Valentine v. On Target, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 8,8
• Citation: Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999)
• Parties: Vincent N. VALENTINE, et al. v. ON TARGET, INC.
• Court: Maryland Supreme Court

727 A.2d 947

353 Md. 544

Vincent N. VALENTINE, et al. v. ON TARGET, INC.

No. 8, Sept. Term, 1997.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 19, 1999.

Clarke F. Ahlers, Columbia, (Sharon E. Haynie of Houston, TX, on brief), for petitioners.

Kevin J. McCarthy (Heather J. Kelly, McCarthy, Bacon & Costello, L.L.P., on brief), Lanham, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, MARVIN H. SMITH, (Retired, specially assigned) and ROBERT L. KARWACKI, (Retired, specially assigned) JJ.

KARWACKI, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned.

We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to answer the question of what, if any, tort duty a gun store owner owes to third parties to exercise reasonable care in the display and sale of handguns to prevent the theft and the illegal use of the handguns by others against third parties. Confining our analysis to the well pleaded facts in the complaint filed by petitioner in the instant case, the issue is properly limited to the determination of whether respondent owed a duty to the petitioner's decedent. We hold that such a tort duty is not cognizable under those facts and consequently that the trial court properly granted respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint.

I.

On July 17, 1993, Edward Wendell McLeod and a confederate stole several handguns from On Target, Inc., the respondent, a gun retailer located in Anne Arundel County. On September 26, 1993, Joanne Valentine was murdered outside of her home in Anne Arundel County by an unknown assailant who shot her with one of the guns stolen from On Target, Inc., on the previous July 17th. Vincent Valentine, the petitioner, as personal representative of the Estate of Joanne Valentine, and as surviving spouse and next friend of Vincent N. Valentine II and Nicholas Paul Valentine, surviving minor children of the deceased, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against the respondent to recover damages for her wrongful death.

The complaint sought damages from the respondent based on a claim of negligence. In his complaint petitioner asserted that respondent owed a duty to "Joanne Valentine and to all other persons situate in or near Anne Arundel County, to exercise reasonable care in the display of handguns held out to the public for sale to prevent theft and illegal use of the handguns." (Significantly, the complaint does not describe how the handguns were displayed or what could have been done by respondent's agents to prevent the theft). The petitioner further averred that respondent breached this duty by failing to (1) properly train and supervise its employees to prevent theft of the handguns, (2) properly supervise customers at a time when the store was open to members of the general public for the sale of handguns, (3) adequately keep watch over the handguns and install adequate security devices to deter, or detect, the theft of handguns, (4) properly secure the handguns and store them in a display case to safeguard them from theft, (5) interrupt the theft of the handguns, (6) notice the theft of the handguns and notify law enforcement authorities in a timely fashion, and (7) failed to warn the community of the theft of the handguns in a timely fashion. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2) based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. After conducting a hearing, the trial court, without stating any reasons, granted the motion to dismiss. The petitioner noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and that court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. Valentine v. On Target, 112 Md.App. 679, 686 A.2d 636 (1996). Then Chief Judge Wilner writing for the intermediate appellate court, reasoned that the trial court was correct for alternative reasons (1) that the respondent did not owe a duty to the petitioner's decedent under the well pleaded facts of the complaint or (2) even if the failure to prevent the theft of the guns was a breach of some duty, it was not the proximate cause of death of the petitioner's decedent.

II.

When considering an appeal that arises as the result of the trial court's granting a motion to dismiss, as opposed to the granting of summary judgment or judgment entered after trial, the Court will assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and any reasonable inferences that can be properly drawn therefrom; however, we do not consider "merely conclusory charges." Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443-44, 620 A.2d 327, 331 (1993), citing Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 264-265, 518 A.2d 726, 728-29 (1987). The granting of a motion to dismiss is proper when, even if the facts and allegations as set forth in the complaint were proven to be true, the complaint would nevertheless fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 443, 620 A.2d 327. As the Court of Special Appeals noted, because the trial court did not state its reasons for granting respondent's motion to dismiss, it will be affirmed if the record reveals any legally sound reason for the decision. Valentine v. On Target, 112 Md.App. 679, 682, 686 A.2d 636, 637 (1996).

III.

To maintain an action in negligence, the plaintiff must assert in the complaint the following elements: "(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty." BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 43, 656 A.2d 307, 311 (1995), citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994). See also Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985). Facts must be pleaded with some specificity to demonstrate that the elements which are required to sustain the cause of action exist. It is not sufficient to merely assert conclusory allegations suggesting that the elements are in fact present in the controversy. Id.

The existence of all of the elements including a legally recognized duty owed by this defendant to this plaintiff or to a class of persons of which this plaintiff is a member is vital to sustaining a cause of action in negligence. Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994). Generally, whether there is adequate proof of the required elements needed to succeed in a negligence action is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder; but, the existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be decided by the court. Nevertheless, as so aptly stated by W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 358 (5th ed.1984):

"There is little analysis of the problem of duty in the courts. Frequently it is dealt with in terms of what is called `proximate cause,' usually with resulting confusion. In such cases, the question of what is `proximate' and that of duty are fundamentally the same: whether the interests of the plaintiff are to be protected against the particular invasion by the defendant's conduct.....

There are, however, a good many defendants, and a good many situations, as to which there is no such duty. In other words, the defendant is under no legal obligation toward the particular plaintiff to act with the care of a reasonable man, and he is not liable even though his conduct falls short of that standard, and the other is injured as a result."

We focus our attention then on the question of whether the respondent owed a duty to the petitioner's decedent under the facts of the instant case. First, it is important to consider the policy reasons supporting a cause of action in negligence. The purpose is to discourage or encourage specific types of behavior by one party to the benefit of another party. The purpose is defined in the first element needed in order to sustain a cause of action in negligence, proof that the defendant had a duty to act to the benefit of the plaintiff. If the creation of a duty has no benefit to the plaintiff then the purpose is defeated. In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986) we quoted Prosser and Keeton's treatise on torts: "A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra, at 356. In addition, "[d]uty, it must be recalled, does not exist in a vacuum; the duty required in law must be to the person injured. It is a focused duty." Valentine v. On Target, 112 Md.App. 679, 684, 686 A.2d 636, 638 (1996). As further defined by Prosser and Keeton "In other words, `duty' is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the same—to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk," supra at 356.

Accordingly, the duty question that arises under the facts of the instant case primarily requires consideration of two of the concepts which create duty, relationship or nexus of the parties and foreseeability. As we further held in Rosenblatt, supra, "[i]n determining the existence of a duty owed to a plaintiff, we have applied a `foreseeability of harm' test, which is based upon the recognition that a duty must be limited to avoid liability for unreasonably remote consequences. Inherent also in the concept of duty is the concept of a relationship between the parties out of which the duty arises." 335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994). Petitioner does not allege any facts to support his claim that respondent knew or should have known of the existence of circumstances that increased the probability that a thief would steal guns from its retail store and that a third unknown party would obtain one of those stolen guns and use it in a criminal manner. Nevertheless, petitioner argues that it is generally foreseeable...