Valerio v. Jahura

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: STONE; DRAPER, Acting P. J., and SHOEMAKER
• Citation: Valerio v. Jahura, 12 Cal.Rptr. 296, 191 Cal.App.2d 159 (Cal. App. 1961)
• Decision Date: 13 April 1961
• Parties: Manuel VALERIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Milovan JAHURA, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 19424.

Page 296

12 Cal.Rptr. 296

191 Cal.App.2d 159

Manuel VALERIO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Milovan JAHURA, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 19424.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

April 13, 1961.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing May 12, 1961.

Hearing Denied June 6, 1961.

Watson & Tedesco, by Vincent N. Tedesco, Rea, Frasse, Anastasi, Clark & Chapman, by William G. Clark, San Jose, for appellant.

Hoge, Fenton, Jones & Appel, by Robert O. Angle, Monterey, for respondents.

STONE, Justice pro tem.

Plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile that collided with a car owned and driven by the defendant. A jury brought in a verdict for defendant, a judgment followed, and plaintiff appeals.

Both vehicles involved were traveling south on Mathilda Avenue in Santa Clara County. The car in which plaintiff was riding was in the lead, with defendant one or two car lengths to the rear, both vehicles traveling about 20 m. p. h. As the vehicles approached the Maude Avenue intersection, each was properly on the right hand side of Mathilda Avenue, a two-lane street, one lane for each direction of traffic. Near the approach to Maude Avenue there was a double white line down the middle of Mathilda Avenue. Defendant, wishing to make a left turn from Mathilda onto Maude, drove over the double line and into the left or northbound lane. He was then some two car lengths from the intersection. As the cars reached the intersection defendant pulled up alongside the car in which plaintiff was riding so that the cars were side by side, with defendant in the wrong lane. Plaintiff's driver, without giving any signal, turned left into Maude Avenue and struck defendant's car which also was about to turn left. Plaintiff was injured in the accident.

The defendant denied negligence and pleaded the affirmative defenses of unavoidable accident and contributory negligence of plaintiff's driver, which he imputed to plaintiff. At the pretrial hearing defendant abandoned the affirmative defenses and the case went to trial on the issues of defendant's negligence and proximate cause.

Plaintiff appeals on the sole ground that there was no substantial evidence to support the defense verdict and judgment. He argues that not only was the defendant negligent as a matter of law, but that also as a matter of law his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. There can be no question about defendant's negligence. He testified that he crossed the double line '10, maybe 20 feet' before reaching the intersection. Admittedly, he was in the wrong lane when he pulled abreast of plaintiff's car. By driving in this manner, defendant violated the following three California Vehicle Code sections then in effect: Section 525.2 ¹, which provides that no driver of a vehicle shall cross a double white line except at an intersection or when turning into a private driveway; section 530, subd. (b), par. (2) ², which provides that no vehicle shall be driven to the left side of the roadway when approaching within 100 feet of an intersection; section 540, subd. (b) ³, which provides that a driver intending to turn left at an intersection '* * * shall approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle and after entering the intersection the left turn shall be made * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

Defendant introduced no evidence tending to show in the slightest degree that when he violated the foregoing Vehicle Code sections 'he did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law.' Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 624, 327 P.2d 897, 900.

Defendant tacitly concedes his negligence inasmuch as his brief dwells primarily on the question of proximate cause, which he argues is a question of fact for the jury and that an appellate court should not attempt to reweigh the evidence. In support of his position, respondent cites comment (a) to section 453 of the Restatement of Torts [quoted with approval in McEvoy v. American Pool Corporation, 32 Cal.2d 295, 299, 195 P.2d 783; and in Fowler v. Callis, 159 Cal.App.2d 746, 750, 324 P.2d 728, 730]:

"If * * * the negligent character of the third person's intervening act or the reasonable foreseeability of its being done is a factor in determining whether the intervening act relieves the actor from liability for his antecedent negligence, and under the undisputed facts there is room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether such act was negligent or foreseeable, the question should be left to the jury."

We have no quarrel with this statement of the law. Rather, we believe it demonstrates defendant's liability under the facts of the case, since the unfortunate results of his actions were so readily foreseeable that no question of fact was left for the determination of the jury. The dangerous consequences of a driver's pulling alongside another vehicle on the left side and in the wrong lane at the approach to an intersection are so evident that the legislature prohibited the practice by enacting the Vehicle Code sections referred to above. Furthermore, defendant was in the process of illegally passing in the wrong lane and over the double line at the very instant the collision occurred. How then could the negligence of plaintiff's driver be the sole proximate cause of the accident? Since defendant's...