Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 83-6052

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
• Citation: 739 F.2d 434
• Docket Number: No. 83-6052,83-6052
• Parties: 35 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 782, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,555 Daryl Ford VALENZUELA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KRAFT, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Decision Date: 31 July 1984

Page 434

739 F.2d 434 35 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 782,
34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,555 Daryl Ford VALENZUELA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KRAFT, INC., Defendant-Appellee. No. 83-6052. United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit. Submitted Feb. 9, 1984.
Decided July 31, 1984.

Cecil E. Ricks, Jr., Anaheim, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.

John W. Prager, Newport Beach, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

Page 435

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before CHOY, NELSON and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we must resolve whether federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e--2000e-17 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. IV 1980). No federal circuit courts have decided the issue. The state courts and federal district courts that have considered the question have reached conflicting decisions. ¹ We hold that the federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions.

DISCUSSION

Daryl Valenzuela filed a Title VII sex-discrimination action against Kraft, Inc., in a California state court. Kraft removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1441 (1982). After removal, the federal district court dismissed Valenzuela's action for lack of jurisdiction. The district court ruled that the California court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a Title VII claim; therefore, the doctrine of Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 351, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922), prevented the federal district court from exercising removal jurisdiction.

Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981), provides the framework in which analysis of the jurisdictional question must proceed:

In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, [a court should] begin[ ] with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction.... [T]he presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.

Accord Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508, 82 S.Ct. 519, 523, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962).

The provision in Title VII which grants federal courts jurisdiction does not expressly state that federal jurisdiction shall be exclusive. Section 706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976), provides only that "[e]ach United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." Standing by itself, that provision grants federal courts jurisdiction but does not exclude the possibility of concurrent state-court jurisdiction.

Other provisions of Title VII, however, do contain the requisite "unmistakable implication" of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Section 706(j), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(j) (1976), provides that "[a]ny civil action brought under this section ... shall be subject to appeal as provided in sections 1291 and 1292, Title 28." (Emphasis added.) Sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 govern the jurisdiction of United States Courts of Appeal. Congress could not have intended that actions brought in state court be appealed to the federal circuit courts. Thus section 706(i)...