Van Eter v. Crossman

Decision Date20 January 1880
Citation4 N.W. 216,42 Mich. 465
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesSILAS E. VAN ETER v. DANIEL L. CROSSMAN and others.

Certain statements and conduct of a party, whereby another was induced to institute legal proceedings for the attachment of certain property on the supposition that it belonged to his debtor, held sufficient to estop such party from claiming such property as owner. Declarations against interests are admissible, and, where part of an entire statement, the party making them may introduce other portions of a conversation or statement omitted, and bearing upon the rest, but a party cannot manufacture evidence in his own favor by outside collateral statements.

Error to Ingham.

Smith & Smith, for plaintiff in error.

E.D Lewis and M.V. Montgomery, for defendants in error.

MARSTON C.J.

We are not satisfied that this case differs materially from the shape in which it was presented before, as to the notice to the officer of the discontinuance of the Crossman and Whipple attachment proceedings.

The court, however, was clearly in error in the charge given in reply to a question asked by one of the jurors. In order to estop Crossman and Whipple, it would not be at all necessary that the jury should find that the attachment proceedings were commenced by them with the intention on their part of causing the defendants Mead &amp Fleming to understand that they, Crossman and Whipple, did not own the property in fact. It was a matter of no sort of consequence what intention they may have had, if any, upon that subject. It is the act and not the intention that governs. The owner of property may silently stand by and see it sold as the property of another, and this without any intention on his part of misleading or injuring any one, and yet the result would be the same.

It is clear, from the facts stated, that Crossman and Whipple had a claim against Watkins, who had left the state, which they were anxious to secure and collect, and that for this purpose they treated the price advanced or paid by them for these oxen as a debt against Watkins, and the oxen as his property. They also knew that Mead & Fleming had a claim against Watkins and the amount thereof, and they informed the business manager of Mead & Fleming of the property attached by them as the property of Watkins, and that if properly handled it would be sufficient to pay all. This last remark could have had no meaning, except upon the theory that Mead &amp Fleming would also commence legal proceedings and levy upon the same property for the collection of their debt. Acting upon this information Mead & Fleming levied and obtained a valid lien upon the property, and this...

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