Vallance v. Boston & Albany R. Co.
| Decision Date | 22 April 1893 |
| Docket Number | 3,531. |
| Citation | 55 F. 364 |
| Parties | VALLANCE v. BOSTON & ALBANY R. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Alfred Hemenway and T. Henry Pearse, for plaintiff.
Samuel Hoar, for defendant.
This is a motion to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. The plaintiff, who is a child, sues by his father and next friend, and was, at the time of the alleged injury 22 months old. The plaintiff sought to recover on two grounds: First, on the statutory ground that the defendant through its servants, did not comply with the requirements of the statute as to sounding the whistle and ringing the bell as the train approached the crossing, and that the failure to do so contributed to the injury; and, second, on the ground that the defendant was negligent in not providing suitable safeguards at the crossing, and the particular complaint in this respect was the failure to provide a gate and gateman. In support of the first ground the plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that the bell was not rung nor the whistle sounded, and evidence tending to show that the child, without the fault of its parents, had strayed from its home, some 20 or more rods, and was found at or near the crossing, with injuries of such a character that it might reasonably be found that the child was run over by the train. The only evidence tending to show that the failure to ring the bell or sound the whistle contributed to the injury was such as could reasonably be inferred from the presence of the child at or near the crossing, with injuries of the character described.
In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover upon this ground the jury were instructed that they must find from the situation that the omission to ring the bell or sound the whistle contributed to the injury. There was no evidence that the child was precocious, or that it had been warned that a railway whistle or bell was a signal of danger; therefore, upon the conceded facts of this branch of the case, the finding of the material and necessary fact that the failure to whistle or ring the bell contributed to the injury is against the weight of evidence, and an inference or deduction so unreasonable as to compel the conclusion that the jury were controlled by prejudice.
As to the second ground, it cannot be contended that reasonable care and diligence requires...
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Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Nichols
... ... crossing is peculiarly hazardous. Vallance v ... Boston, etc., R. Co. (1893), (C. C.) 55 F. 364 ... Whether ... a ... ...
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St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Denty
...defendant. 7. On the whole, the court might well have taken the case from the jury, as being one that warranted no inference of negligence. 55 F. 364; 54 id. W. E. Atkinson, for appellee. 1. The evidence in this case fully sustains the verdict. There is ample proof of negligence in failing ......