Valente v. Boggiano

• Decision Date: 18 May 1931
• Docket Number: No. 91.,91.
• Citation: 154 A. 817
• Parties: VALENTE v. BOGGIANO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

154 A. 817

VALENTE

v. BOGGIANO.

No. 91.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 18, 1931.

Syllabus by the Court.

The cause of action on a promissory note falling due after the death of the holder accrues, for the purposes of the statute of limitations, when such note falls due, and such accrual is not postponed until the qualification of an executor or administrator.

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Suit by John Valente, administrator, etc., of Joseph Valente, deceased, against Lina Boggiano, individually and as administratrix, etc., of John Boggiano, deceased. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Bernard Mindes, of Newark, for appellant.

Lionel P. Kristeller, of Newark, for respondent.

PARKER, J.

The question in this case arises under the statute of limitations as applicable to a promissory note which did not fall due until after the payee died, in view of the fact that no administration of the payee's estate was taken out for some ten years after his death. The trial court granted a nonsuit on the ground that the statute of limitations began to run at the date of maturity of the note. The exact dates are as follows:

The note, to order of Joseph Valente bears date April 1, 1913, payable at one year.

Valente died intestate March 5, 1914, leaving a widow, the plaintiff, and children.

The note fell due April 1, 1914.

On the back are indorsed two so-called "renewals," each for one year, dated June 24, 1914, and July 22, 1915, which need no special consideration.

Administration of Valente's estate was granted to his widow in the state of New York January 16, 1924, and shortly thereafter an exemplified copy of the letters was filed in the office of the register of the prerogative court, as provided by the act of 1896, p. 173, 2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 2265, pl. 21.

This action was begun June 14, 1927, or some thirteen years after the due date of the note, and nearly eleven years after the expiration of the second so-called renewal, if that had any efficacy, which is doubtful, to say the least.

The first section of our statute of limitations (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3162) provides, in part, that "all actions of debt, founded upon any lending or contract without specialty * * * and all actions of account and upon the case" (with exceptions not relevant here) "shall be commenced and sued within six years next after the cause of such actions shall have accrued, and not after."

The view taken by the majority of courts in other jurisdictions, touching the precise point before us, is that a cause of action cannot be said to accrue until there is some definite person legally qualified to enforce it; and hence that, if there is no such person when, for example, a note matures, the "cause of action" waits, and with it the commencement of the six-year period, until the needed person is ascertained. The leading case to this effect is Murray v. East India Co., 5 B. & Aid. 204, decided in 1821, and followed by most of our state courts. 37 C. J. 1034; 17 R. C. L. 751. The case in this state of Stevenson v. Markley, 72 N. J. Eq. 686, 66 A. 185, affirmed in 73 N. J. Eq. 731, 70 A. 1102, is cited and relied on in support of the proposition just stated.

We feel constrained to dissent from the view adhered to by the outside authorities in general, and consider that Stevenson v. Markley is not controlling of the case in hand. Some of our American courts have followed Murray v. East India Co. with obvious and expressed reluctance. Riner v. Riner, 166 Pa. 617, 31 A. 347, 45 Am. St. Rep. 693, and Hoiles v. Riddle, 74 Ohio St. 173, 78 N. E. 219, 113 Am. St. Rep. 946, which latter case, however, was one of a deceased debtor. In California, the doctrine of Murray v. East India Company has been frankly repudiated, and the "cause of action" held to "accrue" when suit could have been brought by the deceased, if living. Sullivan v. Gillon, 26 Cal. App. 421, 147 P. 215; Cortelyou v. Imperial Land Co., 166 Cal. 14, 134 P. 981; Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634, 95 Am. Dec. 152. We are not bound by the ruling in Murray v. East India Company, for, although our statute is modeled on 21 Jac. I, c. 16, passed in 1663, and our courts as a rule adopt the construction of a statute taken over from another jurisdiction that had been previously put upon such statute by the courts of such jurisdiction, decisions by such courts made after adoption of the statute in this state are not within the rule. Neilson v Russell, 76 N. J. Law, 655, 71 A. 286, 19 L. R A. (N. S.) 887,131 Am. St. Rep. 673; Hopper v. Edwards, 88 N. J. Law, 471, 476, 96 A. 667. The English statutes of limitation were declared in force in the province of New Jersey in 1727-28 (Allinson's Laws, p. 72) and were re-enacted by the state Legislature as early as 1799. Paterson, p. 352. The Murray Case, as we have seen, was decided in 1821, and hence is without any controlling force.

The case of Stevenson v. Markley, 72 N. J. Eq. 686, 66 A. 185, Id., 73 N. J. Eq. 731, 70 A. 1102, was a bill for an accounting by the administrator of a deceased former ward against the executor of her guardian. The ward came of age in January, 1883, and died on Christmas Day, 1885. The guardian died February 26, 1905. No administrator of the ward was appointed until March 1, 1906, and the bill was filed shortly thereafter. Vice Chancellor Garrison decided the case orally, and in respect of matters relevant to the present discussion held (1) that the Orphans' Court was without jurisdiction; (2) that, though the statute mentions actions of account, yet, as the relation of guardian and ward is a continuing trust, so long as the ward's status is...