Valenzuela v. Board of Civil Service Comrs.

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: FORD
• Citation: Valenzuela v. Board of Civil Service Comrs., 115 Cal.Rptr. 103, 40 Cal.App.3d 557 (Cal. App. 1974)
• Decision Date: 09 July 1974
• Parties: Henry VALENZUELA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. Civ. 40338.

Page 103

115 Cal.Rptr. 103

40 Cal.App.3d 557

Henry VALENZUELA, Petitioner and Appellant, v. BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent.

Civ. 40338.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

July 9, 1974.

Aaronson, Gruber & Meissner, and Patrick O. Meissner, for petitioner and appellant.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., John A. Daly, Executive Asst. Atty., Jack L. Wells, Asst. City Atty., and William Lorenzetti, Deputy City Atty., for respondent.

FORD, Presiding Justice.

In this proceeding petitioner and appellant Valenzuela sought a peremptory writ of mandate pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel respondent Board of Civil Service Commissioners (hereinafter designated as 'the board') to vacate its decision that petitioner was not coerced to resign, and did not resign under duress, his position as an employee of the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, and to compel the board to reinstate him as an employee. Judgment denying a peremptory writ of mandate was entered and petitioner has appealed therefrom.

The findings of fact in the superior court were in part as follows: 1. Prior to September 15, 1970, petitioner Valenzuela was regularly employed as a maintenance laborer with the Department of Water and Power; that position was in the classified civil service of the City of Los Angeles. 2. On September 14, 1970, petitioner executed a written resignation from his position. 3. On September 17, 1970, petitioner filed a statement of denial of resignation with the board, alleging that he had been compelled to resign under duress by the Department of Water and Power. 4. Pursuant to authority granted to it under section 114 of the city charter, ¹ the board conducted 'three hearings into petitioner's appeal from his alleged forced resignation--January 22, 1971; March 19, 1971, and May 7, 1971.' 5. The hearings were 'public quasi-judicial hearings at which witnesses were called to testify by petitioner and aforesaid Department of Water and Power, evidence was received, exhibits were introduced into evidence and arguments made by the petitioner and the Department.' 6. 'At its meeting of July 30, 1971, the board voted three to two to find that petitioner herein was not coerced to and did not resign under duress.'

One of the conclusions of law of the superior court was: 'That the decision of respondent board of July 30, 1971, in finding that petitioner was not coerced into and did not resign under duress from his position as Maintenance Laborer with the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles is supported by substantial evidence in the light of the record.'

Traditionally, in a case such as this involving the decision of a local administrative agency, the function of the trial court has been to review the evidence adduced before the agency to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency's findings in light of the whole record. (See Keithley v. Civil Service Bd., 11 Cal.App.3d 443, 448, 89 Cal.Rptr. 809.) However, while this case was pending on appeal the Supreme Court decided the case of Strumskey v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., 11 Cal.3d 28, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29. Therein the Court held that when an adjudicatory order or decision of an administrative agency of legislative or local origin 'substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the trial court, in determining under section 1094.5 whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the findings are not supported by the evidence, must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find an abuse of discretion if the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.' (11 Cal.3d at p. 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. at p. 807, 520 P.2d at p. 31.)

The Board of Civil Service Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles is a local administrative agency and thus the question presented on this appeal is whether the board's decision that petitioner was not coerced to resign and did not resign under duress his position as a maintenance laborer with the Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles is a decision substantially affecting a fundamental vested right of petitioner. If such a right was substantially affected by the board's decision, it must be held that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence rule in reviewing the evidence presented to the board.

In Moreno v. Cairns, 20 Cal.2d 531, at pages 534--535, 127 P.2d 914 at page 916, the Supreme Court stated: 'Such resignations (resignations made under duress) are akin to lay offs, suspensions, or discharges by virtue of the element of coercion and bear only a formal resemblance to voluntary resignations. Whenever a person is severed from his employment by coercion the severance is affected not by his own will but by the will of a superior. A person who is forced to resign is thus in the position of one who is discharged, not of one who exercises his own will to surrender his employment voluntarily.' Thus the board's decision in this matter substantially affected petitioner's position as a permanent employee in the classified civil service of the City of Los Angeles. The question remains whether such employment constitutes a fundamental vested right within the meaning of Strumskey v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., Supra, 11 Cal.3d 28, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.

In Strumskey the Court reiterated the definition of the term 'fundamental vested right' laid down in Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.3d 130, at page 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 at page 244, 481 P.2d 242, at page 252, wherein the Court stated (footnote omitted herein): 'The courts must decide on a case-by-case basis whether an administrative decision or class of decisions substantially affects fundamental vested rights and thus requires independent judgment review. (Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles, Supra, 71 Cal.2d 907, 915, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33; Beverly Hills Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Superior Court (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 306, 316, 66 Cal.Rptr. 183 (66 Cal.Rptr. 183).) As we shall explain, the courts in this case-by-case analysis consider the nature of the right of the individual: whether it is a fundamental and basic one, which will suffer substantial interference by the action of the administrative agency, and, if it is such a fundamental right, whether it is possessed by, and vested in, the individual or merely sought by him. In the latter case, since the administrative agency must engage in the delicate task of determining whether the individual qualifies for the sought right, the courts have deferred to the administrative expertise of the agency. If however, the right has been acquired by the individual, and if the right is fundamental, the courts have held the loss of it is sufficiently vital to the individual to compel a full and independent review. The abrogation of the right is too important to the individual to relegate it to exclusive administrative extinction. ( ) In determining whether the right is fundamental the courts do not alone weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect of it in human terms and the importance of it to the individual in the life situation. This approach finds its application in such an instance as the opportunity to continue the practice of one's trade or profession--a right which induced this court's statement in 1939: 'it necessarily follows that the court to which the application for mandate is made to secure the restoration of a professional license must exercise an independent judgment on the facts. . . .' (Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, Supra, 13 Cal.2d 75, 85, 87 P.2d 848, 854.) As Professor Jaffe, a leading authority in the field of administrative law, has written: 'The California rule can be justified in so far as it gives additional procedural protection to an interest of great importance as where a professional license has been revoked. The protection may be the more needed to overcome likely prejudices of a professional licensing body against mavericks and unconventional practioners.' Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Supra, pp. 191--192 (fn. omitted).'

In Strumskey the Supreme Court had before it for review a decision of the Board of Retirement of the San Diego County Employees Retirement Association denying the widow of a former employee a service-connected death allowance as established by section 31787 of the Government Code. In deciding that the widow's right to receive a service-connected death allowance was a fundamental vested right, the Supreme Court stated (11 Cal.3d at p. 45, 112 Cal.Rptr. at p. 816, 520 P.2d at p. 40): 'It has long been established that retirement benefit rights of the nature here involved are vested. (Citations.) We also believe that the right here in question is not only vested but 'fundamental' within the meaning of Bixby v. Pierno, Supra. 'In determining whether the right is fundamental the courts do not alone weigh the economic aspect of it, but the effect of it in human terms and the importance of it to the individual in the life situation.' (4 Cal.3d at p. 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 at p. 244, 481 P.2d 242, at p. 252.) It is the latter consideration which renders the instant right fundamental. Above and beyond the 'economic aspect' present in all pension cases, we have here a situation in which the benefits sought might well mean to the officer's widow the difference between self-support and the necessity that she supplement pension income through employment or other means. (Footnote omitted.) Thus, the impact in human terms of the decision is manifest.'

We turn then to the application of the distinction between vested and nonvested rights in the context of the case presently before this court. Respondent takes the position that public employment is not a fundamental vested right, citing those cases which reiterate the rule that...