Van Blunk v. McAllister Towing of Philadelphia, Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 10-00686 (RBK/JS) |
| Parties | ROBERT K. VAN BLUNK, Plaintiff, v. MCALLISTER TOWING OF PHILADELPHIA, INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Robert K. Van Blunk's motion for reconsideration of the portion of this Court's Order dated March 12, 2012 in which the Court granted in part the motion of McAllister Towing of Philadelphia, Inc. ("Defendant") for summary judgment on the issue of judicial estoppel. The parties submitted briefs and the Court heard oral argument on this issue on April 24, 2012. As explained below, the Court denies Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.
Motions for reconsideration are not expressly recognized in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999). Generally, a motion for reconsideration is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), or as a motion for relief from judgment or order underFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See id. In the District of New Jersey, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration. See Byrne v. Calastro, No. 05-68, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64054, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006).
Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) permits a party to seek reconsideration by the Court of matters which the party "believes the Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked" when it ruled on the motion. See L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). "The standard for [reconsideration] is high, and reconsideration is to be granted only sparingly." United States v. Jones, 158 F.R.D. 309, 314 (D.N.J. 1994). The movant has the burden of demonstrating either: "(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court [issued its order]; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice." Max's Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995)). "The word 'overlooked' is the operative term in the Rule." Bowers v. NCAA, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001) (citation omitted); Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d at 345. The Court will grant a motion for reconsideration only where it overlooked a factual or legal issue that may alter the disposition of the matter. See Compaction Sys. Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d at 345; see also L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
Ordinarily, a motion for reconsideration may address only those matters of fact or issues of law that the parties presented to, but were not considered by, the court in the course of making the decision at issue. See Student Pub. Interest Grp. v. Monsanto Co., 727 F. Supp. 876, 878 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 891 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1989). Thus, reconsideration is not to be used as a means of expanding the record to include matters not originally before the court. See Bowers, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 613; Resorts Int'l. v. Great Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826, 831 & n.3(D.N.J. 1992); Egloff v. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (D.N.J. 1988). Absent unusual circumstances, a court should reject new evidence that was not presented when the court made the contested decision. See Resorts Int'l, 830 F. Supp. at 831 n.3. A party seeking to introduce new evidence on reconsideration bears the burden of first demonstrating that the evidence was unavailable or unknown at the time of the original decision. See Levinson v. Regal Ware, Inc., No. 89-1298, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18373, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 1989).
Moreover, L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) does not allow parties to restate arguments that the court has already considered. See G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F. Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990). Thus, a difference of opinion with the court's decision should be dealt with through the normal appellate process. See Bowers, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (citations omitted); Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 159, 162 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Chicosky v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 979 F. Supp. 316, 318 (D.N.J. 1997); NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (). In other words, "[a] motion for reconsideration should not provide the parties with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple." Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 533 (D.N.J. 1998) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's primary argument in moving for reconsideration is that Plaintiff did not himself make the inconsistent statements to the Coast Guard and to Defendant, relying instead on his doctors' professional judgment. Plaintiff also argues that he did not make any statements in bad faith.
The central basis for Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is that the Court's March 12, 2012 Opinion ("the Opinion") relied upon an incorrect copy of the instruction pages of the United States Coast Guard Application for Relicensure. Defendant concedes that the instruction pages of the Coast Guard form that Plaintiff submitted with his 2008 application for relicensure contained different instructions than the pages considered by the Court in the prior Opinion.3 The instruction form attached to the application for relicensure, which the parties now agree is the correct version of the instructions, states that "[y]ou may submit this report, completed by your physician." Pl. Ex. 8 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that in submitting his application for relicensure, he merely certified that his family physician, Dr. Gross, had completed the form on Plaintiff's behalf.
The Court previously noted that the 2008 Coast Guard application required applicants to certify, as Plaintiff did, that "all information provided by me is complete and true to the best of my knowledge." Pl. Ex. 8. Furthermore, the application required that Plaintiff's physician complete the following sections:
Id. In sections III and V, Dr. Gross certified that Plaintiff's vision and hearing were "normal." Id. Section VII required Dr. Gross to provide certified responses to the question, "[d]oes theapplicant have or ever suffered from [sic] any of the following [medical issues]?" Dr. Gross noted that Plaintiff did not currently have, and had never suffered from, the following medical problems: "[i]mpaired range of motion," "[i]mpaired balance/coordination," "[r]ecent or repetitive surgery" and "[o]ther illness or disability not listed." Id. Dr. Gross's responses to these questions on the application form are curious, given the fact that Plaintiff had undergone surgery on his rotator cuff and follow-up treatments since at least four months prior to Plaintiff's visit to Dr. Gross. In fact, Plaintiff had just visited his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Ciccotti, on October 2, 2008, just four days prior to Plaintiff's visit to Dr. Gross. See Pl. Ex. 5.
The Court notes that Dr. Gross testified in deposition that he had received from Dr. Ciccotti Plaintiff's records of treatment related to his rotator cuff. Gross Dep. at 30-37. Dr. Gross further stated in deposition that he believed that at the time he was examining Plaintiff, he stated to Plaintiff, "You're physically fit as far as I'm concerned, but you have to be cleared by the orthopedic doctor." Id. at 32. Finally, Dr. Gross testified that Plaintiff stated in response to Dr. Gross's questions during the examination that Plaintiff had "[n]o complaint of any shoulder issues." Id. at 29. The Court further notes that Plaintiff has not submitted any affidavits or made any sworn statements of his own personal knowledge that contradict Dr. Gross's testimony. After being examined by Dr. Gross, Plaintiff submitted the two-page application form to the Coast Guard and certified that all information provided by him was true, despite the fact that Plaintiff necessarily knew that he had previously been treated extensively for his shoulder injury by Dr. Ciccotti. See Pl. Exs. 1-5 ().
The Court finds that Plaintiff's knowledge that he had been treated extensively for his shoulder injury, including surgery for rotator cuff repair within 4 months of his application for relicensure to the Coast Guard, is irreconcilably inconsistent with Plaintiff's adoption under oath of Dr. Gross's certified statement that Plaintiff had never had prior impairment of his range of motion and that Plaintiff had "[n]o recent or repetitive surgery." Pl. Ex. 8. The knowledge of whether one has ever had prior impairment of one's range of shoulder motion, and whether one has had recent shoulder surgery, is knowledge that is common to a layperson unschooled in medicine. Therefore, in this case, notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Gross filled out Plaintiff's application form, it is appropriate for Plaintiff's certification of the statements contained within the application, and Plaintiff's submission of the application to the Coast Guard, to be imputed against Plaintiff for purposes of judicial estoppel.
Defendant next presents undisputed evidence that on several occasions, Plaintiff submitted to Defendant certifications from Dr. Ciccotti noting that Plaintiff was "unfit for duty." Def. Ex. B (containing certified copies of all of Plaintiff's "not fit for duty" ("NFFD") slips). After receiving these certifications, Defendant excused Plaintiff from appearing for work, and Defendant began to pay Plaintiff's disability benefits and medical expenses. Def. Ex. A, Benton Decl. The Court notes that during the entire period in...
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