Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Hartford Iron & Metal, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:14-CV-6
• Parties: VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. HARTFORD IRON & METAL, INC., and ALAN B. GOLDBERG, d/b/a Hartford Iron & Metal, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. HARTFORD IRON & METAL, INC., and ALAN B. GOLDBERG, d/b/a Hartford Iron & Metal, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

Case No. 1:14-CV-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FORT WAYNE DIVISION

October 30, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for resolution of several pending motions. The motions, responses, and replies filed by the parties and considered by the Court include the following:

1) A motion for partial summary judgment or, in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant Alan Goldberg (ECF 796), to which Plaintiff Valley Forge filed a brief in opposition (ECF 817) and Goldberg filed a reply (ECF 820).¹ For the reasons explained below, this motion is DENIED.

2) A motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendant Hartford Iron & Metal (ECF 797), to which Valley Forge filed a response in opposition (ECF 813) and Hartford Iron filed a reply (ECF 822). For the reasons explained below, this motion is DENIED.

3) A motion for partial summary judgment filed by Valley Forge (ECF 801), to which Hartford Iron filed a response in opposition (ECF 810), Goldberg filed a response in opposition (ECF812)², and Valley Forge filed a reply (ECF 819). For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED AS MOOT in part.

4) A motion to exclude evidence filed by Hartford Iron (ECF 825), to which Valley Forge filed a response in opposition (ECF 836) and Hartford Iron filed a reply (ECF 840). For the reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

5) A motion to exclude evidence filed by Valley Forge (ECF 837), to which Hartford Iron filed a response in opposition (ECF 841) and Valley Forge filed a reply (ECF 842). For the reasons explained below, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See id. at 255. However, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id. at 247, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986),will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000).

Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits nor is it a vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the non-movant, if genuine doubts remain and a reasonable fact-finder could find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1992); Wolf v. City of Fitchburg, 870 F.2d 1327, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989). However, if it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2003). "[Speculation and conjecture" also cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 2013). In addition, not all factual disputes will preclude the entry of summary judgment, only those that "could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

As the Seventh Circuit has explained many times and reiterated recently, a district court's task on summary judgment is as follows:

The following common refrains in summary judgment cases are important to recall in a case with so many factual recitations:

On summary judgment a court may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder. Rather, the court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Summary judgment is not appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. We must looktherefore at the evidence as a jury might, construing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and avoiding the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more likely true. As we have said many times, summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants.

Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003)). The case at bar will be tried to the bench. "Rule 56 makes no explicit distinction between jury and bench trials. However, the rule is designed as a pretrial mechanism for 'asses[ing] the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial,' and whether there is such a need may depend on whether trial would be to the court or to a jury." Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Residential Title Servs., Inc., 607 F.Supp.2d 959, 961-62 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (citing William Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & David Barrans, The Analysis & Decision of Summary Judgment Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 474 (1991) (in turn quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee's notes (amended 1963)). When evidentiary facts are in dispute, when the credibility of witnesses may be in issue or when conflicting evidence must be weighed, a full trial is necessary regardless of whether it is a bench or a jury trial. Id. "[T]he appropriate time for the Court to weigh the evidence and reach factual conclusions is at trial." Thornton v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 121 F.Supp.3d 819, 826-27 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir.1994) ("[T]he appropriate proceedings for such fact-finding is a bench trial and not the disposition of a summary judgment motion.")).

DISCUSSION

Valley Forge Insurance Company filed this lawsuit alleging that Hartford Iron & Metaland its owner, Alan Goldberg³, breached a contract between the parties that was intended to resolve all disputes and claims between them. Those disputes and claims all arise from the environmental remediation of Hartford Iron's property, on which the company operates a scrap metal recycling business. Hartford Iron entered into an Agreed Order with the Indiana Department of Environmental Management in 2009 that mandated that Hartford Iron remediate pollution at its site, including remediation of PCB contamination and other pollutants that accumulated on the property over the course of decades of industrial use. Valley Forge, as Hartford Iron's insurer, agreed to pay for the remediation. The parties entered into their first Settlement Agreement on April 17, 2009, which set forth the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the remediation process intended to comply with the IDEM Agreed Order. Unfortunately, numerous disputes arose and the parties accused each other of breaching the 2009 Settlement Agreement. On December 4, 2012, the parties entered into a second Settlement Agreement, which again purported to resolve all disputes and claims between them at the time. Importantly, the 2012 Agreement came on the heels of state court litigation between these same parties, in which they litigated the issue of coverage, i.e., whether Valley Forge had to pony up to pay for the remediation pursuant to insurance policies issued to Goldberg and Hartford Iron over the years.⁴ The 2012 Agreement, by its express terms, incorporated and supplemented the 2009 Agreement. Accordingly, the 2009 and 2012 Settlement Agreements together form the contractthat is at issue now, and which each side accuses the other of breaching. In short, this is a breach of contract case; it is not an insurance coverage case. The Court concludes that the issues in this case require a trial (actually, two trials-one on the issue of which side breached the Settlement Agreements and a second on the damages to be awarded to the non-breaching party or parties).

Valley Forge, in its original Complaint (ECF 1) and its first Amended Complaint (ECF 6), stated claims for breach of contract and "claims" for declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. As this Court stated several years ago when ruling on a motion to dismiss Valley Forge's first Amended Complaint filed by Hartford Iron and Goldberg:

Valley Forge says Hartford Iron incorrectly describes Counts 1, 2, and 4 as breach of contract claims. Those claims, Valley Forge argues, seek declaratory judgments. The distinction is irrelevant: the counts seek a declaratory judgment that Hartford Iron breached the contract.[] A declaratory judgment that Hartford Iron breached the Settlement Agreement is only appropriate if Hartford Iron breached the contract.

. . .

Valley Forge claims Hartford Iron breached the contract when it "fail[ed] to cooperate with Valley Forge and August Mack,"⁵ "lock[ed] August Mack out of the Site and threaten[ed] to withhold access in the future," "generally attempt[ed] to control the defense and remediation of the Site," and "insist[ed] on the ongoing reimbursement of invoices for work performed by Mr. Shere."

Opinion and Order denying ...