Valenti v. Hopkins
Decision Date | 26 October 1994 |
Docket Number | CV-0323-TM |
Citation | 883 P.2d 882,131 Or.App. 100 |
Parties | John G. VALENTI and Margaret M. Valenti, Appellants-Cross-Respondents, v. Benjamin T. HOPKINS and Susan Hopkins, Respondents-Cross-Appellants. 90; CA A74166. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
James E. Mountain, Jr., Salem, argued the cause for appellants-cross-respondents. With him on the reply brief were Milo R. Mecham and Harrang Long Watkinson Laird & Rubenstein, P.C. On the opening brief was James W. Walton.
Barry L. Adamson, Portland, argued the cause for respondents-cross-appellants. With him on the briefs was Michael W. Peterkin, Bend.
Before ROSSMAN, P.J., and LANDAU and LEESON, JJ.
This is an action to enforce restrictive covenants in a residential subdivision. Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's denial of their request for injunctive relief requiring defendants to move or modify their house so as not to obstruct plaintiffs' view of the mountains. Defendants cross-assign error to the trial court's failure to dismiss plaintiffs' action. They also cross-appeal, contending that the award of attorney fees is inadequate.
In 1988, plaintiffs purchased their two-story home in the West Ridge Subdivision in Deschutes County. Located on a ridge, the subdivision lots have views of the Cascade mountains to the west and the Paulina and Ochoco mountains to the east. Plaintiffs' lot is on the east side of West Ridge Avenue. At the time they purchased their house, there were restrictive covenants applicable to the subdivision. One of those covenants prohibited the construction of improvements that materially restricted the view of "other lot owners." Plaintiffs had an unimpeded view in all directions.
In 1989, the subdivision lot owners adopted "amended covenants" that controlled, among other things, the design of newly constructed homes. Article I of the amended covenants provides for the creation of an "Architectural Control Committee" (the committee):
Article II of the amended covenants lists restrictions on use of property, and includes provisions regarding maintenance of lots, types of residences, temporary structures, appearance, commercial or offensive activities, animals, motorized vehicles, parking, firearms, sale of subdivision sections, and compliance with laws and regulations regarding fire protection, construction, water sanitation and public health.
Article III of the amended covenants states architectural rules. Section 4 deals with the subject of view and building height:
* * * "(Emphasis supplied.)
Article IV contains "general provisions," among them Section 2, which provides, in part:
In early 1990, defendants purchased the lot immediately to the west of and across the street from plaintiffs' home. In March, 1990, they submitted to the committee their house design proposal, which called for the construction of a two-story log home. Plaintiffs were aware of the design and objected to it on the ground that it would block their view of the Three Sisters and Broken Top mountains. A member of the committee visited with plaintiffs to discuss defendants' proposal. Plaintiffs understood that their view from the first floor would be blocked by any house built on defendants' lot; they expected the committee to protect the view from their second floor.
The committee rejected defendants' design proposal, but for reasons not relating to view. In April, 1990, defendants submitted a second proposal. Again, the design called for the construction of a two-story log home. The committee approved the proposal without imposing a height restriction. Defendants later decided that they would rather build a "stick-frame" house of the same basic design. The committee approved defendants' revised plans in August, 1990.
In its consideration of defendants' house design, the committee discussed and examined various approaches that might have diminished the house's impact on plaintiffs' westerly view. The committee expressly considered the options of placing a restriction on the height of defendants' house, of requiring them to locate the house on a different part of the lot, of requiring them to excavate the lot, or of creating staggered set backs. Each option was rejected based on perceived countervailing considerations. The committee expressly declined to withhold its consent to the design on the ground that the proposed design materially obstructed plaintiffs' view. It reasoned that plaintiffs' view was intended to be to the east, and that plaintiffs had no protected western view. The committee advised plaintiffs that their western view could be enjoyed while it was there, but that it was not subject to protection. Because it concluded that plaintiffs had no protected western view from the front of their home, the committee did not consider it significant that defendants' house materially obstructed their western view.
After the committee's decision, defendants began construction of their home. Within a week, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, seeking injunctive relief and specific performance of the covenants. Defendants completed the construction of their home during the pendency of this lawsuit. The trial court found for defendants, concluding that the committee had not acted unreasonably in approving defendants' plans.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that defendants breached the restrictive covenants that prohibit the erection of structures that materially obstruct the view from an adjacent lot. Defendants argue that the trial court reached the correct conclusion. In their cross-assignment, defendants argue that the trial court should not even have allowed the case to go to trial. According to defendants, plaintiffs' claim is legally defective because it is not directed against the committee itself as a challenge to the reasonableness of its decision.
The property owners, not the committee members, are the parties to the covenants, and they are the "persons" against whom the covenants may be enforced "by proceedings at law or in equity." The amended covenants provide, in fact, that the committee shall not be liable to any lot owner for any loss suffered on account of a good faith act or failure to act of the committee. That further indicates the intention of the parties...
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Valenti v. Hopkins
...restrict the view of other lot owners" and that the ACC "shall be the sole judge of the suitability of such heights." 131 Or.App. 100, 883 P.2d 882 (1994). The issue is whether the decision of a contractually created private architectural control committee is reviewable de novo by the court......
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Taylor v. McCollom
...ACC had not acted "arbitrarily or unreasonably," its decision was binding. The plaintiffs appealed, and we reversed. Valenti v. Hopkins, 131 Or.App. 100, 883 P.2d 882 (1994). We concluded that, under Hanson v. Salishan Properties, Inc., 267 Or. 199, 515 P.2d 1325 (1973), the ACC's construct......
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Valenti v. Hopkins
...885 903 P.2d 885 322 Or. 167 Valenti v. Hopkins NOS. A74166, S42001 Supreme Court of Oregon Oct 03, 1995 131 Or.App. 100, 883 P.2d 882 ...