Valencia v. Heckler

• Decision Date: 15 January 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-6223,83-6223
• Citation: 751 F.2d 1082
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15,763 Fidelia VALENCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, * Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1082

751 F.2d 1082

8 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 192, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15,763

Fidelia VALENCIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Margaret HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services,^* Defendant-Appellee.

No. 83-6223.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 8, 1984.

Decided Jan. 15, 1985.

Martin Taller, Rucker & Taller, Anaheim, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph Stein, Dennis J. Mulshine, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WRIGHT, FERGUSON, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

Fidelia Valencia applied for supplemental security benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1381-1383 (1982), and for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 401-433 (1982). She alleged that she had become disabled as a result of a back injury sustained in February, 1977. She is currently 63 years old and was 56 at the time of the onset of her alleged disability. She was born and raised in Mexico where she received an education through the third grade. She speaks Spanish, and is only marginally capable of reading, writing, and speaking English.

After a hearing, an administrative law judge found Valencia not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and denied both benefit applications. The Appeals Council denied Valencia's request for review of the administrative law judge's decision. The Appeals Council decision constituted the final decision of the Secretary. Valencia then brought suit in federal district court, claiming the Appeals Council erred in denying her request for review. Upon the recommendation of a magistrate, the district court granted summary judgment against Valencia. This appeal timely followed. ¹

I. DETERMINING "DISABILITY" UNDER THE ACT

Claimants are "disabled" within the meaning of the Social Security Act if a medically determinable physical or mental impairment prevents them from engaging in "substantial gainful activity." See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(1)(A) (1982). The statute further elaborates upon this definition, requiring a showing that the claimant's

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists in the national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(A) (1982).

In 1978, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated regulations implementing this statutory definition. See 43 Fed.Reg. 55,349 (1978) (codified as amended at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P (1984)). Unless the impairment is identified by the regulations as conclusively "disabling," the Secretary must determine whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either his former work or other less demanding employment.

With the exception of the relatively small number of cases in which an individual's impairment is classified as per se "disabling," the Secretary must first ascertain whether the applicant can engage in his former work. If he can, he is not entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(e) (1984). In determining whether an applicant can perform his former work, the Secretary compares his physical and mental capabilities ("residual functional capacity") with the physical and mental demands of his past jobs. ² Id.

If the claimant is found unable to engage in his former work, the Secretary must then determine whether, considering the factors which Congress has identified as relevant--the applicant's physical ability, age, education, and work experience, he is able to perform less demanding work. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(f) (1984). As part of the 1978 regulations, the Secretary developed a matrix of medical-vocational guidelines in an effort to improve both the uniformity and efficiency of this determination. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1984). The guidelines consist of a series of tables which in most cases direct a conclusion of disability or nondisability depending upon the relationship of the four variables which Congress has identified. See Stone v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir.1983) (citing Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 462, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1955, 76 L.Ed.2d 66 (1983)).

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

The administrative law judge concluded that Valencia was not disabled, finding that her alleged impairments did not prevent her from meeting the mental and physical demands of her previous occupations. The administrative law judge classified her past relevant work as "medium" grade in exertional effort. He found that Valencia retained the ability to engage in "medium" work and thus concluded that she was not disabled under the Act.

Before the Appeals Council Valencia contended that the administrative law judge erred in concluding that she retained the capacity to perform "medium" work. However, the Appeals Council did not address that question when it denied her request for review. Instead, it noted that she had past relevant work which could be classified as "light" and found that because Valencia retained the ability to engage in "light" work she was not "disabled."

Thus, both the administrative law judge and the Appeals Council found Valencia able to perform her past relevant work. As a result, neither proceeded to step two, the application of the medical-vocational factors incorporated in the grids, in order to determine whether Valencia could engage in other forms of less demanding employment.

We conclude that the Appeals Council erred in finding that Valencia had past relevant work which was "light." Rather, the administrative law judge correctly classified Valencia's past relevant work as "medium" grade. We further find, however, that the administrative law judge's conclusion that Valencia retained the ability to engage in "medium" work is not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore conclude that both the administrative law judge and the Appeals Council erred in finding Valencia capable of engaging in her past work. As a result, the resolution of Valencia's disability claim necessitates an application of the grids in order to determine whether she can perform other less demanding work.

III. VALENCIA'S "PAST RELEVANT WORK"

During the ten years she was in the United States prior to her injury, Valencia worked for eight years as a kitchen helper at various nursing homes and for two years as an agricultural laborer. As a kitchen helper, Valencia performed numerous functions, including cooking and preparing food, washing dishes, and carrying food trays to patients. These various tasks frequently involved the lifting and carrying of heavy industrial-size kitchenware. In her two years as an agricultural laborer, Valencia also performed various tasks, including hoeing and harvesting tomatoes, harvesting cherries, and sorting tomatoes at a machine.

The administrative law judge classified both Valencia's job as a kitchen helper and her job as an agricultural laborer as "medium" grade in exertional effort. The Appeals Council "noted," however, that some of Valencia's "past relevant work" could be classified as "light." Since it concluded that Valencia could still perform "light" work, it denied her request for review. The Appeals Council failed, however, to specify what past relevant work it classified as "light."

The government contends that the unexpressed finding of the Appeals Council was that tomato sorting, one of the many tasks Valencia performed during her employment as a farm worker, constituted the past relevant work. It further asserts that tomato sorting should be classified as "light" work. ³ Therefore, the government concludes, the Appeals Council properly found that Valencia's past relevant work included light work. We think the government correctly explains the rationale for the Appeals Council's conclusion. However, we find that conclusion to be based on an error of law.

Valencia's sorting of tomatoes may not properly be regarded as "past relevant work." ⁴ Valencia sorted tomatoes as one of many tasks she performed at the various farms where she was employed as an agricultural laborer. Indeed, the evidence reflects that even during the one six-week period when the majority of her time was spent sorting tomatoes, Valencia also performed the other tasks customarily performed by agricultural workers, including hoeing and harvesting the fields.

Every occupation consists of a myriad of tasks, each involving different degrees of physical exertion. To classify an applicant's "past relevant work" according to the least demanding function of the claimant's past occupations is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Social Security Act.

As previously noted, both the Social Security Act and the Secretary's regulations provide that disability determinations are to be made according to a two-step process. First, it must be determined whether the applicant can perform his "previous work." If not, the Secretary must then determine whether the claimant can engage in other, less demanding, work which exists in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(2)(A) (1982). It is at the second step of the process that the Secretary is authorized to consider the four factors, including "work experience," incorporated in the grids. Id.; see also, 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1520(f) (1984). Thus, the...