Van Oster v. State of Kansas, No. 303
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | STONE |
| Citation | 47 S.Ct. 133,47 A.L.R. 1044,272 U.S. 465,71 L.Ed. 354 |
| Parties | VAN OSTER v. STATE OF KANSAS |
| Docket Number | No. 303 |
| Decision Date | 22 November 1926 |
v.
STATE OF KANSAS.
Messrs. Duane R. Dills, of New York City, and Wm. H. Thompson, of Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Roland Boynton and C. B. Griffith, both of Topeka, Kan., for State of Kansas.
Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error purchased an automobile of local dealers in Finney county, Kan., agreeing, as part considera-
Page 466
tion for the sale, to its retention by the vendors for use in their business. Clyde Brown, an associate of the dealers, was permitted by them, with the knowledge of plaintiff in error, to make frequent use of the automobile. Brown was arrested by state officers, and an information was filed charging that he used an automobile (which was plaintiff's) for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor and seeking its forfeiture and sale as a common nuisance under the Kansas statute. Laws Kan. 1919, c. 217, §§ 1-6; sections 21-2162 to 21-2167, R. S. Plaintiff intervened, denying the allegations of the information and setting up her ownership of the automobile and that the transportation of intoxicating liquor, if any, was without her knowledge or authority.
A trial by the district court of Finney county without a jury, as provided by the Kansas statute, resulted in a judgment of forfeiture. This determination was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas. State v. (Brown) Van Oster, 119 Kan. 874, 241 P. 112. After this decision, but prior to a petition for rehearing subsequently denied, Brown was acquitted by a jury of the offense charged in the information. The case comes here on writ of error. Judicial Code, 237(a), as amended (Comp. St. § 1214).
The Kansas statute, cited above, declares that an automobile or other vehicle used in the state in the transportation of intoxicating liquor is a common nuisance, and establishes a procedure followed in this case for its forfeiture and sale. The Kansas Supreme Court in this, as in other cases, State v. Peterson, 107 Kan. 641, 193 P. 342; State v. Stephens, 109 Kan. 254, 198 P. 1087, has construed this act as authorizing the forfeiture of the interest of an innocent owner or lienor in property intrusted to the wrongdoer.
It is contended that the statute as interpreted denies the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute is further assailed on the ground that it is repugnant to the provisions of the National Prohi-
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bition Act (Comp. St. § 10138 1/4 et seq.), which covers the same field; and, finally, objection is made that evidence of the intoxicating character of the liquor transported was lacking, and that the acquittal of Brown establishes beyond contradiction that no crime was committed.
It is not questioned that a state in the exercise of its police may forfeit property used by its owner in violation of state laws prohibiting the liquor traffic. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 S. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346, cf. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 671, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205, et seq., Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 S. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385. It is unnecessary for us to inquire whether the police power of the state extends to the confiscation of the property of innocent persons appropriated and used by the law breaker without the owner's consent, for here the offense of unlawful transportation was committed by one intrusted by the owner with the possession and use of the offending vehicle.
It is not unknown, or indeed uncommon, for the law to visit upon the owner...
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People v. One 1998 GMC, 110236
...n.15. But this point was irrelevant to the Bennis holding, particularly in light of the Court's heavy reliance upon Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), where the vehicle in question there was seized and retained prior to any adjudication as to its status. In that case, Van Oster purch......
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Fell v. Armour, Civ. A. No. 6367.
...137 F.Supp. 830 (E.D.Pa.1956); United States v. One Oldsmobile Sedan, 118 F. Supp. 450 (E.D.La.1954). See also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354 (1926); United States v. Pacific Finance Corporation, supra, 110 F.2d at 733; United States v. One 1948 Cadillac Conve......
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Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette VIN No. 1G1YY22P585103433, No. 1G1YY22P585103433
...suffered forfeiture of it because the purchaser taxicab operator used it to conceal 58 gallons of untaxed whiskey); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354 (1926) ("It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lieno......
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Towers v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 6510.
...of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril.... Id. (Quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68, 47 S.Ct. 133, 134, 71 L.Ed. 354 The plaintiff in Bennis further argued that, notwithstanding the precedent of the in rem forfeiture ca......
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People v. One 1998 GMC, 110236
...n.15. But this point was irrelevant to the Bennis holding, particularly in light of the Court's heavy reliance upon Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), where the vehicle in question there was seized and retained prior to any adjudication as to its status. In that case, Van Oster purch......
-
Fell v. Armour, Civ. A. No. 6367.
...137 F.Supp. 830 (E.D.Pa.1956); United States v. One Oldsmobile Sedan, 118 F. Supp. 450 (E.D.La.1954). See also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354 (1926); United States v. Pacific Finance Corporation, supra, 110 F.2d at 733; United States v. One 1948 Cadillac Conve......
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Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. One 1995 Corvette VIN No. 1G1YY22P585103433, No. 1G1YY22P585103433
...suffered forfeiture of it because the purchaser taxicab operator used it to conceal 58 gallons of untaxed whiskey); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 47 S.Ct. 133, 71 L.Ed. 354 (1926) ("It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lieno......
-
Towers v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C 6510.
...of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril.... Id. (Quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68, 47 S.Ct. 133, 134, 71 L.Ed. 354 The plaintiff in Bennis further argued that, notwithstanding the precedent of the in rem forfeiture ca......