Valeo Switches v. Emcom

• Decision Date: 26 September 2006
• Docket Number: Docket No. 264618.
• Citation: 272 Mich. App. 309,725 N.W.2d 364
• Parties: VALEO SWITCHES AND DETECTION SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. EMCOM, INC., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, Citizens Insurance Company, Hanover Insurance Company, and Allmerica Financial, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

725 N.W.2d 364

272 Mich. App. 309

VALEO SWITCHES AND DETECTION SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff, v. EMCOM, INC., Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company, Citizens Insurance Company, Hanover Insurance Company, and Allmerica Financial, Third-Party Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 264618.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 15, 2006, at Detroit.

Decided September 26, 2006, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication December 27, 2006.

Vandeveer Garzia, P.C. (by Hal O. Carroll and Thomas M. Peters), Troy, for EMCom. Inc.

Garan Lucow Miller, P.C. (by Robert D. Goldstein and William J. Brickley), Grand Blanc, for Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company and others.

Before: OWENS, P.J., and KELLY and FORT HOOD, JJ.

KELLY, J.

Defendant EMCom, Inc., appeals by leave granted the trial court's order granting the third-party defendants' motion for summary disposition of EMCom's third-party declaratory action pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6). We affirm.

I. Facts

On February 8, 2005, plaintiff Valeo Switches and Detection Systems, Inc., filed a claim against EMCom in the circuit court alleging that EMCom supplied Valeo with defective printed circuit boards. EMCom sought coverage for the lawsuit from Hanover Insurance Company, which denied coverage. On March 22, 2005, Hanover initiated a declaratory action against EMCom in a New York state court, seeking a declaration of coverage and a determination whether Hanover owed a duty to defend or indemnify EMCom against Valeo's claims. On April 6, 2005, EMCom answered Valeo's complaint and filed a third-party declaratory action against Hanover and the other third-party defendants, seeking a declaration that they were required to defend or indemnify EMCom against Valeo's claims. Hanover and the other third-party defendants filed a motion for summary disposition of EMCom's third-party complaint pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6) on the basis that the declaratory action initiated in the New York state court was between the same parties and involved the same claim. The trial court granted the third-party defendants' motion and entered an order dismissing EMCom's declaratory action.

II. Analysis

EMCom contends that the trial court erred in granting the third-party defendants' motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6). We disagree. A trial court's decision to grant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) is reviewed de novo. Fast Air, Inc. v. Knight, 235 Mich.App. 541, 543, 599 N.W.2d 489 (1999). This issue involves interpretation of MCR 2.116(C)(6), which presents a question of law that we also review de novo. Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 465 Mich. 407, 412, 633 N.W.2d 371 (2001).

Court rules are subject to the same rules of construction as statutes. In re KH, 469 Mich. 621, 628, 677 N.W.2d 800 (2004). "Accordingly, we begin with the plain language of the court rule. When that language is unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, without further judicial construction or interpretation. Similarly, common words must be understood to have their everyday, plain meaning." Id.

MCR 2.116(C)(6) states that that a motion for summary disposition may be based on the grounds that "[a]nother action has been initiated between the same parties involving the same claim."¹ There is no question, and the parties do not dispute, that the language of MCR 2.116(C)(6) is clear and unambiguous. Thus, applying well-established rules of construction, we must enforce the meaning expressed, without further judicial construction or interpretation. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed EMCom's declaratory action because, when it was filed, another action had been initiated between the same parties involving the same claim. Nonetheless, EMCom asserts that 2.116(C)(6), which derives from the common-law plea of abatement by prior action, only bars a suit from being filed in a court in this state if another action, involving the same parties and claim, has been initiated in another court of this state or a federal court located in this state.

In support of this assertion, EMCom relies on Sovran Bank, NA v. Parsons, 159 Mich.App. 408, 407 N.W.2d 13 (1987), in which the plaintiff filed a claim in the Oakland Circuit Court to renew a consent judgment. The plaintiff served the summons and complaint on the defendant in Florida. The defendant asserted a lack of jurisdiction because he was not served in Michigan and had not resided there for many years. The plaintiff then filed a complaint in Florida and served the defendant in Florida. The plaintiff also filed a second complaint in the Oakland Circuit Court and served the defendant in Michigan. Id. at 411, 407 N.W.2d 13.

