Van Brunt v. Wakelee

• Decision Date: 06 December 1863
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Elizabeth Van Brunt v. Clement Wakelee

11 Mich. 177

Elizabeth Van Brunt v. Clement Wakelee

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 6, 1863

Submitted on Briefs October 24, 1863 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in Chancery from Calhoun Circuit.

Complainant filed her bill to redeem from a chattel mortgage a quantity of wheat, which she had mortgaged while growing, and which at the time of filing the bill had been harvested and stacked upon her premises. The mortgage fell due August 1st, 1861 and on the next day defendant, who was assignee of the mortgage, came upon complainant's premises and took possession of the wheat, but without removing it, and refused to allow complainant to redeem. Two weeks thereafter she tendered the amount due on the mortgage, and on defendant refusing to receive it, and stating that he should take the whole wheat, she filed this bill to redeem. Defendant demurred generally. The Circuit Judge overruled the demurrer, and decreed a redemption. ^[*]

Defendant appealed.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

Hughes & Wooley, for complainant:

This cause presents the broad question--Whether there is an equity of redemption to mortgaged chattels, which may be asserted by the mortgagor after default in payment and before foreclosure of the mortgage by an execution of the power of sale.

The common law knows no equity of redemption in lands or goods mortgaged, but such equity is a creation of the Court of Chancery, and no reason, in the nature of things, exists why it should not apply to all mortgages, real and personal alike: 1 Washb. Real Prop., 478.

It may be said not to exist, for the reason that such an equity is inconsistent with the rule at law established in our courts, that the legal title to goods mortgaged is in the mortgagee. But courts have frequently held, in this country, that a mortgage of real estate vested the legal title in the mortgagee, and yet these courts never denied the existence of an equity of redemption on this ground.

There is no difference in principle between a mortgage of goods or lands. The estate in the subject of the mortgage conveyed by one is precisely like the other. Judge Story says with reference to chattel mortgages: "It is a conditional transfer of the property, and if the condition is not performed, the whole title vests absolutely, at law, in the mortgagee, exactly as it does in the case of a mortgage of lands:" 2 Eq. Juris., § 1030.

The same learned jurist makes no distinction, so far as the equity of redemption is concerned, between real and personal mortgages: "In mortgages of chattels, although the prescribed condition has not been fulfilled, these exists, as in mortgages of land, an equity of redemption, which may be asserted by the mortgagor, if he brings his bill to redeem within a reasonable time:" I bid., § 1031. See also Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. Sr., 278; Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch., 100 and 101; Domendary v. Metcalf, Prec. in Ch., 149; Wenderzee v. Willis, 3 Bro. 21; Harrison v. Hart, Comyn, 392, 411; 1 Bouv. Inst., 349; Cutts v. York Man. Co., 6 Shep. 201; Hinman v. Judson, 13 Barb. 629.

L. D. Dibble, for defendant:

The theory of a chattel mortgage is, that it is a conditional sale of property, liable to be defeated only by performance of the condition at the time specified in the instrument itself, and to become an absolute and unconditional sale, by failure to perform the condition at the time specified therein: 1 Hill 473; 2 Denio 170; 3 Mich. 104, and cases cited.

The only question to be determined in this case is, can the property be redeemed after the sale has become absolute, and the title has become vested, absolutely, in the mortgagee, or in his assignee, by the failure of the mortgagor to perform the condition of the mortgage on the day. 2 Denio 170, on the subject of redemption in equity, is but a dictum of the court, without deciding anything or citing authority. 3 Mich 104, is also a mere dictum. 2 Story Eq., § 1031, refers for authority to Kemp v. Westbrook, 1 Ves. 278, and to Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch., 101, and to Comyn, 392, 411, and does not add anything to the law of those cases. The case of Hart v. Ten Eyck was one of pledge and not of chattel mortgage, the distinction between which has long been well defined in law. The case in 3 Bro. Ch., 21, referred to in 2 Johns. Ch., 101, was also a case of pledge of securities deposited, and not of chattel mortgage, and is, therefore, not authority. It is stated in Story on Bailments, § 287, that "equity will interfere to compel a redemption" of chattel mortgaged property, but the statement is not borne out by the authorities which he cites. 2 Pick. 206, was a "bill of sale" to secure a debt, and an agreement to reconvey upon certain conditions. The court, in that case, says it is questionable whether it was a mortgage, and that it was unnecessary to decide whether it was or not. That case does not decide that a redemption could be had in equity. 2 Pick. 249, does not reach the question, for that was a "bill of sale" and a "covenant" given back to reconvey on certain conditions, upon which instrument the court say suit could be brought. 3 Pick. 495, is not at all in point. It must, in this...