Van Buren v. Waddle
| Decision Date | 22 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:14-cv-01894-MJS (PC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | IRVIN VAN BUREN, Plaintiff, v. LT . C. WADDLE, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff, Irvin Van Buren, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. No other parties have appeared in this action. Plaintiff's complaint is before the court for screening.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous, malicious," or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the courtdetermines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff's claims arise out of events that occurred in April, May, and June 2014, while he was incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP") in Delano, California. He names the following correctional officers as Defendants: Lt. C. Waddle, Sgt. Niebert, Officer J. Walinga, Officer Ronquillo, and Lt. Lesniak.
His allegations may be summarized as follows:
After being transferred from the Corcoran Special Housing Unit (SHU) to KVSP on April 22, 2014, Plaintiff learned that "2-5" gang members who had attacked him and broken his jaw at Corcoran were now housed on KVSP's C Facility. Plaintiff told several officers he was concerned about his safety on C Facility. He filed two 602 Appeals on the issue, and was placed in administrative segregation until space became available elsewhere. After an Institutional Classification Committee hearing on May 8, 2014, however, Plaintiff was ordered to be released from administrative segregation and housed on Facility C, Building #3 where, allegedly, "2-5" Mexican gang members were "the most highly concentrated...in the entire prison."
On May 14, after being transferred to C Facility, Plaintiff began to feel suicidal. He met with mental health staff member Dr. Patterson and explained his safety concerns. Dr. Patterson communicated these concerns to custody staff, and Plaintiff met with Lt. Waddle to discuss his placement. According to Plaintiff, Lt. Waddle was highly skeptical of his fears and refused to move him, informing him that she was "not going to fill a bed space in ad-seg just because [he was] scared." She stated she could only help him if he would provide information on gang members or their illegal activities.Lt. Waddle disregarded Plaintiff's warnings that he would kill himself, saying, and she ordered him back to his cell.
Defendants Ronquillo and Walinga yanked Plaintiff from his seat, grabbed his arms, and started pushing him through the hallway towards the patio. Still clad only in his boxer shorts after the medical appointment, Plaintiff assumed he would be taken to the clinic to retrieve his shoes and clothes, so he "motioned slightly" in the direction of the clinic. The officers responded by pulling Plaintiff "violently and aggressively" toward the gate to C Facility. Plaintiff asked them to slow down because he was not wearing shoes and the hot pavement was burning his feet. He reminded the officers that he needed his clothes. When the officers continued to push Plaintiff toward the gate, he yelled, "Y'all are setting me up!" Defendant Walinga replied, "You're going to kill yourself anyways; you should have thought about that beforehand."
Plaintiff claims that without further provocation, both officers began to punch him in the face and head and tried to slam him to the ground. A third officer, Sgt. Niebert, joined in and "body slammed [P]laintiff to the ground on his face and shoulder," injuring Plaintiff's left rotator cuff. Then all three officers began kicking and punching plaintiff. Plaintiff suffered burns from being pressed to the hot pavement. Plaintiff states that he did not receive medical treatment for several days.
On May 22, 2014, Plaintiff received a rule violation report (RVR) for battery on a peace officer in connection with the alleged assault. Officer R. Gonzalez was assigned to investigate the RVR and gather information on Plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff drafted questions for witnesses and requested the surveillance video footage of the alleged assault. According to Plaintiff, Officer Gonzalez obtained statements from six witnesses, but denied Plaintiff's request for video footage.
Senior Hearing Officer Lt. Lesniak adjudicated the RVR on June 4, 2014. He refused to consider any of the witness statements and again denied plaintiff's request for video footage. Lt. Lesniak found Plaintiff guilty of battery on a peace officer and sentenced Plaintiff to an eighteen month term in the SHU at California Correctional Institution Tehachapi.
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.
Here, Plaintiff's complaint alleges multiple constitutional violations by multiple defendants, but pleads insufficient facts to support all of his claims. While his allegations of excessive force and failure to protect meet the pleading standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2), he does not allege sufficient facts to state deliberate indifference and due process claims. In any event, joinder of all named defendants in this action is improper because the claims against them do not involve common questions of law or fact, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B). Therefore, the court will give Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to include additional support for his other claims and/or joinder of all defendants; and to bring his cognizable claims in separate actions.
Plaintiff attempts to bring multiple constitutional claims against five different defendants. While Plaintiff may bring multiple claims against one defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), his ability to join multiple defendants to the same action is circumscribed by Rule 20(a)(2). Under Rule 20(a)(2), a plaintiff may only sue multiple defendants in the same action if at least one claim against each defendant arises out of the same "transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" and there is a "question of law or fact common to all defendants." Here, plaintiff's various claims arise out of three separate occurences: first, his placement within the prison; second, the alleged assault by Officers Ronquillo, Walinga, and Niebert; and third, the disciplinary hearing that followed the alleged assault.
The joinder of Ronquillo, Walinga, and Niebert in one action may be appropriate under Rule 20(a)(2) because Plaintiff's excessive force claim against each of those three arises out of the same occurrence - the assault they allegedly perpetrated against him as he was being led back to his cell. The assault and disciplinary hearing are sufficiently factually interrelated to meet the requirements of Rule 20(a)(2): the outcome of the disciplinary hearing depended on Lt. Lesniak's interpretation of the facts of the alleged assault. Therefore, Lt. Lesniak could be an appropriate defendant in this suit under Rule 20(a)(2) should Plaintiff decide to amend his complaint in accordance with the guidelines set out below.
By contrast, Plaintiff's claims against Lt. Waddle exist independently of his other claims. Despite having occurred on the same day, the interview and the assault are factually unrelated. The court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to demonstrate that his claims against Waddle are related to his other claims. Alternatively, Plaintiff may bring a separate action against Waddle.
The Court now turns to the legal standards Plaintiff must meet if he wants to amend to assert related and legally cognizable claims..
Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment violation agai...
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