Valvo v. Freedom of Information Com'n, No. 18283.
Decision Date | 26 January 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 18283. |
Citation | 294 Conn. 534,985 A.2d 1052 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Vincent M. VALVO et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al. |
Daniel J. Klau, with whom was Justin R. Clark, Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Martin R. Libbin, deputy director of legal services, for the appellee (defendant chief court administrator).
Victor Perpetua, appellate attorney, for the appellee (named defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.
The plaintiffs, Vincent M. Valvo and the Connecticut Council on Freedom of Information, filed a complaint with the named defendant, the freedom of information commission (commission), after the defendant chief court administrator of the judicial branch of the state of Connecticut (chief court administrator), denied their request pursuant to the freedom of information act (act), General Statutes § 1-200 et seq., for copies of certain docket sheets.1 The commission dismissed the complaint and the plaintiffs appealed from the dismissal to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs then appealed2 from the judgment of the trial court claiming that, although the trial court properly determined that, under this court's decision in Clerk of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, 278 Conn. 28, 37, 895 A.2d 743 (2006), the docket sheets were not administrative records subject to the act, that case was wrongly decided and this court should overrule it. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on the alternate ground that the plaintiffs' claim is nonjusticiable.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. In a letter dated May 3, 2007, the plaintiffs requested copies of the docket sheets in all level 2 sealed files from the office of the chief court administrator.3 The chief court administrator denied the request on the ground that, under this court's decision in Clerk of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 278 Conn. at 37, 895 A.2d 743, the docket sheets were records of adjudicative matters, not records of an administrative function, and, therefore, they were not subject to the act. Id. (); id., at 42, 895 A.2d 743 (). The plaintiffs then filed a letter of complaint with the commission. The commission concluded that, "with respect to the requested records, the [judicial branch] is not a public agency within the meaning of [the act]." Accordingly, the commission dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then appealed from the dismissal to the trial court.
While the plaintiffs' administrative appeal was pending in the trial court, the judicial branch implemented a process by which all level 2 sealed cases in the state were identified and reviewed to determine whether the sealing orders should be overturned. As the result of these proceedings, all but five of the docket sheets requested by the plaintiffs were unsealed. Thereafter, the office of the chief court administrator provided the plaintiffs with copies of the docket sheets in the unsealed cases.
In her brief to the trial court following the disclosure in the unsealed cases, the chief court administrator argued that the trial court should dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal on the ground that it was moot. Specifically, the chief court administrator contended that the case was moot with respect to the unsealed docket sheets because they had been provided to the plaintiffs and that it was moot with respect to the five sealed docket sheets because the chief court administrator had no authority to issue orders to unseal the files that remained sealed pursuant to a court order. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir.2004) (). Therefore, the chief court administrator argued, the trial court could grant no practical relief because, even if the trial court found that the docket sheets were subject to the act, she had no power to overturn the sealing orders. In addition, the chief court administrator relied on a prior case in which the commission had determined that documents that are subject to a sealing order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-114 are exempt from the act under General Statutes § 1-210(a),5 and that "it was not for the [c]ommission to second-guess the appropriate scope of a sealing order issued by a judicial authority."6 Peruta v. Chief Court Administrator, Freedom of Information Commission, Docket No. FIC 2003-035 (September 24, 2003).
The trial court disagreed with the chief court administrator's argument that the case was moot because it concluded that the question of whether the chief court administrator had the authority to vacate the sealing orders went to the merits of the case, not to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court agreed, however, with the chief court administrator's claim that, under Clerk of the Superior Court, the requested docket sheets were not administrative records and, therefore, were not subject to the act. Accordingly, it dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This appeal followed. At oral argument before this court, the plaintiffs conceded that their claim is moot with respect to the docket sheets that the chief court administrator has provided to them. Thus, only the five sealed docket sheets that the chief court administrator has not provided are at issue in this appeal. The plaintiffs claim that, although the commission and the trial court properly determined that, under this court's decision in Clerk of the Superior Court v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, at 278 Conn. at 53, 895 A.2d 743, the requested docket sheets were not administrative records subject to the act, that case was wrongly decided and this court should overrule it. In response, the chief court administrator contends that we should affirm the judgment of the trial court on the alternate ground that the case is moot because no practical relief can be provided.7 She further contends that, if we conclude that the case is not moot, the trial court properly determined that the documents are not subject to the act under Clerk of the Superior Court, which she maintains was correctly decided. We conclude that the plaintiffs' claim is nonjusticiable because neither the commission nor the trial court can grant the plaintiffs any practical relief.
We begin with the standard of review. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Preston, 286 Conn. 367, 373-74, 944 A.2d 276 (2008). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Preston, supra, at 373-74, 944 A.2d 276. "A case is considered moot if court cannot grant the appellant `any practical relief through its disposition of the merits....'" Moraski v. Connecticut Board of Examiners of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 291 Conn. 242, 255, 967 A.2d 1199 (2009). Because mootness implicates this court's subject matter jurisdiction, it raises a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. See Windels v. Environmental Protection Commission, 284 Conn. 268, 279, 933 A.2d 256 (2007).
The chief court administrator contends that the plaintiffs' claim that the docket sheets are subject to the act as administrative records is moot because she has no authority to overturn sealing orders issued pursuant to court order. She further argues that the commission has no power in an administrative proceeding to overturn the decision of the trial court in separate proceedings wherein the trial court reviewed the sealing orders and determined that the cases should remain sealed. Therefore, she argues, even if the docket sheets ultimately were found to be administrative records subject to the act, no practical relief would be available.
The plaintiffs concede that, even if this court were to overrule its decision in Clerk of the Superior Court, neither the chief court administrator nor the commission would have authority under the act to overturn the sealing orders in the five sealed cases;9 see Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, supra, 380 F.3d at 97; but contend the trial court would have the inherent judicial authority, as opposed to authority under the act, to do so on appeal from the commission's decision.10 They also contend that this court cannot consider the merits of the question of whether the sealed docket sheets are subject to the act without first resolving the issue of whether this court correctly determined in Clerk of the...
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