Van Klootwyk v. Van Klootwyk, 960183

• Decision Date: 13 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 960183,960183
• Citation: 563 N.W.2d 377,1997 ND 88
• Parties: Robert J. VAN KLOOTWYK, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michelle L. VAN KLOOTWYK, Defendant and Appellant. Civil
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 377

563 N.W.2d 377

1997 ND 88

Robert J. VAN KLOOTWYK, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michelle L. VAN KLOOTWYK, Defendant and Appellant.

Civil No. 960183.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 13, 1997.

James D. Hovey (argued) and Jon J. Jensen (appearance), of Pearson, Christensen, Larivee, Clapp, Fiedler & Fischer, Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellee.

Charles L. Chapman (argued), of Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant.

MARING, Justice.

¶1 Michelle L. Van Klootwyk appeals from a district court judgment dated June 27, 1996, denying her spousal support from Robert J. Van Klootwyk. We conclude the trial court's finding Michelle is not disadvantaged by the divorce and is not in need of rehabilitative spousal support is clearly erroneous and we reverse.

¶2 Robert and Michelle Van Klootwyk were married on December 5, 1967, and have two adult children, who at the time of trial were emancipated and self-supporting. At the time of the marriage, Robert had completed two years of college. During the course of the marriage Robert worked in the radio industry, first as a disc jockey and then in the management area of radio.

¶3 At the time of the marriage, Michelle had a high school education, a work history of minimum wage work, and was working as a clerk at the old GP Hotel in Bismarck, North Dakota. During the marriage Michelle worked odd jobs to assist family finances from time to time, but both Robert and Michelle agreed Michelle's primary responsibility was to care for the children and their home.

¶4 The family made 27 or 28 moves in 24 years to advance Robert's career in the radio industry. At the time of trial Robert testified that his gross income for 1995 was $76,000. Robert then resided in Boston, Massachusetts, where he was the operations director for Fairbanks Communication.

¶5 In the fall of 1987, Michelle went back to school at Central Oregon Community College in Bend, Oregon. In the fall of 1988, Michelle attended Spokane Community College in Spokane, Washington. When the family moved to Bismarck to join Robert in the summer of 1989, Michelle took a class at Bismarck State College and then started classes at the University of Mary. In the spring of 1991, Michelle received a bachelor's degree in nursing from the University of Mary. Following her graduation she obtained employment on the telemetry unit at St. Alexius Hospital. She graduated on May 3, 1991, and started work on May 4, 1991. Her degree in nursing from the University of Mary enabled her to earn approximately $30,000 per year.

¶6 In March 1991 Robert and Michelle separated. From 1991 to 1994, Michelle continued to work as a nurse in Bismarck. In September of 1994 Michelle started a two year nurse practitioner program at the University of Mary. Michelle obtained her degree in May 1996.

¶7 At the time of trial on January 3, 1996, Michelle testified her starting salary as a nurse practitioner would be anywhere from $40,000 to $55,000 per year.

¶8 Michelle testified her cost of obtaining her undergraduate nursing degree at the University of Mary was about $5,000 per semester or a total of $20,000. Marital funds paid for approximately one half of that amount. Robert testified the family paid about $10,000 a year for tuition for Michelle to go to the University of Mary. Michelle testified she had to take out a loan for $6,500 to pay for her undergraduate tuition and at the time of trial the loan had been paid down to approximately $2,000. Michelle further testified that at the time of her graduation from the University of Mary in May of 1996 she will owe approximately $32,000 in student loans, including both graduate and undergraduate costs, living costs and help given to her daughter. Michelle estimated the cost of her two years in the University of Mary's graduate program was $18,000, which included $14,000 for tuition and $4,000 for books. She paid these costs by obtaining student loans which she had to start repaying commencing six months after her graduation.

¶9 The parties accumulated very few assets during their marriage. They borrowed money from both of their parents and neither of those debts has been completely paid. In 1991 they filed for bankruptcy. At the time of trial the family occupied rented property and their only assets consisted of some household goods and furniture.

