Valentine v. American Home Shield Corp., C 95-3030-MWB.
| Decision Date | 30 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. C 95-3030-MWB.,C 95-3030-MWB. |
| Citation | 939 F. Supp. 1376 |
| Parties | Arthur P. VALENTINE, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN HOME SHIELD CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
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David H. Goldman and Michael J. Carroll of Goldman & Carroll, P.C., in Des Moines, IA, for plaintiff.
Rebecca Boyd Parrott of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., in Des Moines, IA, for defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ..................................................... 1379
II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .................................................. 1380
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND .............................................................. 1382
A. Undisputed Facts ............................................................. 1382
B. Disputed Facts ............................................................... 1385
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS .................................................................. 1388
A. The Federal Disability Discrimination Claim .................................. 1388
1. The origins of the ADA ................................................... 1388
2. Disability discrimination under the ADA .................................. 1391
a. Substantial limitations on major life activities ...................... 1391
b. Qualified individual with a disability ................................ 1393
3. Plaintiff's prima facie case and the burden-shifting framework for ADA
claims ................................................................. 1396
4. Valentine's ADA claim .................................................... 1398
a. Valentine's prima facie case and the process to determine "reasonable
accommodation" ..................................................... 1398
i. The "interactive process" to determine reasonable accommodation
................................................................ 1398
ii. Breakdown of the process ......................................... 1399
b. Second and third stage issues ........................................ 1401
B. The State Disability Discrimination Claim .................................... 1402
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 1402
The defendant's motion for summary judgment in this employment discrimination lawsuit pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and comparable provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act presents a nettlesome question that is apparently one of first impression. Where a plaintiff employee has failed to meet job qualifications under an agreed accommodation to his disability, is a genuine issue of material fact as to disability discrimination generated by evidence that the defendant employer offered a further accommodation ?€” one different from any the plaintiff suggested ?€” but then withdrew the offer after the plaintiff had accepted it? The plaintiff, who suffers from asthma, alleges that his employer failed to make reasonable accommodations to his disability and fired him because of his disability. The defendant employer has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it did all that was required by law and more to provide reasonable accommodations to the plaintiff, but that, after a trial period, those accommodations failed to make the plaintiff a qualified employee, because they did not resolve the plaintiff's absenteeism problem. Hence, the employer contends that it legitimately terminated the plaintiff for excessive and unpredictable absenteeism and poor performance, even though it allegedly offered, then withdrew, part-time employment as a possible further accommodation of the plaintiff's absenteeism problem. The plaintiff asserts that genuine issues of material fact should preclude summary judgment in this case. The plaintiff asserts that his average weekly hours over the nine months preceding his termination generate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he "normally" met the employer's attendance requirements. He also asserts that withdrawal of the offer of part-time employment and refusal to consider other accommodations raise inferences of disability discrimination.
Plaintiff Arthur P. Valentine filed this lawsuit on April 10, 1995, against his former employer, American Home Shield Corporation (AHS). Valentine had been employed at AHS from March 12, 1990, until his employment terminated in mid-January of 1994. AHS is a "home warranty" corporation that sells and services "home service contracts," or insurance policies, for major home appliances. For the bulk of his time as an employee of AHS, Valentine was engaged in telemarketing sales of AHS's service contracts.
Valentine, who suffers from asthma,1 alleges in his complaint that he was terminated because of his disability, or because he was "perceived" to have a disability, which had caused him to miss work or leave work early on a number of occasions. Specifically, Count I of Valentine's complaint alleges that AHS violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. ? 12101 et seq., because AHS failed to make a reasonable accommodation to his disability and his disability or perceived disability was a motivating factor in his discharge. Count II alleges violation of comparable provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code Ch. 216, on essentially the same grounds as stated in Count I. Valentine seeks actual and punitive damages on his ADA claim and actual damages on his ICRA claim. Valentine does not seek reinstatement on either claim. Trial is set to begin in this matter on October 7, 1996.
On May 30, 1996, just prior to the deadline for dispositive motions, AHS moved for summary judgment on both of Valentine's claims. In this motion, AHS asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that, as a matter of law, Valentine is not a "qualified individual" under the ADA, because he is unable to perform an essential function of his job, attendance, even with reasonable accommodations. AHS contends further that there is no evidence of discriminatory animus on its part. It also contends that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for removing Valentine from his full-time status and instead offering him part-time employment, because of Valentine's failure to attain the attendance required to maintain full-time status under either the accommodation AHS allowed for his disability, or under Valentine's somewhat different requested "reasonable accommodation," during the eight-week period the parties had agreed to try the accommodation. Finally, AHS argues that even if it in fact terminated Valentine, rather than Valentine quitting, which is AHS's version of events, it is entitled to summary judgment, because it was entitled to terminate Valentine for poor attendance, which made him unqualified for his position either with or without accommodation, and, specifically, for poor performance during the eightweek trial of the accommodation arrangement. AHS asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Valentine's ICRA claim, because Valentine was not "qualified" for a full-time position as a telemarketer at AHS owing to his inability to attain the required level of attendance.
Valentine's resistance to AHS's motion for summary judgment was filed on August 5, 1996. Valentine asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of AHS. Valentine asserts that the court cannot find, as a matter of law, that attendance was an essential element of his job at AHS that could not be met by reasonable accommodation. Valentine argues that AHS "was required to determine whether there was any reasonable accommodation it could make to permit Valentine to perform the essential functions of his job without creating undue hardship on AHS." Valentine now identifies a number of assertedly reasonable accommodations AHS did not offer. Valentine also asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether AHS had a discriminatory animus. He also asserts that AHS is not entitled to summary judgment on his claim under the ICRA, because of genuine issues of material fact concerning whether his disability could be accommodated.
AHS filed a reply brief on August 19, 1996.2 In its reply, AHS contends that Valentine cannot raise purportedly reasonable accommodations years after his termination that he never presented to AHS at the time. AHS further disputes the reasonableness of such accommodations, and disputes that Valentine has succeeded in raising any other genuine issues of material fact.
The court heard oral arguments telephonically on AHS's motion for summary judgment on August 26, 1996. At the oral arguments, plaintiff Arthur P. Valentine was represented by counsel David H. Goldman and Michael J. Carroll of Goldman & Carroll, P.C., in Des Moines, Iowa. Defendant AHS was represented by counsel Rebecca Boyd Parrott of Dickinson, Mackaman, Tyler & Hagen, P.C., in Des Moines, Iowa.
The court turns first to the standards applicable to motions for summary judgment, then to a discussion of the undisputed and disputed facts as shown by the record and the parties' submissions, and finally to the legal analysis of whether AHS is entitled to summary judgment on either of Valentine's claims.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.199...
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