VAN HOUDNOS v. Evans
| Decision Date | 21 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-3304.,81-3304. |
| Citation | 627 F. Supp. 476 |
| Parties | Kathy VAN HOUDNOS, Plaintiff, v. Robert EVANS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Mary Lee Leahy, Springfield, Ill., for plaintiff.
Martin Haxel, Asst. Atty. Gen., John Keith and John Mehlick, Springfield, Ill., for defendants.
Sex discrimination employment case.
Judgment directed for the Defendant— notwithstanding the jury's verdict for the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff brought this cause of action alleging that six employees of the Illinois State Museum acted and conspired to deny her employment because of her sex in contravention of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Prior to trial, the Court denied Defendants' joint motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff's allegations, if supported by the evidence, might establish liability under the civil rights statutes. The Court, however, expressed to counsel its concern with the element of causation necessary in Plaintiff's proof.
At the close of the Plaintiff's case, the Court directed a verdict for five of the six Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff had manifestly failed to carry her burden of proof with respect to these Defendants on the crucial elements of intent and causation. These same elements were not yet established as to the remaining Defendant but the Court determined that a more fully developed record—including Plaintiff's rebuttal of the Defendant's case—might elicit needed evidence.
The necessary evidence was not, however, forthcoming. At the close of all the evidence, the Court reserved a decision on the remaining Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. Upon receipt of the jury's decision for the Plaintiff, the Court directed a judgment for the Defendant, the jury's verdict notwithstanding.
The standard for entering a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict is the same. See Sparrow v. Yellow Cab Co., 273 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1960); Shaw v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 249 F.2d 434 (7th Cir.1957). In considering such motions, the Court must determine "whether the evidence presented, combined with all reasonable inferences permissably drawn therefrom, is sufficient to support the verdict when viewed in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed." Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985).
The Court should not make credibility determinations. Brady v. Southern Railroad, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943); Sonnentheil v. Christian Moerlain Brewing Co., 172 U.S. 401, 408, 19 S.Ct. 233, 235, 43 L.Ed. 492 (1899). Only the non-moving party's evidence and the moving party's uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence should be considered. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092, 102 S.Ct. 658, 70 L.Ed.2d 631 (1981), citing Brunner v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railroad, 240 F.2d 608 (7th Cir.1957); see also C.A. Wright and A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2524, p. 573 (1971).
In accordance with these guiding principles, the Court accepts as established the following relevant evidence offered or unchallenged by Plaintiff:
Plaintiff Van Houdnos is a woman. She applied for the position of Art Gallery and Collections Assistant at the Illinois State Museum. Prior to her application, she had performed the duties required of a collections assistant while employed as a Curatorial Assistant "intern." Ultimately, a male, Mr. Lawrence Rhoads, received the Collections Assistant position.
The position the Plaintiff sought was under the direct supervision of Defendant, Robert Evans, the museum's Curator of Art. Evans stated to the Plaintiff that he preferred to have a man fill the Collections Assistant position. Evans was the official who had earlier approved the hiring of Plaintiff as a Curatorial Assistant "intern" under a CETA grant and had approved of her work in the intern position.
In the spring of 1979, Evans held a meeting of the museum's department staff. During the course of the meeting, Evans publicly stated his preference that a man be named Curatorial Assistant. It is reasonable to infer that those Defendants who attended this meeting knew of Evans' preference. Evans' uncontradicted testimony establishes that all the members of the art department had input into the content of the job questionnaire, but that he probably prepared it. The application forms, however, contained nothing discriminatory. The only reasonable inference that may be drawn from this fact is that Evans' preference for a man to fill the position did not influence the drafting of the application forms.
In light of Mr. Evans' expressed preference for a man as Collections Assistant, Plaintiff sought and received assurances from the museum's director, Defendant Bruce McMillan, that she would receive fair consideration for the open position.
Subsequent to and—it may be inferred— at least partially in response to Plaintiff's concern that she would not receive fair consideration for the assistantship, the museum administration convened an ad hoc screening committee composed of three experienced female museum employees: Defendants Maureen McKenna, Judi Johnson, and Susan Pickel-Hedrick. Each member of the screening committee was charged with reviewing individually each of the 26 applications eventually received and with ranking the applicants. Evans served as chairman of the screening committee but did not review or rank any of the candidates. Defendant Hedrick, the museum's assistant director and Evans' immediate supervisor, served as an ex-officio member of the committee; he monitored the applications and the committee's review but took no part in the initial individual rankings.
Each committee member's individual reviews and recommendations were based on specific criteria articulated at trial: age, experience, education, and background. The committee members' individual rankings listed women among the top contenders. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this inclusion of women among the top candidates is that the members of the screening committee did not exclude women from consideration because of their sex.
After each member of the screening committee had ranked all of the applications, Evans tabulated the rankings and compiled a list of the six top candidates for final consideration. The first three candidates on the final list were male; the second three candidates were female. Plaintiff was not one of the finalists. Mr. Lawrence Rhoads, the person hired, received the highest ranking. The qualifications of the six finalists clearly exceeded Plaintiff's.
Evans forwarded his compilation of rankings to his superior, Assistant Director Basil Hedrick. Hedrick compared Evans' compilation of the screening committee's rankings to the committee members' evaluations, and to his own evaluation of the twenty-six applications, and concurred in the compiled rankings.
The top three candidates were then scheduled for interviews; the second three candidates were held in reserve for additional interviews should the first three candidates prove unacceptable. The interviews were conducted by various members of the screening committee who were available at the time of each interview. After the first set of three interviews, the screening committee recommended Mr. Rhoads' selection.
Evans reported the recommendation to Mr. Hedrick who approved the recommendation and in turn forwarded it to Director McMillan. Director McMillan approved the recommendation and submitted it to the museum's Board of Directors who ultimately confirmed the appointment. (Assistant Director Hedrick, Director McMillan, and the Board all had independent authority to reject the consensus candidate.)
These facts do not establish that the Plaintiff suffered from discrimination based on her sex.
42 U.S.C. § 1983
In order to establish liability for sex discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege with clarity and prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) that this conduct deprived a person of rights, privilege, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); see, e.g. Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 722 (7th Cir.1985).
The parties do not dispute that all of the Defendants are state employees who conduct themselves under color of state law. See generally, Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir.1977). To establish liability, however, the Plaintiff must also show that each Defendant "committed" the conduct of which she complains. The doctrine of respondant superior does not apply; absent direct involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation, no liability will attach. Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996 (7th Cir.1982).
The second branch of the proof of a claim under § 1983 implicates the concepts of causation and mental state grafted from the common law.
A defendant may not be found to have violated § 1983 unless his alleged conduct can be said to have caused the alleged injury. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980); Lossman v. Perkarske, 707 F.2d 288, 290-91 (7th Cir.1983); cf. Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 161-62 (7th Cir.1985) (). The plaintiff may prevail in a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if he can establish that the deprivation of rights he complains of would not have occurred "but for" the Defendant's conduct. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 417, 99 S.Ct. 693, 697, 58 L.Ed.2d 619; Lossman, 707 F.2d at 291.
The mental state required for establishing a violation of § 1983 depends on the particular...
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Van Houdnos v. Evans
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