Valley County v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 04 December 1939
• Docket Number: 7922.
• Parties: VALLEY COUNTY v. THOMAS, County Treasurer, et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

97 P.2d 345

109 Mont. 345

VALLEY COUNTY v. THOMAS, County Treasurer, et al.

No. 7922.

Supreme Court of Montana

December 4, 1939

Appeal from District Court, Seventeenth District, Phillips County C. B. Elwell, Judge.

Suit by Valley County, a quasi municipal corporation, against S. A Thomas, County Treasurer of McCone County, Mont., and McCone County, a quasi-municipal corporation, to enjoin defendants from issuing automobile licenses upon automobiles allegedly owned and taxable within Valley County, and for other relief. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

MORRIS J., dissenting.

Booth & Booth and Thomas R. Marron, all of Glasgow, for appellant.

John M. Kline and C. H. Roberts, both of Glasgow, and Homer A. Hoover, of Circle, for respondents.

JOHNSON Chief Justice.

By this action Valley county seeks to enjoin McCone county and the treasurer thereof from issuing automobile licenses upon cars owned and taxable within Valley county, and to cancel such licenses already issued, or to recover from McCone county the sums Valley county would have received if the licenses had been issued by it. Judgment was for defendants and plaintiff has appealed.

The first cause of action, which is for injunction, alleges that Valley county was created by legislative enactment in 1893; that its boundaries are defined by section 4355, Revised Codes, and have never been changed; that under section 1759, Id., as amended by Chapter 72 of the 1937 Session Laws (section 1), owners of motor vehicles operated upon the public highways of Montana are required to apply for and obtain licenses from the treasurer of the county wherein such motor vehicles are owned or taxable, and that before such license is issued the personal property taxes thereon for the current year, as well as the license fee thereon, must be paid; that the defendants county treasurer and county "have accepted applications and issued licenses upon cars owned and taxable within Valley county, Montana, and unless restrained and enjoined will continue" so to do contrary to law; that defendants' action involves a loss to plaintiff and irreparable damage, and that plaintiff has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

The second cause of action contains the additional allegations that such licenses have been issued by defendants in numbers and to parties unknown to plaintiff; that in order to determine the status of the licenses and moneys derived therefrom the defendants should "render a true account of the licenses applied for and issued upon motor vehicles owned and taxable in Valley county;" that such licenses should be cancelled so that the owners will apply for proper licenses, but that if the same cannot be cancelled, Valley county should recover from McCone county such amounts as it would have received if the licenses had been issued by it. During the trial it was agreed by the parties that the recovery right would in any event extend only to license fees, as plaintiff would not itself have collected property taxes upon the automobiles in question.

Defendants' answer to both causes of action denied that they had accepted any application for or issued any license upon any motor vehicle "owned or taxable within Valley county, Montana," or intended to do so, but admitted that they had issued automobile licenses for persons residing in Fort Peck townsite. They proceeded to describe the land upon which Fort Peck townsite is situated; alleged that it and other lands purchased by the United States before January 17, 1934, in connection with the Fort Peck dam project are not part of Valley county; that the legislature in 1937 had no jurisdiction over the same and that Chapter 72 of the 1937 Session Laws is, therefore, inapplicable thereto; that "the road from the Fort Peck townsite to McCone county ** is upon land purchased by the United States, in connection with the Fort Peck Dam project prior to January 17, 1934"; that "motor vehicles within or owned by persons residing on the Fort Peck townsite go by this road *** into McCone county, without going into Valley county;" that "such motor vehicles, or most of them, are running daily in this way between the townsite and the works of the United States in McCone county;" that "in every instance where an application was received or a license issued by McCone county to anyone residing on the townsite of Fort Peck, the vehicle was either on the townsite or within McCone county on January 1, 1938, and was within McCone county at the time of the application for and the issuance of the license, and was in daily or almost daily use on the works of the United States in McCone county, and the owner had his home on the townsite; in a number of instances the legal residence of the owner was in McCone county. In instances where the motor vehicles were working on the works of the United States in McCone county (and there are a number of such instances) the vehicle was in McCone county anyway for approximately eight hours of every day it worked."