The defendant moved for summary disposition of both Michigan cases. Id. The trial court dismissed the second Michigan case with prejudice pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(6) and indicated that the first Michigan case would be dismissed if the Florida case was not dismissed with prejudice before December 20, 1985. Id. at 411-412, 407 N.W.2d 13. On January 28, 1986, after ascertaining that the Florida case had not been dismissed, the trial court entered an order dismissing the first Michigan case. The plaintiff appealed, among other things, the trial court's dismissal of the second Michigan case under MCR 2.116(C)(6) on the grounds that the Florida case was pending. Id. at 412, 407 N.W.2d 13. This Court noted, "Although at first blush it appears that dismissal of the second Michigan case would have been proper under the court rule, we find that it was erroneous in this instance." Id. It further noted that MCR 2.116(C)(6) is a codification of the former plea of abatement by prior action, the purpose of which was to protect parties from the harassment of new suits. Id. Although it ascertained that the three cases filed by the plaintiff "involve the same parties and claim," the Court stated: "[O]ur analysis does not end there." Id. The Court held:

The pending Florida case would not support dismissal under the court rule. A court does not lose jurisdiction by reason of the pendency of litigation covering the same subject matter in a court of another state. Owen v. Owen, 389 Mich. 117, 120, n. 2, 205 N.W.2d 181 (1973), cert den 414 U.S. 830, 94 S.Ct. 60, 38 L.Ed.2d 64 (1973), reh den 414 U.S. 1086, 94 S.Ct. 606, 38 L.Ed.2d 491 (1973); In re Elliott's Estate, 285 Mich. 579, 584, 281 N.W. 330 (1938). Nor does a suit pending in another state or foreign jurisdiction constitute a prior action subjecting the subsequent suit to a plea in abatement. McKey v. Swenson, 232 Mich. 505, 516, 205 N.W. 583 (1925); Hoover Realty v. American Institute of Marketing Systems, 24 Mich.App. 12, 16-17, 179 N.W.2d 683 (1970), lv. den. 384 Mich. 754 (1970). See also 1 Am Jur 2d, Abatement, Survival and Revival, § 10. [Id. at 412-413, 407 N.W.2d 13.]

We are not required to follow Sovran because it was issued before November 1, 1990. MCR 7.215(J)(1). We also disagree with Sovran's application of MCR 2.116(C)(6) because, eschewing basic rules of statutory construction, it ignored the plain language of the court rule and instead looked to the purpose of the rule and existing common law. In so doing, Sovran relied on several Michigan Supreme Court cases in support of its conclusion that MCR 2.116(C)(6) does not apply when another action involving the same parties and claim is pending in an out-of-state court. We review each of these cases in turn to determine whether they provide any guidance on the proper reading and application of MCR 2.116(C)(6).

One of the cases Sovran relied on is Owen, in which the plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce in a Michigan court and the defendant filed an answer and a cross-complaint for separate maintenance. The court entered a judgment of separate maintenance and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant support. The plaintiff later moved to Nevada, where he filed an action for divorce and ultimately obtained a divorce judgment. The plaintiff then petitioned the Michigan court to amend the earlier judgment of separate maintenance to one of divorce. The circuit court denied the petition. This Court affirmed. Owen, supra at 119, 205 N.W.2d 181. The plaintiff appealed to our Supreme Court, raising the questions whether the Nevada divorce judgment must be given full faith and credit in Michigan and, if so, whether it affected the plaintiff's obligations imposed by the judgment for separate maintenance. Id. at 119-120, 205 N.W.2d 181.

Our Supreme Court determined that the pending Michigan action did not bar the cause of action in Nevada. Id. at 120, 205 N.W.2d 181. The Court further determined that Michigan must give full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce. Id. at 120-121, 205 N.W.2d 181. However, the Court determined that, even though the Nevada judgment "must be given full faith and credit as to the continuance of the marriage relationship, it does not necessarily affect other incidentals of marriage such as property settlement or support payments." Id. at 121, 205 N.W.2d 181, citing Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S.Ct. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948). The Court interpreted Estin as providing that the law and policy of the home state dictates the decision regarding whether the foreign divorce judgment affects those aspects of the marriage over which the home state retains control. Owen, supra at 121, 205 N.W.2d 181. Noting that the divorce judgment in Nevada adjudicated nothing other than the marriage relationship, the Court concluded that Michigan's policy in favor of protecting citizens' property rights dictated that the Nevada divorce did not terminate the plaintiff's obligation to pay the defendant support as provided in the Michigan judgment. Id. at 122, 205 N.W.2d 181.

Although Owen supports the conclusion for which it was relied on in Sovran, i.e., that "a court does not lose jurisdiction by reason of the pendency of litigation covering the same subject matter in a...