Valdez v. State, 49541.
| Decision Date | 26 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 49541.,49541. |
| Parties | James Menor VALDEZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
JoNell Thomas, Las Vegas; Cristalli & Saggese, Ltd., and Michael V. Cristalli, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and William D. Kephart, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
A jury convicted appellant James Valdez of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Contrary to constitutional and statutory procedures requiring a separate penalty trial, when the jury returned the guilty verdict, it also announced that it had decided the sentence. Valdez subsequently agreed to waive his right to a penalty hearing. He stipulated to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder and an equal and consecutive term for the use of a deadly weapon. In this stipulation, he reserved his right to appeal the judgment of conviction. The district court then sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, plus an equal and consecutive term for the use of a deadly weapon, and 96 to 240 months for attempted murder, plus an equal and consecutive term for the use of a deadly weapon, to run consecutively with the first-degree murder sentence. In this appeal from the judgment of conviction, we address four issues raised by Valdez.1
First, we consider whether the district court must explicitly instruct the jury, immediately prior to deliberations in a first-degree murder case, that it is to determine only the question of guilt and not deliberate on the sentence until the separate penalty phase of the proceedings. Here, the district court only instructed the jury regarding bifurcation orally, immediately after jury selection. We conclude that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury in writing, after the close of argument, that it was not to deliberate as to Valdez's possible penalty until after the sentencing hearing.
Second, we consider whether the jury acted improperly by deliberating the penalty while deciding the issue of guilt and, if so, whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial based on this jury misconduct. We hold that the jury disobeyed the district court's oral instruction and therefore committed misconduct. We further conclude that this misconduct deprived Valdez of his constitutional rights, and the district court, therefore, abused its discretion in denying a mistrial based on this misconduct.
Third, we consider whether numerous alleged acts of prosecutorial misconduct require reversal. In doing so, we clarify the proper harmless-error analyses for prosecutorial misconduct of a constitutional and nonconstitutional dimension. We conclude that the prosecutors engaged in several instances of misconduct throughout the trial but that the individual instances of prosecutorial misconduct do not require reversal.
Finally, we consider whether cumulative error warrants reversal in this case. Although the evidence of guilt was substantial, it was not overwhelming. Considering the jury instruction error, the juror misconduct, and the prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that these errors denied Valdez a fair trial. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
Valdez shared an apartment with his girlfriend, Teresa Tilden, and her 12-year-old son, S.E. Early on November 8, 2004, Tilden and Valdez became involved in a heated argument. Both of them had been drinking. Tilden awoke S.E. to help calm Valdez, who said that he was leaving the apartment. The couple argued, and S.E. tried to calm Valdez down. Tilden told S.E. to get a knife, but S.E. testified that he refused to do so.
At some point, Valdez left the apartment and walked down to the parking lot. He then went back up the steps to the apartment, knocked on the door, and when no one opened the door, he went back down to the parking lot. He then walked up the steps to the apartment a second time. Witnesses testified that Valdez was calm — singing or humming — as he walked up the steps to the apartment. However, S.E. testified that when Valdez reentered the apartment, he was angry and began to carry some of his belongings to the door. Tilden interfered by putting his things back where they had been. Valdez grabbed a knife from the kitchen and told Tilden to leave him alone while he gathered his belongings or else he would kill her. Tilden replied that she was not afraid of him, she continued to interfere, and then she pushed him multiple times. After Tilden turned her back to walk away, Valdez grabbed her from behind.
Valdez told a friend that when he grabbed Tilden from behind, S.E. threatened him with a knife, told him to let Tilden go, and then stabbed Valdez in the hand. While Valdez suffered a cut to his hand, a police detective testified at trial that Valdez could have accidentally cut himself because, with the amount of blood involved in a killing with multiple stabbings, conditions become slippery and the perpetrator sometimes misses, stabbing himself. S.E. testified that he never had a knife, and there was no evidence that Tilden had a knife during the altercation.
When Valdez grabbed Tilden from behind, he sliced her chin, consistent with an attempt to slash her throat. He then stabbed S.E. in the chest with an 8.5-inch blade, which broke and remained lodged in S.E.'s body. Valdez dragged S.E. into the kitchen, retrieved another knife, and continued to stab him. According to the transport nurse's testimony, in addition to the wound to his chest, S.E. suffered three puncture wounds on his right shoulder, a wound to his right neck area, and a wound to his ear.
While Valdez was stabbing S.E. in the kitchen, Tilden was screaming from the living room. In response, Valdez left S.E. lying on the kitchen floor to move toward Tilden. Later, when the police found Tilden, she was lying face-down, covered in blood, and already dead. According to the coroner's testimony, she suffered multiple blunt force injuries and a total of nine stab wounds.
When Valdez attacked Tilden, S.E., with the broken knife still lodged in his body, grabbed his shoes and fled the apartment. On his way to the main office, S.E. collapsed to the ground. Valdez, holding a knife, ran down the apartment stairs after him. Witnesses gave conflicting testimony regarding whether Valdez stabbed and punched S.E. while he was on the ground. Witnesses, however, agreed that Valdez ran after a security guard who attempted to aid S.E. Valdez did not reach the security guard but turned in a different direction.
After leaving the apartment complex, Valdez called a friend and told him that he had "screwed up" and "cut" Tilden and S.E. Valdez also said that he attempted to kill himself with the knife, but it was too dull. Later, the police found a knife and blood trail by a dumpster near the location where Valdez had called his friend.
At the crime scene, the police discovered Valdez's cellular phone number and called him. While Valdez was talking to one police officer, another officer approached him and arrested him outside the hospital.
The grand jury indicted Valdez on the following three counts: (1) first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon for the death of Tilden, (2) attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon for the stabbing of S.E., and (3) assault with a deadly weapon for running after the security guard. The State noticed its intent to seek the death penalty. After a four-day trial, the jury began deliberations.
Verdict and sentencing
The district court gave no written jury instruction regarding the separation of the guilt and penalty phases immediately before the jury entered deliberations and the jury had no instructions describing the various sentences that could be imposed if the jury found Valdez guilty.
During jury selection, however, the district court and the prosecutor orally explained the general procedure for the bifurcated proceedings. Nevertheless, during deliberations the jury submitted a note to the judge inquiring whether the second phase would proceed that night if the jury convicted Valdez of first-degree murder. The judge responded in writing,
The jury then delivered its verdict: guilty as to one count of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, guilty as to one count of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and not guilty as to one count of assault with the use of a deadly weapon. When the district court informed the jury that it would return a different day for the penalty phase, the jury foreperson interrupted, explaining that a portion of the jury's deliberations had been devoted to the penalty, and it had already decided Valdez's sentence. The district court concluded that two separate phases were necessary and the defense needed the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. Therefore, the district court required the jury to return for the penalty phase.2
At the penalty hearing, the parties informed the district court that they had reached an agreement as to the sentence. Valdez accepted two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole, one for the murder of Tilden and one for the use of a deadly weapon. Valdez also reserved the right to appeal any issue in the case, including the procedure regarding the jury's sentence deliberations. The State reserved the right to seek all possible sentences, including the death penalty, if this court reversed the verdict. Valdez then waived his right to a penalty hearing by the jury.
Subsequently, the defense moved for a mistrial based on the assertion that the jury violated its oath by considering the penalty during...
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