Those allegations seem to assume that within the intent of the statute in question an automobile is ordinarily "owned or taxable" at the domicile of the owner, unless controlled in certain instances by the fact that the owner had his voting residence elsewhere, or that he habitually employed the automobile on work elsewhere or had it with him on such work, or by the fact that the automobile was in another county on January 1, or at the time of the application for and issuance of the license. We shall consider these matters later in this opinion. But for present purposes these and other allegations of the answer and of respondents' briefs may fairly be taken as an admission that some, at least, of the automobiles licensed in McCone county were "owned or taxable" in Fort Peck townsite within the meaning of the statute, if applicable.

It is unnecessary to detail the answer further, except to state that it sufficiently tendered the issues whether automobiles "owned or taxable" within Fort Peck townsite were "owned or taxable" within Valley county, and whether the taxing power of the State of Montana extends to Fort Peck townsite so that the state has jurisdiction to collect property taxes or license fees upon automobiles therein "owned or taxable."

The plaintiff's evidence showed that about January 3, 1938, the county officials of Valley county learned that the county treasurer of McCone county had opened a branch office across the river from Fort Peck and was issuing licenses upon the cars of Fort Peck residents; that at that time and prior to the decision handed down by this court in the second Bruce case, infra, on March 14, 1938, the Valley county officers were insisting upon the payment of taxes as prerequisite to the issuance of a license, but that after that decision they required only the license fee as to cars owned in Fort Peck townsite. No direct testimony was offered as to any particular cars owned or taxable in Fort Peck townsite, or Valley county, upon which licenses had been so issued by the treasurer of McCone county. Copies of a number of application cards, certified by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, were admitted in evidence purporting to show that the said cars mentioned therein were owned in Fort Peck townsite. These cars bore the notation "Tax exempt by reason of military reservation." Defendants offered no evidence.

We will pass for the present the question whether Valley county is entitled to recover from McCone county the license taxes received from the cars in question, and will proceed to a discussion of the issues involved in the cause of action for injunction, which are almost entirely issues of law.

It was stipulated at the trial: "That Fort Peck is situated on the land described in the amended answer in this cause and that that is the land of which the Supreme Court of this state decided that the United States has exclusive jurisdiction in the case of State ex rel. Board [of Com'rs of Valley County] v. Bruce , 77 P.2d 403, and also in State ex rel. Board [of Com'rs of Valley County] v. Bruce , 69 P.2d 97;" and that "while no part of the land considered in those two cases is in McCone county that the government works do extend over and into McCone county."

The learned trial judge made and entered as preliminary to entry of judgment the following opinion:

"The above entitled case having been regularly submitted upon oral and documentary evidence and upon briefs filed by the attorneys for the respective parties,

And it appearing to the Court that the effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Montana in the case of State ex rel. Board [of Com'rs of Valley County] v. Bruce, 104 Mont. 500, 69 P.2d 97, and State [ex rel. Board of Com'rs of Valley County] v. Bruce , 77 P.2d 403, is to hold that the Fort Peck townsite and military reservation has been entirely removed from the jurisdiction of the State of Montana for all purposes except certain reservations regarding the service of process, etc., which decisions are binding upon this Court,

And it appearing that the effect of such decisions is to exempt all automobiles owned within such reservation from the operation of the automobile license tax of the State of Montana so long as said automobiles are operated only on said reservation, and that such automobiles are subject to the license tax only when they presume to operate outside of said limits, which would, in effect, make them subject to license in practically the same manner as cars owned in a foreign state.

And it therefore, appearing that there is nothing, either in the law or the evidence, which would indicate that said cars must of necessity be licensed within the ...