Vallindras v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM; SHENK; In an almost identical situation; CARTER
• Citation: Vallindras v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 265 P.2d 907, 42 Cal.2d 149 (Cal. 1954)
• Decision Date: 22 January 1954
• Parties: VALLINDRAS v. MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INSURANCE CO. et al. S. F. 18869.

Page 907

265 P.2d 907

42 Cal.2d 149

VALLINDRAS v. MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INSURANCE CO. et al.

S. F. 18869.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Jan. 22, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1954.

Allan L. Sapiro, Warren Sapiro and Arthur N. Ziegler, San Francisco, for appellant.

Raymond D. Williamson, San Francisco, for respondent.

Dinkelspiel & Dinkelspiel and Robert Drewes, San Francisco, amici curiae on behalf of respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for defendants after general demurrers to his amended complaint were sustained without leave to amend. The complaint attempts to state a cause of action for damages for false imprisonment against Sheriff Daniel C. Murphy and his surety. It alleges that the defendant sheriff 'did unlawfully imprison plaintiff in the County Jail.' It specifies that in April, 1950, the sheriff imprisoned plaintiff under an order of the superior court adjudging him guilty of contempt for wilful failure to pay attorney's fees and support money to his wife in a pending divorce action; a copy of the order is attached to the complaint and made a part thereof. The complaint further avers that the contempt order was 'void upon its face'; that on application to this court plaintiff was discharged from such imprisonment by writ of habeas corpus, In re Vallindras, 1950, 35 Cal.2d 594, 220 P.2d 1; and that as a result of his imprisonment he sustained certain damages. The complaint does not negative any of the facts upon which the order of commitment was based. We have concluded that the facts alleged in the amended complaint do not, and it appears therefrom that plaintiff cannot, state a cause of action for false imprisonment.

The allegations that the order of commitment was 'void upon its face' and that the sheriff 'did unlawfully imprison plaintiff' are conclusions of law and add nothing to the substantive averments of the complaint. Foerst v. Hobro, 1932, 125 Cal.App. 476, 478, 13 P.2d 1055; Barrier v. Alexander, 1950, 100 Cal.App.2d 497, 500, 224 P.2d 436.

It is plaintiff's theory that our holding in the habeas corpus proceeding, In re Vallindras, 1950, supra, 35 Cal.2d 594, 596, 220 P.2d 1, 2, that he was entitled to be released because 'regardless of the court's failure to file (with the clerk) these judgments (the orders adjudicating contempt) and other deficiencies in the procedure leading to the imprisonment of Vallindras, the order of April 10th does not meet the law's requirements', establishes as a matter of law that his arrest and detention were unlawful not only as being vulnerable to the attack on habeas corpus but also as establishing civil liability of the sheriff in this damage action. But this theory is not tenable.

From time immemorial our law has recognized differences between criminal proceedings and civil proceedings. The fact that a man is held to be entitled to release on habeas corpus does not mean that his custodian must answer in damages for the previous detention. Generally speaking, the right to release from custody is determined by the rules of criminal law while the right to recover damages for false imprisonment depends on the rules of civil law. By the light of the civil law, therefore, we must examine the factual allegations of the complaint to ascertain whether the sheriff was justified in imprisoning plaintiff pursuant to the order of the superior court and prior to the ruling of this court.

