Valverde v. California

• Decision Date: 25 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. C 13-05353 LHK (PR),C 13-05353 LHK (PR)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: ESPERANZA ISABEL VALVERDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

ESPERANZA ISABEL VALVERDE, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.

No. C 13-05353 LHK (PR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

November 25, 2015

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging her state conviction. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not be granted.¹ Respondent has filed an answer, and petitioner filed a traverse. Having reviewed the briefs and the underlying record, the court concludes that petitioner is not entitled to relief, and DENIES the petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner² was found guilty by a jury in Santa Clara County of 24 counts of grand theft,nine counts of committing a fraudulent notarial act on a deed of trust, and seven counts of forgery. The jury also found true "excessive taking" allegations. In October 2008, petitioner was sentenced to twenty-three years and eight months in state prison.

Petitioner appealed the conviction. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction on July 25, 2012, (Ans. Ex. 1), and the state high court denied review on November 14, 2012, (id., Ex. 4).

Petitioner filed state habeas petitions challenging the conviction. The state superior court denied the petition on substantive and procedural grounds on January 16, 2013. (Id., Ex. 6.) The state appellate and high courts summarily denied the petitions, with the latter decision filed on October 30, 2013. (Id., Exs. 8, 10.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on November 19, 2013.

BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal set forth the following facts³:

I. Factual Background

Valverde and her husband Covarrubias were mortgage brokers. A prospective borrower engages the services of a mortgage broker to work with wholesale lenders on the borrower's behalf. The wholesale lender's loan representative works directly with the broker, not the borrower. The broker submits a loan application and other documentation on behalf of the borrower to the wholesale lender's loan representative. This documentation is then forwarded to the wholesale lender's loan underwriter, who makes the decision whether to fund the loan. The purpose of the underwriting process is to ensure that the borrower will be able to repay the loan.

This case involved five wholesale lenders: Argent Mortgage Corporation (Argent), BNC Mortgage (BNC), Downey Savings and Loan (Downey), WMC Mortgage (WMC), and World Savings (World). These lenders relied on the information on the loan applications and documentation submitted by brokers to determine whether the borrowers would be able to repay the loan. Where the application was for a "stated income" loan, the lender relied on the broker to ensure that the borrower's stated income was accurate. [FN3] Typically, the underwriter would issuea conditional loan approval that required further documentation. The loan would not actually be funded until the conditions were met.

FN3. Some of the wholesale lenders offered only stated income loans, while others offered a variety of loan types.

Because the broker's fees are funded from the total loan amount, the borrower ends up paying those fees. Typically the broker's fee is 1 percent of the loan amount, but it may legally be as high as 5 percent. The wholesale lender may require a longer prepayment penalty period if the broker's fee is high in order to ensure that the lender profits from the loan. The borrower on a refinancing transaction had the legal right to cancel the transaction within three days after signing the document.

Defendants acted as brokers on numerous transactions with these five wholesale lenders. These were subprime loans. Subprime loans include stated income loans, loans to borrowers with poor credit scores, and loans with high loan-to-value ratios. Many of the borrowers represented by defendants did not speak or read English, could not read the documents (which were always in English), and did not understand the details of the transactions. Defendants lied to these borrowers about the amounts of their fees and misrepresented the terms of the loans. Valverde notarized backdated deeds of trusts in order to prevent the borrowers from exercising their rights to cancel refinancing transactions. Defendants prepared and submitted loan applications that misrepresented the borrowers' income and assets, and forged documents to support those applications.

II. Procedural Background

Defendants were jointly charged by indictment with 19 counts of grand theft [counts 5, 12, 15, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, and 46] and two counts of forgery [counts 39 and 40]. Valverde alone was charged with an additional seven counts of grand theft [counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 10], 12 counts of committing a fraudulent notarial act on a deed [counts 8, 11, 13, 16, 22, 25, 27, 30, 32, 42, 45, and 47], and five counts of forgery [counts 14, 17, 18, 34, and 35]. [FN4] Covarrubias alone was charged with one count of forgery [counts 20]. The indictment also alleged excessive taking allegations under sections 186.11 and 12022.6 against both defendants.

FN4. Count 4, which was another grand theft count against Valverde, was dismissed at the commencement of trial.

After lengthy deliberations, the jury returned verdicts finding defendants guilty of nearly all of the counts. On count 3, Valverde was found guilty as to only the lender but not to the borrowers. She was also acquitted of counts 9 and 10, which were grand theft counts, and counts 27, 32, and 42, which were fraudulent notarial act counts. Valverde was convicted of the remaining counts. Covarrubias was convicted of all of the charged counts. The enhancement allegations were found true as to both defendants, as was a probation-related excessive taking allegation.

In May 2009, Valverde was sentenced to 23 years and eight months in state prison. She was awarded 67 days of actual custody creditand 32 days of conduct credit. Covarrubias was sentenced at the same time to 19 years and eight months in state prison. He was awarded 61 days of actual custody credit and 30 days of conduct credit. Both of them timely filed notices of appeal.

In February 2010, defendants filed motions seeking additional conduct credit under the newly revised version of section 4019 that had taken effect in January 2010. The prosecution conceded that defendants were entitled to the additional credit they sought. In April 2010, the trial court granted defendants' motions and awarded Valverde an additional 34 days of conduct credit and Covarrubias an additional 30 days of conduct credit.

(Op. at 2-5.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384-86 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" Supreme Court authority, falling under the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if thestate court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but "unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.

"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. The federal habeas court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which Section 2254(d) applies is the "last reasoned decision" of the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemak...