Van Iderstine Company v. RGJ Contracting Co., Inc., 548
Citation | 480 F.2d 454 |
Decision Date | 12 June 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 548,Docket 72-2225.,548 |
Parties | VAN IDERSTINE COMPANY, a division of Darling Delaware Co., Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RGJ CONTRACTING CO., INC., and Michael Petrow, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Benjamin H. Siff, Thomas R. Newman, New York City (Greenhill & Speyer, New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Morris Zweibel, Brooklyn, N. Y. (Grant & Helfenstein, Brooklyn, N. Y., on the brief), for appellee RGJ Contracting Co., Inc.
Arthur N. Seiff, New York City (Katz & Gantman, New York City, on the brief), for appellee Michael Petrow.
Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge, and KILKENNY* and OAKES, Circuit Judges.
On December 29, 1964, a fire gutted a five-story building owned by appellant, Van Iderstine Company, in Long Island City, New York. The structure was part of a complex of twenty-eight buildings used in Van Iderstine's business of rendering butchers' offal and manufacturing bone meal, poultry feed and bone glue. Van Iderstine subsequently brought this action against R. G. J. Contracting Company, a contractor hired by Van Iderstine to demolish the building in question in preparation for new construction, and Michael Petrow, a subcontractor engaged by R. G. J. to perform the job, to recover $980,000 in property damage allegedly caused by the defendants' negligence in setting the fire. A jury, after trial before the Hon. Orrin Judd in the Eastern District of New York, returned a verdict for the defendants. Thereafter, Judge Judd denied Van Iderstine's post-trial motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, and Van Iderstine appealed.
Appellant urges us to reverse the judgment below because, in his view, the verdict was contrary to the evidence, the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury in certain respects and the trial conduct of the attorney for defendant R. G. J. Contracting Company was so prejudicial to Van Iderstine as to require a new trial. We have carefully considered the briefs and the record of the trial and find no basis for disturbing the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.
We doubt whether we would have memorialized this case in a written opinion of the court were there not present in the record evidence of conduct by counsel so disturbing as to require some further discussion. During our customary reading of the briefs and examination of the record in preparation for the argument of the appeal we discovered a pattern of behavior by several lawyers who participated at trial that was shocking, unbecoming officers of the court and lacking in concern for professional integrity and responsibility. Since the courts must never provide a sanctuary for such gross misconduct as was demonstrated in this case we shall have something to say about the events at the trial.
We note initially that had more than an insubstantial portion of counsels' intemperate behavior been brought to the attention of the jury, we would have had no restraint in ordering a new trial. The attentiveness of the district judge, however, spared the jury from conduct that we believe would have fatally infected the trial. Although it is our judgment that the verdict was untainted by the acrimony that occurred outside the jury's presence, that alone cannot excuse the untoward behavior of counsel.
Moreover, Ethical Consideration 7-37 provides:
In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, attitude or demeanor towards opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administration of justice and have no proper place in our legal system.
With this backdrop, we turn to a discussion of several examples of the conduct we have found particularly offensive.1
During the direct testimony of Daniel Roff, vice-president of R.G.J., Mr. Mangiatordi, counsel for defendant R.G.J., questioned the witness on the relationship between R.G.J. and defendant Petrow. The following colloquy took place:
The able trial judge unfortunately permitted himself to be drawn into the dispute between the attorneys. He was often interrupted discourteously and abused without reason by Mr. Mangiatordi, as the following testimony during plaintiff's cross-examination of Roff illustrates:
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...and "zealous advocacy in behalf of a client can never excuse contumacious or disrespectful conduct." Van Iderstine Co. v. RGJ Contracting Co. , 480 F.2d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1973).Id. And as the Second Circuit has noted, "[c]ourts can adjudicate disputes only when the parties present reasoned ......
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Gudavadze v. Kay, 08 Civ. 3363(RJS).
...and former counsel. In this regard, the Court finds instructive the Second Circuit's observation in Van Iderstine Co. v. RGJ Contracting Co., Inc., 480 F.2d 454, 459 (2d Cir.1973): Civil litigation provides an opportunity for private parties to dispose of disputes in an orderly and discipli......
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