Valentine v. Wash. Nationals Baseball Club, LLC
| Decision Date | 20 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-1299 (TJK) |
| Parties | THOMAS VALENTINE, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON NATIONALS BASEBALL CLUB, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
In May 2021, the Washington Nationals ejected Thomas Valentine from Nationals Park for not wearing a face mask in compliance with the Nationals' COVID-19 policies. Valentine claims he has a disability that prevented him from wearing one, and so he sued Defendants for violating the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”). Defendants move to dismiss all counts for failure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed, the Court will grant the motion as to the former claims but deny it as to the latter.
According to the operative complaint, Defendants Washington Nationals Baseball Club, LLC and Washington Nationals Stadium, LLC operate Nationals Park. ECF No. 9 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 8-9. On May 5, 2021, Valentine visited the park to attend a game. Id. ¶ 11. At that time, to comply with District of Columbia Mayor's Order 2020-080 related to COVID-19, Defendants enforced a mask mandate on all attendees. Id. ¶ 13. One exemption in the Mayor's Order, however provides: “Wearing a mask is not required when . . . [a] person is unable to wear a mask due to a medical condition or disability.” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Mayor's Order 2020-080).
Valentine did not wear a mask at the game because, he alleges, he “is a person with a disability within the meaning of the ADA and DCHRA” and is “unable to wear a mask due to his disability.” Compl. ¶ 14. But Nationals Park personnel allegedly “demanded” he wear one several times. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. During each confrontation, he responded that he had a medical condition and, because of it, could not wear a mask. Id. Valentine declined to disclose the nature of his medical condition when asked. Id. ¶ 18. The Nationals' Vice President of Safety and Security eventually told Valentine that, unless he wore a face mask or face shield, he would be ejected. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. Valentine alleges the Vice President “did not offer any reasonable accommodation.” Id. ¶ 20. Ultimately, Defendants ejected Valentine. Id. ¶ 23.
Valentine alleges that afterward, he felt “embarrassment and humiliation” for being “treated like a criminal and kicked out of a baseball game because of his disability.” Compl. ¶ 24. He tried to resolve his grievances without resorting to a lawsuit. Id. ¶ 25. Defendants responded by inviting Valentine to come back to Nationals Park for “a game of [his] choosing” at “any time” during the 2021 regular season and assured him that his experience on May was “a one-time occurrence.” Id. Valentine also alleges that “there is currently no mask mandate in place at Nationals Park.” Id. ¶¶ 30, 35, 41.
Evidently, the Nationals' proposed resolution proved unsatisfactory and so Valentine, representing himself, sued Defendants for three counts under the ADA and one under the DCHRA. Under the ADA, he alleges violations for (1) denial of access under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i); (2) unequal treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii); and (3) failure to modify policies under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Compl. ¶¶ 26-41. And he alleges Defendants violated the DCHRA for denying him, a person with a purported disability, with “full and equal enjoyment” of Nationals Park's goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 42-48. Valentine seeks a declaration that Defendants violated the ADA and DCHRA. Id. ¶ 49(a). He also seeks an injunction requiring Defendants modify their policies, practices, and procedures, including those about face masks, to comply with the ADA and DCHRA. Id. ¶ 49(b). And he seeks compensatory and punitive damages along with his costs and attorneys' fees. Id. ¶ 49(c)-(d).
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 19. They raise three main arguments. First, they argue Valentine's ADA claims must be dismissed both because the ADA does not permit money damages and because his claims for injunctive relief are moot. ECF No. 19-2 at 6-8. Second, they say that all his claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 3-4. Third, they contend that Valentine has failed to allege facts sufficient to show he suffers a “disability” as defined by the ADA and DCHRA. Id. at 5-6.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, so it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).[1] And courts “have an affirmative obligation ‘to consider whether the constitutional and statutory authority exist for us to hear each dispute.'” James Madison Ltd. by Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Thus, to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.” United States ex rel. Bid Solve, Inc. v. CWS Mktg. Grp., Inc., No. 19-cv-1861 (TNM), 2021 WL 4819899, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021). In considering its subjectmatter jurisdiction, a court is not limited to the allegations in the complaint and may consider materials outside the pleadings, but the court must “accept all of the factual allegations in [the] complaint as true.” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327 (1991)).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To survive such a motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim to relief on its face. Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 892 F.3d 332, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2018). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint in the plaintiff's favor and grant the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012). But mere conclusory statements of misconduct, even from a pro se plaintiff, are not enough to make out a cause of action against a defendant. Kretchmar v. FBI, 32 F.Supp.3d 49, 54 (D.D.C. 2014).
Additionally, when, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the complaint is “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). In practice, that means “courts assess a pro se complaint ‘in light of all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.'” Gallo v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-03298 (TNM), 2022 WL 2208934, at *3 (D.D.C. June 21, 2022) (quotation omitted); Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ().
Valentine raises claims under two statutory provisions-the ADA and DCHRA. And Defendants move to dismiss them all. The Court finds that Valentine's ADA claims must be dismissed for lack of standing but that he has adequately stated a DCHRA claim.
Defendants argue that Valentine's ADA claims must fail for two reasons. First, Valentine cannot seek money damages under the ADA. ECF No. 19-1 at 6-7. Second, his remaining ADA claims for declaratory and injunctive relief must fail as moot. Id. at 7-8; ECF No. 27 at 6-10. The Court agrees that Valentine's ADA claims cannot survive, but it reaches that conclusion on standing, not mootness, grounds.
Defendants are correct that Valentine cannot seek money damages under ADA. The remedies available under the ADA are “exclusive” and “do not include money damages.” Am. Bus Ass'n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a) and 12188(a)(1)). But Valentine's complaint appears to cabin his money-damages request to his DCHRA claim, Compl. ¶ 48, and his ADA claims seek only a court order that Defendants “make modifications to their policies, practices, and procedures” under the ADA, id. ¶¶ 30, 35, 41. Thus, the Court construes Valentine's ADA claims to seek only declaratory and injunctive relief-but, to the extent they seek money damages, the Court dismisses them for failure to state a claim.
As for the declaratory and injunctive relief Valentine seeks under the ADA, Defendants argue those claims are moot because the challenged mask mandate has been discontinued, and so Valentine cannot show a likelihood of future harm. ECF No. 19-2 at 7. Although Defendants argue that “plaintiff lacks standing,” their argument focuses on mootness. See id. at 7-9. And responding in kind, Valentine invokes the “voluntary cessation” exception to mootness. ECF No. 21 at 7-8. In the end, as described below, the Court finds that Valentine's ADA claims for declaratory and injunctive relief fail for lack of standing, rather than mootness.[2]
“Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution of ‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.'” Maguire v. FBI 236 F.Supp.3d 147, 149 (D.D.C. 2017). Thus, “[a] party invoking federal court jurisdiction must show they meet the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum' of Article III standing.” Nat'l Cap. Presbytery v. Mayorkas, 567 F.Supp.3d 230, 240 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ...
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