Valera-Rodriguez v. State

Decision Date17 April 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 2D18-1794
Citation294 So.3d 990
Parties Juan Benjamin VALERA-RODRIGUEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Terry McCreary of The McCreary Law Firm, Ft. Myers; and Patrick N. Bailey of The Law Office of Patrick N. Bailey, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

LaROSE, Judge.

A jury found Juan Valera-Rodriguez guilty of conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine (count 1) and trafficking in cocaine (count 2). The trial court sentenced him to concurrent mandatory minimum terms of fifteen years' imprisonment. We have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A) ; 9.140(b)(1)(A), (F). We affirm, without further comment, the judgment and sentence on count 2. The parties urge us to reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the mandatory minimum sentence on count 1. Mr. Valera-Rodriguez is entitled to relief on count 1. Yet, we do not agree with the parties' suggested remedy.

Background

Count 1 of the amended information alleged:

Between and including October 5, 2015 through October 9, 2015, in the Seventeenth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits, to wit: Broward and Lee Counties, Florida, the Defendant, Juan Benjamin Valera-Rodriguez, did unlawfully and knowingly agree, conspire, combine or confederate with another person, to wit: Amaury Matias aka Jose Angel De Jesus-Cruz, and with other persons known or unknown, to commit the act of trafficking in cocaine ... contrary to Florida Statute 893.135(5).

Section 893.135(5), Florida Statutes (2015), provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person to commit any act prohibited by subsection (1)1 commits a felony of the first degree and is punishable as if he or she had actually committed such prohibited act." See also § 775.082(3)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (authorizing a term of up to thirty years' imprisonment upon conviction for a first-degree felony).

Importantly, subsections (1)(b)(1)(a)-(c) set out different mandatory minimum prison terms tied to the various trafficking amounts for which a defendant is convicted. See § 893.135(1)(b)(1)(a) (requiring that a defendant convicted of trafficking in cocaine "28 grams or more, but less than 200 grams ... shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 3 years, and the defendant shall be ordered to pay a fine of $50,000"); (1)(b)(1)(b) (stating that a defendant convicted of trafficking in cocaine "200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams ... shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 7 years, and the defendant shall be ordered to pay a fine of $100,000"); (1)(b)(1)(c) (providing that a defendant convicted of trafficking in cocaine "400 grams or more, but less than 150 kilograms ... shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years and pay a fine of $250,000"). Consequently, the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine requires a minimum quantity of 28 grams of cocaine. As the statute provides, an individual who "knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine ... but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine ... commits a felony of the first degree, which ... shall be known as ‘trafficking in cocaine.’ " § 893.135(1)(b)(1).

Critically, count 1 of the amended information neither charged an amount of cocaine nor referenced the subsection under which it charged Mr. Valera-Rodriguez. In contrast, count 2 of the charging document stated that Mr. Valera-Rodriguez "did unlawfully and knowingly sell or deliver 400 grams or more but less than 150 kilograms of cocaine ... contrary to Florida Statute 893.135(1)(b)(1)(c)."

At trial, the State established that Mr. Valera-Rodriguez brokered a drug deal between a confidential informant working for the Drug Enforcement Administration and a buyer; Mr. Matias would supply the contraband. Ultimately, law enforcement stopped Mr. Matias's vehicle while traveling to the arranged sale location and seized 991 grams of cocaine.

The trial court provided the jury with a verdict form which, for count 1, permitted the jury to find Mr. Valera-Rodriguez either guilty or not guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. If the jury found him guilty, the form required the jury to make a finding as to the amount of cocaine involved. The possible choices included the largest quantity carrying the most onerous mandatory minimum penalty under section 893.135(1)(b)(1)(c), all the way to the lowest quantity requiring the least punitive mandatory minimum term under section 893.135(1)(b)(1)(a). The jury found that Mr. Valera-Rodriguez conspired to traffic in "cocaine weigh[ing] 400 grams or more but less than 150 kilograms." The trial court imposed the mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentences, as well as fines totaling $525,513. See § 893.135(1)(b)(1)(c), (5). At no point during the trial did Mr. Valera-Rodriguez raise the apparent deficiency in the amended information for count 1.

