Valdivia v. Davis

Decision Date14 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV. S-94-671 LKK/GGH.,CIV. S-94-671 LKK/GGH.
Citation206 F.Supp.2d 1068
PartiesJerry VALDIVIA, Alfred Yancy, and Hossie Welch, on their own behalf and on behalf of the class of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Gray DAVIS, Governor of the State of California, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

Karen Kennard, McCutcheon, Doyle, Brown & Enerson, San Francisco, CA, for plaintiffs.

William Cashdollar, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, CA, for defendants.

ORDER

KARLTON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs sue the Governor of the State of California, and various state correctional officials for allegedly maintaining parole revocation procedures which violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Plaintiffs now move for partial summary judgment on their claim that the State's unitary parole revocation hearing system is unconstitutional.2 I resolve the matter on the pleadings and evidence filed herein and after oral argument.

I. FACTS3

Under California's system, a parole officer can impose a hold if the officer concludes that there is reasonable cause to believe the parolee has violated a condition of his parole and is a danger to himself, a danger to the person or property of another or may abscond. A parole hold authorizes the detention of a parolee charged with an alleged parole violation pending a parole revocation hearing. The parole officer is not required to obtain an arrest warrant prior to placing the hold and taking the parolee into custody. Within seven days after detention pursuant to the parole hold, the parolee must be notified of the reasons for the hold.

As noted, California's process does not provide for a preliminary revocation hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a parolee committed a parole violation. Rather, California has adopted a wholly internal review system from which the parolee is entirely excluded. Following the placement hold, the parole officer has a case conference with the unit supervisor to review the decision to place the hold, and to determine a possible disposition. Thereafter, the parole officer prepares and files a parole violation report which is, after review by the unit supervisor, submitted to the Board of Prison Terms. The report contains information on the alleged parole violation and supporting evidence, a summary of the parolee's adjustment while on parole, and a recommendation as to what action should be taken.

Based on the parole violation report, a Board of Prison Terms' deputy commissioner determines the terms of a "screening offer" to be presented to the parolee. A "screening offer" tenders to the parolee a specific term of incarceration in exchange for the disposition of the case and a waiver of the parolee's right to have a revocation hearing.4 When the deputy commissioner reviews the parole violation report to determine the appropriate screening offer, the parolee is neither present, nor has he had any opportunity to communicate with the deputy commissioner. Put directly, at no time prior to the determination of the screening offer has the parolee been given an opportunity to speak to the charges, challenge the contents of the violation report, present his own evidence, or to question witnesses.

If the parolee accepts the screening offer, a revocation hearing is not held and thus the parolee has no chance to challenge either the parole hold or the charges. If the parolee does not accept the screening offer, a formal revocation hearing is scheduled where the parolee may then challenge the charge leading to the hold, rather than the parole hold. Pending the revocation hearing, parolees who are under a parole hold remain in custody.

In sum, at no time prior to the unitary revocation hearing, do parolees have an opportunity to present their position to an independent decision-maker or to challenge, in any manner, whether the parole officer had probable cause for the parole hold and resulting detention.

California's regulations suggest that the unitary revocation hearing for parole revocation be scheduled within forty-five days from the date the parole hold is placed. This forty-five day period is only advisory, See Cal.Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2640(f),5 and can be extended if defendants determine a delay does not prejudice the parolee. Id.6 The average hold to revocation hearing time statewide is 35.2 days.7

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Owens v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir.1992).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the `pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'" Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, "so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1600, 63 L.Ed.2d 786 (1980).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.1973). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575; see also T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the "purpose of summary judgment is to `pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments); see also International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman Local Union No. 20 v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c); see also SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir.1982). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) (per curiam)); see also Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 208 (9th Cir.1979). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F.Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D.Cal.1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1987).

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106...

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24 cases
  • Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • March 26, 2009
    ...on the issue of whether defendants' parole revocation procedures violated the class members' due process rights. See Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d 1068 (E.D.Cal.2002). At the time of the order defendants had operated a parole revocation process that was constitutionally problematic for s......
  • People v. Deleon
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • July 24, 2017
    ...2013) 956 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1126 [summarizing procedural history].) That system was found unconstitutional ( Valdivia v. Davis (E.D.Cal. 2002) 206 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1075–1078 ), and the parties ultimately filed a stipulated order for injunctive relief, which the court entered in 2004. (See Vald......
  • Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • November 30, 2004
    ...plaintiff class by unduly delaying preliminary hearings on the reliability of the probable cause determination. See Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d 1068 (E.D.Cal.2002). The fifth amended complaint, the operative pleading in Valdivia, was filed on September 13, 2002 (see Defendants' Request......
  • L.H. v. Schwarzenegger
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • September 19, 2007
    ...Because the issues presented in the present case present a legal analysis similar to that which the court undertook in Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d 1068 (E.D.Cal.2002), the court recreates the relevant portions of that opinion In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Valdivia v. Davis.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 25, February 2003
    • February 1, 2003
    ...District Court PAROLE DUE PROCESS Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2002). Parolees filed a class action challenging a state's parole revocation procedures, and alleging violation of their due process rights. The district court held that the state's unitary parole revocation h......
  • Valdivia v. Davis.
    • United States
    • Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 25, February 2003
    • February 1, 2003
    ...District Court PAROLE -- REVOCATION PAROLE -- DUE PROCESS Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2002). Parolees filed a class action challenging a state's parole revocation procedures, and alleging violation of their due process rights. The district court held that the state's uni......
2 provisions
  • Chapter 38, SB 77 – 2005-06 Budget.
    • United States
    • California Session Laws
    • January 1, 2005
    ...appropriated for purposes of compliance with the Remedial Plan, adopted in response to the decision in Valdivia v. Davis (E.D.Ca. 2002) 206 F.Supp.2d 1068, and for no other purpose. Any authorization shall be based upon data that shall be provided by the Department of Corrections and Rehabi......
  • Chapter 208, SB 1113 – 2004-05 Budget.
    • United States
    • California Session Laws
    • January 1, 2004
    ...appropriated for purposes of compliance with the Remedial Plan, adopted in response to the decision in Valdivia v. Davis (E.D.Ca. 2002) 206 F.Supp.2d 1068, and for no other purpose. Any authorization shall be based upon data that shall be provided by the Department of Corrections, through t......

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