¶10 Robert Van Klootwyk admitted he had more than one affair during the course of their marriage and that an affair in 1991 led to the separation of the parties in March 1991. Robert also conceded that his consumption of alcohol had been a detriment to the marriage and became a problem in the marriage. Michelle testified Robert struck her on "many occasions" during the course of the marriage and that on two occasions his conduct resulted in 911 calls.

¶11 On April 24, 1996, the court entered a judgment granting a divorce and dividing the parties' marital property. The court also decreed each would assume the separate indebtedness incurred since their separation in March 1991. Robert would be responsible for the existing indebtedness to his mother, the IRS, and a former business associate. Michelle would be responsible for the student loan debt she incurred to obtain her nurse practitioner degree. The court denied Michelle's request for rehabilitative spousal support and she appealed.

¶12 Michelle Van Klootwyk asserts the trial court erred in denying her request for rehabilitative spousal support. She claims she incurred debt to obtain her nurse practitioner degree and she requests a support award of $430.00 per month for ten years to pay that debt.

¶13 In Smith v. Smith, 534 N.W.2d 6, 12 (N.D.1995), we summarized our standard for reviewing a trial court's spousal support decision:

There are two types of spousal support. Permanent spousal support is appropriate to provide traditional maintenance for a spouse who is incapable of rehabilitation. van Oosting v. van Oosting, 521 N.W.2d 93, 100 (N.D.1994). Rehabilitative support is appropriate to restore an economically disadvantaged spouse to independent status or to equalize the burden of divorce. Lill v. Lill, 520 N.W.2d 855 (N.D.1994). A trial court's spousal support decisions are treated as findings of fact which will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous. LaVoi v. LaVoi, 505 N.W.2d 384, 386 (N.D.1993). The complaining party bears the burden of demonstrating on appeal a finding of fact is clearly erroneous. Sateren v. Sateren, 488 N.W.2d 631 (N.D.1992).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a) only if it is included by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence the court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. McDonough v. Murphy, 539 N.W.2d 313, 316 (N.D.1995).

¶14 This court has long held the trial court must consider the Ruff-Fischer guidelines in deciding whether to award spousal support. Lill v. Lill, 520 N.W.2d 855, 856 (N.D.1994). The Ruff-Fischer guidelines include:

"the respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of each, their health and physical condition, their financial circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters as may be material." Weir v. Weir, 374 N.W.2d 858, 862 (N.D.1985).

Id. Although the trial court does not need to make specific findings as to each guideline, it must specify a rationale for its determination. Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 710 (N.D.1994). A review of the trial court's findings of fact reveals that its specified rationale for its finding that Michelle was not disadvantaged by the divorce was she "received education during the marriage, has an adequate salary and is self supporting."

¶15 There are two different concepts of rehabilitative spousal support. See Marcia O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D.L.Rev. 225, 242 (1985). One is a "minimalist doctrine" and the other a more "equitable concept" of rehabilitative support. Id. at 242-43. The "minimalist doctrine" has as its objective to educate and retrain the recipient for minimal self-sufficiency. Id. at 242. The "equitable doctrine" tries to enable the disadvantaged spouse to obtain "adequate" self-support after considering the standard of living established during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, the parties' earning capacities, the value of the property and other Ruff-Fischer factors. Id. at 244-55.

¶16 This court has not adopted the "minimalist doctrine"--one where the only determination is whether the recipient of support is merely "self-supporting." We have upheld rehabilitative spousal support where the recipient is already working full time. See, e.g., Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 710 (N.D.1994); Wahlberg v. Wahlberg, 479 N.W.2d 143, 145 (N.D.1992); Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D.1981). In Wahlberg, the husband argued that because the wife was already self-supporting she was not "disadvantaged." Wahlberg at 145. This court stated, "[t]he need which evidences that one spouse has been disadvantaged by the divorce and that rehabilitative support is, therefore, appropriate is not limited to the prevention of destitution." Id. We have held a spouse is "disadvantaged" who has foregone opportunities or lost advantages as a consequence of the marriage and who has contributed during the marriage to the supporting spouse's increased earning capacity. Id. We have also stated a valid consideration in awarding spousal support is balancing the burdens created by divorce. Id.

¶17 Michelle contributed during the marriage to Robert's increased earning capacity. She moved 27 to 28 times in...