Analysis

Mr. Valera-Rodriguez argues that the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for count 1 constitutes fundamental error because the amended information failed to allege any amount of cocaine qualifying him for a mandatory minimum sentence. The State concedes error, reasoning that "the charging document did not put [Mr. Valera-Rodriguez] on notice of the mandatory minimum sentence."

To prove conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt an express or implied agreement or understanding between two or more persons to deliver or sell cocaine in the proscribed quantity. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 5.3; 25.7(a); Spera v. State, 656 So. 2d 550, 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ; see also Mosley v. State, 100 So. 3d 1214, 1215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) ("[T]o support a conviction for trafficking, the State is required to prove that the ... cocaine ... meets the statutory trafficking weight."). Quantity is an "essential element" of trafficking. Greenwade v. State, 124 So. 3d 215, 220, 221 (Fla. 2013) ("To support a conviction for trafficking in cocaine in an amount greater than 200 but less than 400 grams, the State must prove three essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant knowingly sold, purchased, manufactured, brought into the state, or actively or constructively possessed a certain substance; (2) the substance was cocaine; and (3) the quantity of the substance met the statutory weight threshold."). It is beyond cavil that "[a]n information must allege each of the essential elements of a crime to be valid." State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538, 541 (Fla. 1977). An element of count 1, therefore, is an amount of trafficked cocaine, as set out in section 893.135(1)(b)(1).

"For an information to sufficiently charge a crime it must follow the statute, clearly charge each of the essential elements, and sufficiently advise the accused of the specific crime with which he is charged." Price v. State, 995 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2008). Due process demands no less. Id. ("Due process of law requires the State to allege every essential element when charging a violation of law to provide the accused with sufficient notice of the allegations against him." (citing art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; M.F. v. State, 583 So. 2d 1383, 1386-87 (Fla. 1991) )). A jury's factual findings do not cure the omission of an essential element. Denegal v. State, 263 So. 3d 842, 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) ("An information's failure to cite to the specific statutory subsection[ of section 775.087(2) ], while simultaneously failing to precisely charge the elements, ‘cannot be cured by a jury's factual findings.’ " (quoting Bienaime v. State, 213 So. 3d 927, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) )). Moreover, the State "cannot rely on grounds alleged in [count 2] to support a[ ] ... mandatory sentence on [count 1]." See Bienaime, 213 So. 3d at 929. Quite simply, count 1, as charged, failed to support the trial court's imposition of a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.

However, it does not follow that we must direct the trial court, on remand, to simply strike the mandatory minimum sentence for count 1. Both parties rely on cases demonstrating that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under section 775.087, known as the 10/20/Life statute, requires the State to allege in the information, and the jury to specifically find, the grounds for the sentence. "To pursue an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence under the 10/20/life statute, the [S]tate must allege the grounds for enhancement in the charging document, and the jury must make factual findings regarding those grounds.’ " Agenor v. State, 268 So. 3d 868, 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Bienaime, 213 So. 3d at 929 ). This conclusion is rooted in the courts' discernment of legislative intent. See Rogers v. State, 963 So. 2d 328, 336 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("To the extent that the Florida case law requires that the factual basis for imposition of a mandatory minimum term under section 775.087(2) always be charged and found by the jury, it reflects a judicial conclusion that the legislature intended the factors requiring imposition of a mandatory minimum under section 775.087(2) to be essential elements."). To that end, "[t]he factors relevant to sentencing under various versions of section 775.087(2) have been treated as ‘essential elements.’ " Id. at 335 (quoting Jackson v. State, 852 So. 2d 941, 943 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ); see, e.g., Adams v. State, 916 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("The information failed to allege that Adams discharged a firearm. The information alleged only that Adams ‘used and actually possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense.’ The trial court improperly enhanced Adams' sentence...

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