Valentine v. State, s. SC10–1463

• Citation: 98 So.3d 44
• Decision Date: 14 September 2012
• Docket Number: SC11–427.,Nos. SC10–1463,s. SC10–1463
• Parties: Terance VALENTINE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Terance Valentine, Petitioner, v. Kenneth S. Tucker, etc., Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

98 So.3d 44

Terance VALENTINE, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Terance Valentine, Petitioner,

v.Kenneth S. Tucker, etc., Respondent.

Nos. SC10–1463, SC11–427.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 17, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 14, 2012.

Bill Jennings, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ali Andrew Shakoor, Richard Edward Kiley, and James Viggiano, Jr., Assistant CCR Counsel, Middle Region, Tampa, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Carol Marie Dittmar, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Terance Valentine appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.¹ For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of his motion and deny his habeas petition.

I. BACKGROUND

Terance Valentine met and married Livia Romero prior to emigrating with her to the United States from their native Costa Rica. Valentine v. State, 616 So.2d 971, 972 (1993) (Valentine I). In New Orleans, the couple adopted a child, but eventually divorced in 1986.²Id. Romero later “married” Ferdinand Porche and moved with him to Tampa to start a family.³Id. After learning of the couple's “marriage” and relocation, Valentine began placing telephone threats to the couple's home. Id. In September of 1988, Valentine brutally attacked Romero and Porche in their home, drove the couple to a remote location, and shot them both in the head. Id. The trial court's sentencing order describes Valentine's attack as follows:

On September 9, 1988, Ferdinand Porche returned to his home in mid-afternoon expecting to meet his pregnant wife and small child. Instead he was greeted by a bullet in the back which [severed his spinal cord and] rendered him paralyzed from the waist down. Mr. Porche was then confronted by Mr. Valentine who announced “this is my revenge.” Mr. Porche was forced to crawl into a bedroom where he found his wife nude, bound, and gagged and his baby crying and covered in blood. Mr. Valentine then pistol whipped Mr. Porche. Mr. Porche's face was lacerated, his jaw was broken, and several teeth were knocked out. According to the medical examiner there were at least three separate blows to Mr. Porche's face. After administering this beating Mr. Valentine made his purpose clear, announcing, “I'm gonna kill you, but you're gonna suffer. This is not going to be easy.” Further tortuous acts included stabbing Mr. Porche in the buttocks—the knife stopping only because it struck bone, kicking Mr. Porche in the chest, and dragging him after he was bound hand and foot with [baling] wire. The medical examiner testified that all of the above injuries occurred while Mr. Porche was alive, that none was immediately life threatening, and none would immediately result in a loss of consciousness. Mrs. Porche testified that Mr. Porche told her he was in so much pain that he did not know why he did not lose consciousness. Mrs. Porche testified she could feel him touch her as if to reassure her while they were in the back of the Blazer being transported [to an isolated area].

While the fatal gunshot resulted in near instantaneous loss of consciousness and death, the ordeal leading up to his death was quite lengthy. Mr. Porche was beaten and degraded in his home. Trussed like an animal he was kidnapped and taken on a nine-mile trip to his slaughter. Either due to the gunshot wound to his spine or through the stress of the ordeal Mr. Porche lost control of this bowels and was covered with his own excrement.

Paralyzed and bound hand and foot with wire there was nothing Mr. Porche could do to save himself. Nor was there anything he could do to protect his wife, who he knew was the ultimate object of Mr. Valentine's barbarous intent. Nor could he know what would happen to his ten-month-old daughter or what would become of Mrs. Porche's adopted child. The horror, terror and helplessness that Ferdinand Porche experienced prior to being shot in the eye at point blank range are evident.

Valentine v. State, 688 So.2d 313, 314–16 (Fla.1996) (Valentine II).

Somehow, Romero survived the attack and identified Valentine as her attacker. Valentine I, 616 So.2d at 972. After being released from the hospital, Romero received another series of threatening phone calls from Valentine, which she recorded with a telephone and recorder supplied by the police. Id. Valentine was later apprehended and was charged with armed burglary, two counts of kidnapping, grand theft, first-degree murder for the death of Porche, and attempted first-degree murder for the shooting of Romero. Id.

“Valentine was convicted on all counts, the jury recommended death on the first-degree murder charge by a ten-to-two vote, and the judge imposed a sentence of death, finding three aggravating circumstances and three mitigating circumstance[s]. This Court reversed the conviction and vacated the sentence due to a jury selection error under State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984). On retrial, Valentine was again convicted on all counts but this time he waived the jury advisory sentence and presented mitigating evidence directly to the judge.” Valentine II, 688 So.2d at 315.

During the penalty phase, Valentine presented the testimony of three lay witnesses, one of whom was his older sister, and a joint stipulation that Dr. Gamache, a forensic psychologist, found Valentine to be able to adjust well to prison life and make a positive contribution if he were to receive a life sentence. The sentencing court found four aggravators ⁴ and four mitigators ⁵ and sentenced Valentine to death. After Valentine was again convicted on all charges and resentenced to death, this Court, on direct appeal,⁶ reversed Valentine's conviction for attempted first-degree murder ⁷ but affirmed his death sentence because the commission in the course of a violent felony aggravator was still supported by Valentine's armed burglary and kidnapping convictions. Id. at 317–18.

Valentine's postconviction motion, as amended, raised fourteen claims and numerous subclaims.⁸ A Huff⁹ hearing was held, and Valentine was granted an evidentiary hearing on multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied all of Valentine's claims. Valentine now appeals the denial of his postconviction motion and petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.

II. POSTCONVICTION MOTION

Valentine raises the following arguments: (A) counsel was ineffective for failing to object or otherwise prevent Livia Romero from being referred to or portrayed as divorced from Valentine and married to Ferdinand Porche; (B) counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and uncover mental health mitigation; and (C) the postconviction court erred in summarily denying three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As explained below, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief.

A. Failure to Object to the Portrayal of Livia Romero as Divorced from Valentine and Married to Porche

Valentine claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object or otherwise prevent Livia Romero from being referred to and or portrayed as being divorced from Valentine and married to Ferdinand Porche throughout his trial. We disagree.

During the guilt phase, Romero testified that she divorced Valentine and married Ferdinand Porche in Louisiana. However, during Romero's cross-examination, defense counsel demonstrated that no record existed of either the divorce or the subsequent marriage to Porche. At Valentine's postconviction evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor who tried Valentine's case explained that there “was a big issue of whether or not [Valentine and Romero] had a valid divorce” and that she never fully resolved the issue because “Louisiana records and laws were very difficult to get to the bottom of.” The prosecutor also explained that Romero held herself out as Livia Porche and believed herself married to Porche and that Romero was addressed accordingly at trial. Valentine's guilt phase counsel also testified at the hearing and explained that he had determined that Valentine and Romero had never actually become divorced. He then explained that he had proven this fact to the jury by impeaching Romero through the introduction of Louisiana records which showed that no divorce or marriage involving Romero had occurred.

Based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has explained that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must satisfy a two-pronged test to succeed:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Bolin v. State, 41 So.3d 151, 155 (Fla.2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986)).

Under Strickland's deficiency prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was not ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Further, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We have also explained that, regarding deficiency, “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of...