Valonis v. State

• Citation: 66 A.3d 661,431 Md. 551
• Decision Date: 20 May 2013
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2012.,Nos. 46 and 52,s. 46 and 52
• Parties: Jeffrey Robert VALONIS v. STATE of Maryland. Anthony Tyler v. State of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland

431 Md. 551

66 A.3d 661

Jeffrey Robert VALONIS

v.STATE of Maryland.

Anthony Tyler

v.State of Maryland.

Nos. 46 and 52, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 20, 2013.

David P. Kennedy, Assistant Public Defender, (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Jeremy M. McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, BARBERA and McDONALD, JJ.

GREENE, J.

In this opinion we must address whether the amendment to Rule 4–246(b) which added the language “the court determines and announces on the record” and requires a trial judge to make an explicit finding of jury trial waiver on the record is subject to strict compliance; and whether failure to make such a factual determination is reversible error. Also we must determine whether the defendant's failure to object during the proceedings to the trial judge's failure to comply strictly with Rule 4–246(b) constitutes a waiver or, whether a trial judge's failure to strictly comply with Rule 4–246(b) is harmless error. The two criminal cases before us involve Jeffrey Robert Valonis, convicted of robbery and related criminal charges in a bench trial in Carroll County and Anthony Tyler, convicted of burglary and malicious destruction of property in a bench trial in Baltimore County. We have consolidated the two criminal cases for purposes of this opinion.¹

I.

A.Jeffrey Robert Valonis

Valonis was represented by counsel at his trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County. At the conclusion of a bench trial he was convicted of robbery, second-degree assault, and theft of property worth less than $1,000.00 and sentenced to a term of incarceration of ten years, with all but six years suspended, and subject to a five-year term of supervised probation. Prior to commencement of trial the following exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Good afternoon, Your Honor.... This is a plea of not guilty. Shall I advise?

THE COURT: Please do.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Valonis, you are electing to have a trial in front of [His] Honor instead of a jury trial. Okay, a jury consists of 12 citizens selected at random from the voter and motor vehicle polls of Carroll County. In a jury trial, all 12 jurors would have to agree on a verdict of guilty or not guilty.

The standard used by the jury is the same standard [His] Honor would use, which is beyond a reasonable doubt, okay?

It is my understanding you are waiving your right to a jury trial and have [His] Honor hear the case today?

[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. We will note the waiver of the right to trial by jury. He pleads not guilty. Anything preliminarily?

The trial judge accepted defense counsel's comments and Valonis's response, “Yes” as a valid waiver of Valonis's right to a trial by jury. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Valonis guilty of all charges and imposed a sentence. Valonis noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, held that “the record supports a finding that [Valonis's] waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowing and voluntary.” In addition, the intermediate appellate court held that the issue was preserved even though Valonis did not object in a timely manner to the sufficiency of the trial judge's acceptance of the jury trial waiver. The court reasoned that “there is no indication on the record in this case that [Valonis] recognized error and failed to lodge a timely objection for strategic purposes.” Moreover, our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals concluded that “it would be somewhat perverse to penalize [Valonis] for failing to alert the court to error in a procedure whose whole purpose was for the court to ensure that [Valonis] understood what was going on.” As to the merits of Valonis's claim that the trial judge did not strictly comply with Rule 4–246(b) in failing to announce on the record that Valonis's waiver was knowing and voluntary, the court held that the trial judge's statement—“We will note the waiver of the right to trial by jury[ ]”—satisfies the requirement of Rule 4–246(b) that a “court determine[ ] and announce[ ] on the record that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.” According to the intermediate appellate court, the trial judge “did take cognizance of [Valonis's] waiver [,]” and because the judge stated, “We will note the waiver of the right to trial by jury,” the court concluded that the trial judge found that Valonis knowingly waived his right to a jury trial. As to the voluntariness prong, the court held that Valonis did not allege “a triggering fact or information which suggests [he] was coerced or induced to waive his rights[,]” or “that the absence of a voluntariness inquiry at his trial was error.” Thus, the intermediate appellate court held, in consideration of our holding in Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289, 320–21, 893 A.2d 1018, 1036 (2006), Valonis's waiver was knowing and voluntary. In addition the court pointed out that Valonis's constitutional rights were not impaired, the trial judge is not “obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic[,]” and the trial judge, in the present case, knew and is presumed to know “that waivers of a jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily, and there is an affirmative indication on the record that the court recognized and accepted the waiver here.”

B.Anthony Tyler

Anthony Tyler was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with burglary,in varying degrees, attempted theft and malicious destruction of property. He was convicted after a bench trial of burglary and malicious destruction of property. Tyler was sentenced to a term of incarceration for ten years for the crime of burglary in the first-degree. The remaining convictions were merged.

Initially, Tyler and his attorney appeared in court to proceed with a trial by jury. Prior to trial, however, apparently, Tyler expressed an interest in foregoing the jury trial and proceeding with a bench trial. Before the Circuit Court, the following exchange occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Initially, Mr. Tyler in Judge Finifter's courtroom made election for Jury trial. At this point Mr. Tyler wishes to waive Jury trial and proceed with this matter before Your Honor with a Court trial.

THE COURT: Would you talk to Mr. Tyler about that on the record?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Mr. Tyler, I have indicated just now to Judge Cahill that you are wishing to waive the right to a Jury trial. I explained to you previously a Jury is 12 people picked from a larger pool of candidates from the motor/voter registration rolls of Baltimore County. By proceeding in this manner, you give up the right to have jurors decide this case unanimously, meaning all 12 would have to agree on a verdict, and give up the right to have those jurors hear the case. The State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty of any crime.

You asked a couple [of] times this morning what my thoughts were of a Court and Jury trial. I gave you my counsel ... on how I thought you should proceed. By no means does that mean that I'm telling you what to do. This is your choice. No one can decide this for you. This is a decision you have to make on your own; you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It's my understanding after talking with me, consulting with me, asking me pertinent questions, it's your desire to have Judge Cahill be the sole trier of facts and law in this case, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Couple additional things about a Jury trial. If you were to ask for a Jury trial, we would get jurors up here and start picking forthwith. The critical part about a Jury trial is that the State has to prove its case to the unanimous satisfaction of all 12 jurors. If even one person doesn't agree the State has made their case, that Jury can't find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, if there is not unanimous concurrence amongst the jurors, a mistrial is declared and the State has a right to come back and retry you another time. You understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Moreover, if you were to elect a Jury trial, that wouldn't change the fact that you have a right not to testify and to remain silent during the course of the trial. If we had a Jury trial and you decided you wanted to maintain your silence, then I would instruct that jury upon request of Mr. Parvizian [defense counsel] that they were not allowed to consider your invoking your Fifth Amendmentright as any evidence or indication of guilt. Do you understand all that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you wish to have, to elect a bench trial? Yes? THE

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. You may have a seat. Ready to start?Following this exchange, the case proceeded as a bench trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found Tyler guilty and imposed a sentence. He noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, held that Tyler waived his claim that Rule 4–246(b) was violated because he “never complained about the court's failure to find on the record that the waiver was knowing and voluntary.” In addition, the court held alternatively, assuming the trial judge erred by failing to place on the record an explicit determination that the waiver was knowing and voluntary, under the circumstances, the error was harmless “because the record evidences that [Tyler's] jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.”

We granted both Tyler and Valonis's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to determine: (1) whether the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that Tyler and Valonis validly waived their right to a jury trial where the trial judge did not make an explicit determination on the record that the...