Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. R. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 December 1889 |
| Citation | 78 Mich. 530,44 N.W. 321 |
| Parties | VAN BRUNT v. CINCINNATI, J. & M. R. Co. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Error to circuit court, Calhoun county; FRANK A. HOOKER, Judge.
Action by William B. Van Brunt, administrator, etc., of William H Van Brunt, deceased, against the Cincinnati, Jackson & Mackinaw Railroad Company. The court ordered a nonsuit, and plaintiff appeals.
John C. Patterson and Jesse M. Hatch, for appellant.
Miner & Southworth, for appellee.
William H. Van Brunt, the plaintiff's intestate, while in the employ of the defendant as brakeman on a freight train, was crushed between defendant's caboose car No. 86 and caboose car No. 88 on the 1st day of January, 1888, at Marshall, and died from his injuries on the next day, about five hours after the injury. The administrator brought suit to recover damages on account of such injury and death. The court below directed verdict for defendant. The court based its direction, among other things, upon the ground that no damages were shown. The declaration was in four counts, each of which alleged that the claim for damages was expressly based upon sections 7 and 8 of article 5 of an act entitled "An act to revise the laws providing for the incorporation of railroad companies, and to regulate the running and management, and to fix the duties and liabilities, of all railroads and other corporations owning or operating any railroad in this state," approved May 1, 1873, as amended, and also pursuant to an act entitled "An act requiring compensation for causing death by wrongful act, neglect, or default," approved February 12, 1848, as amended." Sections 7 and 8 of article 5 of the railroad act, above referred to, are sections 3391 and 3392, 1 How. St., and the act of 1848, as amended, is found in How. St. �� 8313 and 8314. After the counsel for plaintiff had opened the case to the jury, and before any witnesses were sworn in the case, the court asked counsel for plaintiff, in substance, upon what section of the statute this suit was based; and also whether deceased was a married man, or had any person dependent upon him for support; whether he had any family; who were the relations of the deceased. Counsel replied, in substance, that the suit was based on sections 3391 and 3392, 1 How. St.; that the deceased was an unmarried man, about 20 years of age, and had no one dependent upon him; and that whatever damages were recovered would go to the administrator, to be distributed under the statute of distribution of this state; and that his father would be the proper distributee. The court then, in like manner, asked, "What do you, then, claim to be the measure of damages?" Counsel replied, "Just what the statute says, viz., whatever the jury may deem just and fair." The court then called counsel's attention to the case of Railway Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205, and stated: The counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Patterson, then stated that the case cited was under the general law, and that the present action was under the railroad law, which was broader. The court stated that he brought the subject up at that time so that it need not be a surprise to any one.
The proof showed that the deceased was a young man, unmarried, and about 22 years of age at the time of his death. No evidence was given that he left any next of kin surviving him; but it appears in the record that a brother of his was sworn as a witness, and the statement was made by counsel, as above shown, in answer to the query of the court, "that he had no one dependent upon him; and that whatever damages were recovered would go to the administrator, to be distributed under the statute of distribution of this state; and that his father would be the proper distributee." For the purposes of this case, therefore, we shall assume that it appeared that he had a father and a brother, but that no one was dependent upon him for support. It was also shown that the bill of the physician who attended him was $1, and his funeral expenses amounted to about $60; but it was not shown that any of his next of kin paid these charges, or were liable to pay them, or that decedent's estate was not ample to meet them. It was also shown that he was a healthy man, of good habits, and earning at the time $50 per month. After the proofs were closed, and the court had intimated his purpose to take the case from the jury on the ground that no damages were shown, the court asked counsel for plaintiff if he cared to make further proofs on that subject, and counsel replied that he did not think it was required under the statute; that it was a matter for the jury.
Sections 3391 and 3392, How. St. pp. 869, 870, are as follows: These sections are found in the general railroad law as revised in 1873. Previous to this revision the statute provided (Comp. Laws 1871, � 2351) that the damages should be assessed with reference "to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the wife and next of kin of such deceased person." It was held in this court, under the statute as it then existed, that the meas-sure of such pecuniary injury would be the loss by the death of what the family was accustomed to receive, or had reasonable expectations of receiving, in his life-time. Railway Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. at pages 214, 215. In this case it was not shown that the deceased had ever contributed any of his earnings to any of his next of kin, or that it was expected that he would do so in the future, had he lived. It is therefore argued in support of the ruling of the circuit judge: That the young man was an unmarried adult, who owed no obligation to any one. That there was absolutely no proof whatever that there was such a person as a father or mother dependent upon him, or who had lost anything by his death, or any person who was legally entitled to a particle of support from him, or who had ever received one dollar from him; and the court could do nothing less than to take such a blind guess from the jury. That if a person had no next of kin no recovery can be had for his death, nor if there rests upon him no moral or legal obligation to contribute to the support of next of kin, if any are left surviving him. That the jury have no right, in "fairness and justice," under this statute, to give men blood money or punitive damages, but the damages found must be compensatory, and susceptible of proof. In support of this claim the counsel for defendant cite the following Michigan cases: Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Bayfield's Case, 37 Mich. 205; Staal v. Railroad Co., 57 Mich. 239, 245, 23 N.W. 795; Mynning v. Railroad Co., 59 Mich. 257, 26 N.W. 514; Klanowski v. Railway Co., 57 Mich. 525, 24 N.W. 801; Cooper v. Railway Co., 66 Mich. 261, 33 N.W. 308; Balch v. Railroad Co., 67 Mich. 394, 34 N.W. 884; Rajnowski v. Railway Co., 41 N.W. 847. Reference is also had to authorities from other states, and to text-books.
The plaintiff's counsel contend, first, that the deceased would have been required under the statutes of this state to maintain his father, had such father been unable to take care of himself, and that there can be no doubt of his moral obligation to do so, independently of any statute. But they further argue that by the amendment of 1873 the legislature intended to, and did, alter the rule prevailing under "Lord Campbell's Act," so called, (9 & 10 Vict c. 93,) of which the statutes of this state (Comp. Laws 1871, � 2351) and of other states were a substantial copy; and, by such Revision of 1873, not only took away the limit of $5,000 under the old law, but meant to authorize the jury to give such amount of damages as they might deem fair and just, under the circumstances; and that it should not depend on the...
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