The order in question clearly directed the officer to imprison plaintiff, and it bore on its face the signature of a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction. The order, according to the copy thereof attached to the complaint, recited that on April 10, 1950, the date of the hearing and the order, Vallindras and his counsel were present in court, that he had been theretofore adjudged guilty of contempt 'and ordered to pay the sum of $250.00 by this date,' and 'said sum not being paid, and the said plaintiff (Vallindras) having admitted that he was in default of the orders of said Court * * * and the Court further finding that plaintiff had and has the ability to pay the said sum as aforesaid and to purge himself of said contempt by complying with said orders, * * * and this Court having on the 10th day of April, 1950, by its order then duly entered, adjudged and decreed' Vallindras to be guilty of contempt for his 'wilful refusal and failure to comply with the said order of this Court, he having the ability and means to comply therewith,' the court 'did order that * * * Vallindras, be punished for his said contempt by imprisonment in the County Jail * * * until such time as he shall comply with the decree and order of this Court to pay to the said defendant the sum of _ _ as aforesaid.' The adjudicating and committing portion of the order follows, in this language: 'Now, Therefore, * * * the Sheriff of the City and County of San Francisco is hereby ordered to take said defendant (plaintiff) into custody * * * to be imprisoned in the County Jail * * * until the sum of _ _ shall have been paid, or until he be otherwise discharged according to law, and until further order of this Court in the premises.' By examination of the substance of the entire order, including the recitals as above set forth, it is apparent that the act required of Vallindras, the performance of which would end the term of his imprisonment, was intended to be the payment of the sum of $250 which was mentioned in the recitals. That sum, however, was omitted from the portion of the order following the 'Now, Therefore,' which purports to state the specific adjudication, the term of commitment, and the act required to be performed.

In the habeas corpus proceeding, applying the strict standards which protect those charged with contempt of court, ¹ we examined the order of April 10 in its entirety and, after carefully mentioning its recitals, held that the committing portion of the order did 'not meet the law's requirements' ² in that it did not specify the 'amount which Vallindras must pay to purge him from contempt and secure his release.' But it does not necessarily follow from this holding, based as it is upon the standards of criminal law ³ and contempt commitments, that the sheriff is liable in civil damages for having obeyed the order of the superior court until this court ordered otherwise. The order does specifically direct the sheriff to imprison Vallindras until the further order of the court; it specifies, 'Now, Therefore, * * * the Sheriff * * * is hereby ordered to take said defendant (plaintiff) into custody * * * to be imprisoned in the County Jail'; and it was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The only inadequacy or uncertainty relates to the specification of the act by which the prisoner could purge himself of contempt and become entitled to his release.

Section 262.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (formerly section 4168 of the Political Code) provides, 'A sheriff or other ministerial officer is justified in the execution of, and shall execute, all process and orders regular on their face and issued by competent authority, whatever may be the defect in the proceedings upon which they were issued.' And section 43.5(a) of the Civil Code provides, 'There shall be no liability on the part of and no cause of action shall arise against any peace officer who makes an arrest pursuant to a warrant of arrest regular upon its face if such peace officer in making the arrest acts without malice and in the reasonable belief that the person arrested is the one referred to in the warrant.'

The validity of a judgment of commitment, where the question is a close one, as is true here, is ultimately for the courts, not the sheriff, to decide. A sheriff is a ministerial or executive, not a judicial, officer, Merrill v. Gorham, 1856, 6 Cal. 41, 42; People ex rel. Attorney-General v. Squires, 1859, 14 Cal. 12, 16; First Nat. Bank of Marysville v. McCoy, 1931, 112 Cal.App. 665, 670, 671, 297 P. 571; Sparks v. Buckner, 1936, 14 Cal.App.2d 213, 220, 57 P.2d 1395. It is his duty to execute the orders of the court unless they are patently irregular and void. In determining whether process and orders are 'regular on their face' so far as the liability of such an officer is concerned, the following statement from Aetna Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal, 1943, 129 Conn. 545, 553, 29 A.2d 751, 754, is pertinent: 'When we speak of process 'valid on its face,' in considering whether it is sufficient to protect an officer, we do not mean that its validity is to be determined upon the basis of scrutiny by a trained legal mind; nor is it to be judged in the light of facts outside its provisions which the officer may know. (Citations.) Unless there is a clear absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court or magistrate issuing the process, it is sufficient if upon its face it appears to be valid in the judgment of an ordinarily intelligent and informed layman. To hold otherwise would mean that an officer must often act at his peril or delay until he has had an opportunity to search out legal niceties of procedure and, as said in Anderson v. Dewey ((1917), 91 Conn. 510, 514, 100 A. 99, 101), 'A result subjecting him to constant danger of liability would be an intolerable hardship to him, and inevitably detract from the prompt and efficient performance of his public duty."

As was pointed out in Robinette v. Price, 1943, 214 Minn. 521, 8 N.W.2d 800, 805, 806, 'All that is required to make process...