Van Antwerp v. State

• Decision Date: 06 October 1952
• Docket Number: No. 47,47
• Citation: 334 Mich. 593,55 N.W.2d 108
• Parties: VAN ANTWERP v. STATE
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 108

55 N.W.2d 108

334 Mich. 593

VAN ANTWERP v. STATE

No. 47.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 6, 1952.

Lyle S. Van Antwerp, in pro. per.

Conlin, Conlin & Parker, Ann Arbor, for appellant.

Frank G. Millard, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor Gen., Lansing, Daniel J. O'Hara, Meredith H. Doyle, Assts. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench, except NORTH, C. J.

CARR, Justice.

Under date of December 16, 1948, the plaintiff instituted an action in the court of claims to recover a judgment for damages against the State of Michigan. From the petition filed by him it appears that his alleged cause of action was based on certain proceedings in the probate court of Kent county which resulted in his commitment to the State psychopathic hospital at Ann Arbor for a period of 35 days, and subsequently to an adjudication that he was an insane person, followed by his commitment to the Kalamazoo State hospital. Plaintiff asserted in his pleading that as a result of such actions he sustained damages, that the proceedings against him were null and void because of the failure of the court to observe provisions of the statute relating thereto, and that, in consequence, the State of Michigan is liable for the various elements of damage sustained by him, as set forth in his bill of particulars.

Defendant moved to dismiss the case on the general ground that the facts stated were not sufficient 'to constitute a valid cause of action against said defendant.' The motion was granted, the trial judge concluding that under pertinent statutory provisions relating to the court of claims defendant was not precluded from raising the defense of governmental immunity, that the acts of the probate judge of Kent county of which the plaintiff complained were judicial acts for which the State cannot be held liable, and that the proceeding in the court of claims was not seasonably instituted. Plaintiff has appealed from the order of dismissal.

The case having been disposed of in the trial court on the issues raised by the motion, the well pleaded allegations of fact in plaintiff's petition must be accepted as true. It appears therefrom that on the 10th of June, 1927, plaintiff's father filed in the probate court of the county of Kent a petition seeking plaintiff's commitment to the State psychopathic hospital at the University of Michigan. Such order of commitment was made for a period not exceeding 35 days. Subsequently and under date of April 6, 1928, plaintiff's father filed a second petition in the probate court alleging that plaintiff was insane and seeking his admission to the Kalamazoo State hospital for treatment. As a result of the proceedings taken plaintiff was so committed as a public patient. The petition further alleges that the proceedings and orders of the Kent county probate court were null and void, and in violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights because the petition by which the proceedings were instituted was insufficient, no hearing to determine the matter of insanity was held, and plaintiff was denied the right to be present at a proper hearing held pursuant to the statute. Reference is made to P.A.1923, No. 151, § 11, which, as amended by P.A.1925, No. 283, was in force and effect at the time of the commitment ¹. The petition alleges that by reason of the void proceedings plaintiff was injured in his reputation, was wrongfully deprived of his liberty, and has sustained financial losses.

Attached to the petition is a decree rendered by the circuit court for the county of Washtenaw on the 13th day of June, 1947. The record indicates that plaintiff herein brought suit against the Commissioner of Revenue of the State for injunctive relief. The case was not contested, defendant's default being taken. The decree entered declared the orders and commitments of the probate court for the county of Kent, referred to by plaintiff in his petition, to be null and void, and recited that plaintiff had been deprived of his constitutional rights to his damage. In terms he was authorized to assert in any court of the State 'any cause of action which may inure to him' because of the void commitments; and the defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue, was enjoined from instituting any proceeding against plaintiff to recover because of the expenditures by the State in caring for him in the State institutions.

Approximately six months after the entering of the default decree a motion to set it aside was denied. Plaintiff apparently relies to some extent on the recitals in such decree. Obviously, however, the statements referred to cannot be regarded as creating any new right of action in his behalf, or as imposing on the State any liability in addition to that, if any, created through legislative enactment.

The primary question at issue is whether the State of Michigan has by statute waived the right to assert governmental immunity in cases of the character here involved, and had subjected itself to liability therein. The court of claims was created, and its jurisdiction defined, by P.A.1939, No. 135, which, as subsequently amended, appears as C.L.1948, § 691.101 et seq., as amended by P.A.1948, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 47, and P.A.1949, No. 253, Stat.Ann.1951 Cum.Supp. § 27.3548(1) et seq. In section 8 of the act as originally passed in 1939 the court was given power:

'To hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies.'

Said section 8, C.L.1948, § 691.108, Stat.Ann.1951 Cum.Supp. § 27.3548(8), was amended in certain respects not material in the instant case by P.A.1941, No. 137, and P.A.1945, No. 199. The clause above quoted was not changed in any way. Plaintiff relies thereon, asserting that under its terms the State is liable to him for the damages alleged in his petition, and that the State has thereby waived its right to raise against him the defense of governmental immunity.

The question at issue is in effect one of statutory interpretation. In City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 183, 189 N.W. 221, 222, it was said:

'There seems to be no lack of harmony in the rules governing the interpretation of statutes. All are agreed that the primary one is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. All others serve but as guides to assist the courts in determining such intent with a greater degree of certainty. If the language employed in a statute is plain, certain, and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices, and no interpretation is necessary. The rule is no less elementary that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence, and section. To that end, the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.'

See, also, Gardner-White Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, 296 Mick. 225, 295 N.W. 624; In re Chamberlain's Estate, 298 Mich. 278, 299 N.W. 82; In re Petition of Bryant, 323 Mich. 424, 35 N.W.2d 371.

On the specific point in issue here the legislature in the enactment of P.A.1939, No. 135, did not leave the question of intent to be determined by the application of general rules of construction. In section 24 of said act it was specifically provided:

'This act shall in no manner be construed as enlarging the present liabilities of the state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies.'

It will be noted that the quoted section was not in the from of a limitation on, or an exception to, any other specific provision or provisions of the act, but, rather, was a general statement with reference to the legislative purpose in the adoption of the act, and a guide for observance by the courts in its interpretation. It was accordingly held in Manion v. State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527, and in Mead v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 303 Mich. 168, 5 N.W.2d 740, that the legislature, by the court of claims act, had not waived or abrogated the right to rely on its sovereign immunity. See, also, McNair v. State Highway Department, 305 Mich. 181, 9 N.W.2d 52.

It is a fair inference that the legislature in declaring that it was not its intention to enlarge the then existing liability of the State and its agencies had in mind the commonly accepted rule with reference to sovereign immunity. In 49 Am.Jur., pp. 315, 316, it is said:

'It is well established that by consenting to be sued the state does nothing more than waive its immunity from action. It does not thereby concede its liability in favor of the claimant or create a cause of action in his favor which did not theretofore exist. Thus, liability of the state for tort cannot be predicated upon the fact that the state has entered its general statutory consent to be sued, directing the manner in which suits may be brought by those having claims against the state. Neither does a special statute permitting suits on particular claims concede the justice of the claims. Statutory consent to be sued merely gives a remedy to enforce a liability and submits the state to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.'

In an annotation appearing in 169 A.L.R. page 105 et seq. many decisions relating to the question at issue are cited and discussed. The holdings are summarized in the following statement there made:

'The decisions discussed herein add further support to the uncontroverted proposition noted in the earlier annotation that a general statute authorizing suits against the state does not permit a recovery in actions in tort, upon the principle that the state is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents, or servants, and it will only be so liable upon its clear and definite...