Vallen v. Dr. Roger Beau Plan
Decision Date | 04 February 2016 |
Docket Number | 15-CV-0703(JS)(ARL) |
Parties | BARRY VALLEN, Plaintiff, v. DR. ROGER BEAU PLAN, DR. BILAL KHAN, and DR. LEONICA CARLOTTA, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Barry Vallen, prose
Pilgrim State Psychiatric Center
Bldg. 81, Ward 401
998 Crooked Hill Road
West Brentwood, NY 11717
For Defendants:
Lori L. Pack, Esq.
Office of the N.Y. State Attorney General
300 Motor Parkway, Suite 205
Hauppauge, NY 11788
Pending before the Court is a motion by Dr. Roger Beauplan ("Dr. Beauplan"), Dr. Bilal Khan ("Dr. Khan") and Dr. Leoncia Carlotta ("Dr. Carlotta" and collectively, "Defendants") to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry 10). The motion is unopposed. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED IN PART.
Plaintiff Barry Vallen commenced this action on February 9, 2015 alleging, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment Rights. (See Compl. ¶ IV and at 6.) Plaintiff is presently a patient at Pilgrim State Psychiatric Hospital.1
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Docket Entry 10.) Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) the Defendants have qualified immunity. (Defs.' Br., at 1-4.)
Plaintiff's brief handwritten Complaint is submitted on the Court's Section 1983 complaint form and alleges the following it its entirety:3
On December 11, 2014 Dr. Beauplan - Dr. Khan Dr. Carlotta came to me and showed me a Letter stating concern from an agency about some of my medications I take. From a severe back injury from another patient and 2 surgeries later I am on Soma - Celebrex - and Percoset. De. Beauplan led the group t0 then call me an addict, Dr. Khan and Dr. Carlotta also said that to me. When I stated I would be in unbearable pain without them, they proceeded to tell me they would be stopping all those medications because I was an addict. Dr. Beauplan kept saying it over and over again getting right up on me in the calming room. This room is for quiet contemplation whereas plaintiff was verbally assaulted and humiliated by these so called doctors, Roger Beauplan a so called keeper of sanity (a psychiatrist) pushing plaintiff over the edge delibertaly inflicting pain and suffering causing catastophic fear of unknown health problems. Dr. Khan having an oath not to do harm to a patient, Dr. Carlotta the same what was their point. Dr. Beauplan has regularly been a bad doctor to plaintiff not speaking to him for over one year, making him be in extra pain by forcing him to walk further than he has to laughing at his increased pain yelling at me "you are a drug addict." My mind reeling with the verbal assault my senses appalled, shocked, to much for me to handle, I am sent into another world of confusion and fear, humiliated by their statements, what did they think would be my reaction a mental patient a chronic paranoid schyzophernic my mind could have snapped. What if I had done something physical becoming unaware of what was going on. So many situations could have developed, none of them good. Can Dr. Beauplan, Dr. Khan, and Dr. Carlotta actually say they were trying to help me. . . .
These doctors telling me I must go to programs. The deliberate infliction of pain, unnecessary and wanton is a violation of my Eighth Amendment Rights . . . .
(Compl. ¶ IV.A.) As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks to recover $75,000 from Dr. Beauplan, $25,000 from Dr. Khan, and $25,000 from Dr. Carlotta. (Compl. ¶ V.) In addition, Plaintiff seeks "an end to the lowering of my medications [and] to see an outside psychiatricst-psychologist medical doctor and social worker trained in treating trauma." (Compl. ¶ V.)
The Court will first set forth the applicable legal standards before turning to Defendants' motion more specifically.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court applies a "plausibility standard," which is guided by "[t]wo working principles." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)); accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009). First, although the Court must accept all allegations as true, this "tenet" is "inapplicable to legal conclusions;" thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,129 S. Ct. at 1949; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. Second, only complaints that state a "plausible claim for relief" can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Determining whether a complaint does so is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72.
While pro se plaintiffs enjoy a somewhat more liberal pleading standard, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) , they must still comport with the procedural and substantive rules of law, see Colo. Cap. v. Owens, 227 F.R.D. 181, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because they are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and/or qualified immunity. (Defs.' Br. at 4-7.)
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "'The reach of the Eleventh Amendment has . . . been interpreted to extend beyond the terms of its text to bar suits in federal courts against states, by their own citizens or by foreign sovereigns. . . .'" State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (ellipses in original) (quoting W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation v. Orange Cty., 395 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to suits against state officials in their official capacities. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1989) () (internal citations omitted).
Here, insofar as Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims seek monetary damages against Defendants, all of whom are alleged to be state actors sued in their official capacities, and because New York state has not waived its sovereign immunity for suits underSection 1983 .
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims seeking monetary damages are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, this prong of Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED and these claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Suits against state officials in their official capacities are permitted for prospective injunctive relief to stop ongoing violations of federal law. Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State &Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 166 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 18, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3107, 87 L. Ed. 2d. 114 (1985) ( ). To the extent Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief against the Defendants to "end the lowering of [his] medications" and to allow him to "see an outside psychiatricst-psychologist medical doctor and social worker trained in treating trauma" (Compl. ¶ V), such claims are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, the Court next turns to the substance of Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims seeking injunctive relief.
Plaintiff claims that the Defendants' "deliberate infliction of pain, unneccessary [sic] and wanton is a violation of my Eighth Amendment rights." (Compl. ¶ IV.A.) Individuals involuntarily committed to state custody, such as Plaintiff, have constitutionally-protected liberty interests in adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and conditions of reasonable care and safety. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458-59, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982). "The rights of patients who are involuntarily committed have been likened to the rights ofdetainees awaiting trial." James v....
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