Van Doozer v. Van Doozer

• Decision Date: 03 June 1947
• Parties: VAN DOOZER <I>v.</I> VAN DOOZER
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

181 Or. 274

181 P.2d 126

VAN DOOZERv.

VAN DOOZER

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued May 6, 1947.

Modified June 3, 1947.

Divorce — Custody of minor children

1. Where trial court by divorce decree determined that husband was the party at fault, Supreme Court on appeal was required to give preference to the wife in respect to custody of minor child, unless she was manifestly an improper person to have such custody. O.C.L.A. § 9-914.

Divorce — Party at fault — Minor children

2. Where trial court determined by divorce decree that husband was at fault, and record established that wife was a good mother, Supreme Court modified decree in so far as it gave husband privilege to take child to the home of his parents during the months of July and August of each year, so as to award custody of the child to the mother for entire year. O.C.L.A. § 9-914.

                  See 17 Am. Jur. 518; 27 C.J.S., § 324
                

Appeal from Circuit Court, Union County.

R.J. GREEN, Judge.

George T. Cochran, of La Grande, (Cochran & Eberhard, of La Grande, on the brief) for appellant.

L.B. Sandblast, of Portland, on the brief, for respondent.

Before ROSSMAN, Chief Justice, and LUSK, BELT, HAY and WINSLOW, Justices.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

WINSLOW, J. (Pro Tempore)

This suit was commenced by appellant (the wife) against respondent to procure a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. The respondent, after admitting the formal parts of the complaint, denied the allegations thereof regarding mistreatment, denied that appellant herself had faithfully performed her marriage contract and likewise denied that appellant was a fit and proper person to be awarded the exclusive care, control and custody of their minor child, Gerald Franklyn Van Doozer.

The parties were married on the 4th day of May, 1940. At the time of the trial (August 1946), the child was sixteen months old.

The decree granted to appellant a divorce and the custody of the child, and then made the following provision:

"* * * that during the months of July and August of each year the defendant shall have the privilege of taking said child to the home of his parents in Portland, Oregon, provided that he shall call for said child and return him at the conclusion of such visits, all at defendant's own expense; and provided that plaintiff shall not remove said child from the jurisdiction of the court for a period of more than thirty (30) days at any time, without the consent of the court."

It is from the portion of the decree quoted above that this appeal is prosecuted. There is no contention here regarding the other matters.

As the lower court rightly observed, this is a case of too much liquor. If appellant's testimony is to be taken at full face, she is an exemplary matron and respondent is a fiend. If respondent's testimony is to be given the same credit, he is an exemplary young man and appellant is a hellion. Each has a good word for himself, but neither can find anything of merit in the other. While most of these outbursts coming from both sides were directed to the issues regarding the right of appellant to obtain a divorce, they cannot be overlooked entirely in connection with our consideration of the questions involved on this appeal.

Respondent's parents admit that appellant was a good housekeeper and took good care of the child. This evidence no doubt prompted the trial court to award custody of the child to appellant. But the question we are concerned with is: Was the court justified in permitting respondent to take the child during the months of July and August of each year to the home of his parents in Portland, Oregon.

The evidence shows that respondent's parents lived in Portland, are elderly people, have a first-class home and are of high character. Respondent's mother gave the following testimony:

"Q If the child was given to the father, would you be willing to give the child a good home?

"A Well, I would be. I would rather they were together, and had their own child. I don't care to take anybody's child. If it comes to where it must be, I will be glad to take care of him."

We understand and thoroughly appreciate the attitude of this good woman. "If it comes to where it must be," you can count on "mother."

At the time the parties were married, appellant lived at La Grande. When the final break came, she returned to La Grande and is now residing there. It was only natural that she should return to the home of her mother when this dream of marital bliss shipwrecked and foundered on the hidden shoals of domestic intolerance. In other words, it is not appellant's fault that respondent finds himself in a position where he is compelled to travel 275 miles (from Portland to La Grande) in order to enjoy his right to visit his child, while the child is in the custody of its mother. As we said in Hughes v. Hughes, ___ Or. ___, 178 P. (2d) 170, 174: "Every boy, or girl for that matter, needs, and needs desperately, both a father and mother, all of the time, not just part time." The parties themselves have made this impossible for Gerald Franklyn Van Doozer.

1. By the decree, the court determined that respondent was the party at fault. Under this state of the record, this court is required to give preference to appellant, unless she is manifestly an improper person to have such custody. Norcross v. Norcross, 176 Or. 1, 155 P. (2d) 562; Henry v. Henry, 156 Or. 679, 69 P. (2d) 280; Sachs v. Sachs, 145 Or....