendon was retained to evaluate plaintiff in connection with Worker's Compensation proceedings. Examination revealed limited forward flexion of the spine, arthritis, and slight bilateral genu valgum (knock-knee). Dr. Chittendon remarked that plaintiff was not much improved from her prior surgeries. He also noted that plaintiff would probably benefit considerably from a weight reduction program, more so than from further surgery, although future total knee joint reconstruction could not be discounted (T.R. 128). X-rays revealed "fairly significant" degenerative changes in her right knee due to osteoarthritis. Dr. Chittendon also noted that plaintiff was "relatively limited to, at best, sedentary or light work as defined by the California Division of Industrial Accidents" (T.R. 129). Dr. Chittendon rated plaintiff's subjective complaints as "slight at rest, increasing to moderate with activity" (T.R. 129).
Plaintiff first applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance Benefits in November of 1981 (T.R. 53, 65). Plaintiff claimed disability due to hypertension and right leg problems. Plaintiff further claimed her disability began on 3/30/80, after her second arthroscopic procedure. Both her SSI and disability applications were denied in February 1982, after a determination that she had a residual functional capacity for light work and therefore was capable of substantial gainful activity (T.R. 57).
On January 25, 1982, Dr. Badke noted in a letter to the Department of Social Services that plaintiff's condition was "being aggravated by her overweight and also by her valgus deformities of both knees" (T.R. 105). Dr. Badke further noted his feeling that 70% of plaintiff's problems pre-existed her July 1979 injury, and he attributed at least 50% of her continuing problems to her overweight condition (T.R. 105). Dr. Badke reported that plaintiff continued to be afflicted with chondromalacia and osteoarthritis, both of which were exacerbated by her obesity. Dr. Badke also stated that plaintiff "continued to fail to heed the advice for weight-loss," (T.R. 106) which he felt would expedite her recovery.
In February, 1982, plaintiff was admitted to the Natividad Medical Center for a cholecystectomy, which was performed by her regular physician, Dr. Fabriciano Vela. She recovered from this surgery without complications.
Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration in March of 1982, which was denied in April, 1982.
In May 1982 plaintiff was evaluated by Shoreline Occupational Services, a division of Goodwill Industries, to determine her vocational rehabilitation potential. It was noted that plaintiff was unable to sit or stand for more than 10-20 minutes at a time due to pain and numbness in her lower extremities. Plaintiff also used a cane for walking. The conclusion of the evaluation was that plaintiff experienced and complained of pain to such an extent as to "make competitive employment unfeasible at this time" (T.R. 141).
From June 30, 1982 until July 16, 1982, plaintiff sporadically attended a work adjustment program set up by Paradigm Consultants (T.R. 142). Plaintiff was not able to fully participate in this vocational rehabilitation program due to frequent illnesses and complaints of pain and discomfort. In a July 16, 1982 report to plaintiff's counsel, Paradigm Consultants noted that plaintiff was motivated to return to work, but was not physically able to do so at that time.
In June of 1982 plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), claiming total disability beginning March 30, 1980. Plaintiff's claim was again denied on December 29, 1982. The ALJ determined that there was substantial evidence to find that plaintiff was not disabled, based on the medical records and testimony of a qualified vocational expert witness. The expert concurred with the statements...
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Jones v. Bowen
...there is no positive clinical evidence to support such a claim. Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir.1979); Valdez v. Heckler, 616 F.Supp. 933, 940 (D.C.Cal. 1985). An inability to work without pain, however, is not enough to show disability. Valdez, 616 F.Supp. at 940. If the ALJ do......