Van Orden v. State

• Decision Date: 26 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 183S8,183S8
• Citation: 469 N.E.2d 1153
• Parties: Julie VAN ORDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1153

469 N.E.2d 1153

Julie VAN ORDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 183S8.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 26, 1984.

Charles L. Berger, Evansville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Lisa M. Paunicka, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-Appellant Julie Van Orden was found guilty of murder by a jury in the Bartholomew Circuit Court and subsequently was sentenced by the trial judge to a term of forty years imprisonment. She now directly appeals and raises the following seven issues for our consideration:

1. denial of Appellant's motion to suppress a certain manuscript written by her;

2. denial of Appellant's request to begin opening and closing arguments and to present her evidence before the State's presentation;

3. denial of Appellant's motion to televise the trial proceedings;

4. admission into evidence of slides depicting the victim's body at an autopsy;

5. denial of Appellant's objection to a police officer demonstrating the position of the victim's body when shot;

6. denial of Appellant's motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct; and

7. alleged error in the giving or refusing of certain final instructions.

The evidence shows that on March 19, 1980, Appellant and her mother owned and resided in a small house in Evansville. They had experienced difficulty with city officials over the manner in which their property was maintained and Appellant previously had confronted city officials regarding these problems. Apparently there was no inside plumbing in the house and there were many complaints from neighbors regarding the premises. During some of the period of Appellant's residency in Evansville, Russell G. Lloyd, Sr., was Mayor of Evansville but on March 19, 1980, he was not Mayor as he had decided not to stand for reelection. On that date, Appellant went to Lloyd's home and shot him with a revolver thereby causing his death. On November 20, 1981, Appellant filed a document styled "Admission of Facts" whereby she admitted that she shot Lloyd with a revolver and caused his death. She further indicated that her defense in this case was that she was "not responsible for her conduct which took Russell G. Lloyd, Sr.'s life, because said conduct was the result of a mental disease or defect, which caused [her] to lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct, or to conform her conduct to the requirements of law."

I

Appellant first claims that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress a manuscript written by her while she was incarcerated in jail and given to personnel of Evansville television station 25. Appellant confessed to committing this crime in said manuscript which she characterized as her "life story." Although Appellant told channel 25 personnel that she wrote the manuscript to "tell her side of the story," Appellant now claims that the manuscript was not knowingly and voluntarily given to station 25 since she was suffering from a mental disease. Dr. Karleen Hammitt, a psychiatrist at the Madison State Hospital, testified during the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress that the relinquishment of the manuscript was a product of Appellant's psychosis. Appellant now contends that the State did not sustain its burden to show that the manuscript was knowingly and voluntarily given and therefore the manuscript was inadmissible.

Karen Dillon testified at the suppression hearing that she was a news reporter and co-anchor at TV station 25 and had talked on the telephone with Appellant some eight to twelve times. During these conversations which were instigated by Appellant, Appellant discussed her case and said that she was writing a manuscript which she would give to Dillon. Dillon kept the lines of communication open while attempting without success to get permission from Appellant to interview her. Dillon further testified that Appellant was aware that Lloyd had been shot and killed and that she had been charged with the crime. Appellant told Dillon of the encounters she had with the City and described instances in which she thought she was being unfairly treated. Throughout these conversations, some of which were tape recorded, Appellant told Dillon about the circumstances of her predicament and about the proceedings then pending such as the hearing to determine Appellant's competency to stand trial. Stanley Clark testified that he was the channel 25 news director and had talked to Appellant on the phone two or three times. He also observed that Appellant was coherent and cognizant of her predicament as she discussed with him her competency hearing and said she needed his assistance since she did not want to be found incompetent by the judge. Dillon and Clark discussed with Appellant the prospect of publishing her manuscript by reporting about it on television. Apparently the only limitation Appellant put on such publication was that certain personal events in her life, particularly those pertaining to her sexual encounters with men, could not be discussed. The manuscript subsequently was delivered to the station by Appellant's mother.

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on the voluntariness of a statement, this Court will neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we will examine the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are favorable to the trial court's ruling together with any uncontroverted, adverse evidence. If there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, it will not be disturbed. Heartfield v. State, (1984) Ind., 459 N.E.2d 33. In the instant case, there is no evidence that Appellant was subjected to coercive measures or trickery to channel 25 employees that might have served to overbear her will. Moreover, there is no inference that employees of the television station were in some manner acting as agents of the State to extract a statement from Appellant. The evidence shows that Appellant freely talked with Dillon and Clark and willingly gave her manuscript to the television station. We agree with the State that a review of the evidence presented supports the trial court's determination that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily gave the manuscript to the TV station. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion to suppress.

II

Appellant next claims that since she had the burden of proving her insanity defense, the trial court erred by refusing to permit her to begin opening argument, to begin final argument and to present her evidence prior to the State's presentation of evidence. There is no merit to this contention. Ind.Code Sec. 35-36-2-2 (Burns Supp.1984) defines the order of trial and provides that the prosecuting attorney is to make his opening statement followed by the defendant's opening statement. The statute further provides that the prosecuting attorney shall offer evidence in support of the prosecution before the defendant shall offer evidence in support of her defense and shall open and close the final argument. Ind.Code Sec. 35-36-2-2 (Burns Supp.1984) provides that testimony to establish an insanity defense must follow the presentation of evidence for the prosecution and for the defense. The existence or non-existence of insanity does not negate the necessity of the State to prove the required elements of the crime. Since the insanity defense is directly related to the homicide offense, it is essential to consider the circumstances of the homicide which directly affect a defendant's culpability. The proper procedure was followed by the trial court here.

III

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to televise the proceedings which was denied by the trial court. She now contends that she was denied a fair and public trial due to the failure of the trial court to televise the proceedings. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., (1978) 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require that a trial be broadcast live or on tape to the public. The requirements of a public trial are satisfied by the opportunity for both the public and the press not only to attend the trial but to report what they observe. Those requirements were met in this case. Appellant was tried in a public trial in which the courtroom was open for the public and the press to attend and to publish or report what they observed.

IV

The trial court admitted into evidence certain photographic slides--State's Exhibits 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, and 49--which depicted the victim's body at an autopsy. On appeal, Appellant contends that the slides were irrelevant, inflammatory and cumulative because she had admitted that the victim died by being shot.

We have many times held that the trial court's decision to admit photographs into evidence will be reversed only upon showing an abuse of discretion. Admissibility involves the photograph's relevance which may be determined by an inquiry into whether a witness would be permitted to verbally describe the objects photographed. Also germane is whether the photographs are illustrative of a witness' testimony and tend to prove the cause of death. Reynolds v. State, (1984) Ind., 460 N.E.2d 506, on rehearing, Ind., 463 N.E.2d 1087; Grimes v. State, (1983) Ind., 450 N.E.2d 512.

The photographs in question demonstrated the nature and extent of the victim's wounds by showing the entrance and exit paths of the bullets which caused death. As such, the photographs served to elucidate and explain relevant oral testimony given at the trial. There is, therefore, no showing that the photographs were unnecessarily repetitive, gruesome or otherwise calculated to arouse the passions and prejudice of the jury. There is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting these exhibits into evidence.

V

Appellant also claims...