Van Poyck v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, No. 99-14734.

Citation290 F.3d 1318
Decision Date09 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. 99-14734.
PartiesWilliam VAN POYCK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Michael W. Moore, Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Jeffrey O. Davis, Quarles & Brady, LLP, Milwaukee, WI, Joseph W. Bain, Quarels & Brady, LLP, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Celia A. Terenzio, Dept. of Legal Affairs, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondents-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In 1988, Petitioner William Van Poyck was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Florida court.1 Van Poyck brought this petition for habeas corpus in federal district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court rejected his petition. These issues were certified for appeal: 1) whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial; 2) whether the trial court erred when it denied Petitioner a continuance between the guilt and penalty phases of his trial; 3) whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during appellate proceedings; 4) whether the trial court failed to consider properly all of the mitigating evidence before it; 5) whether Petitioner's sentence is based on an invalid aggravating factor; and 6) whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). We affirm the district court's ruling on each of the issues.2

BACKGROUND

The facts giving rise to Petitioner's conviction and sentence are discussed in the Florida Supreme Court's opinions dealing with this case. See Van Poyck I, 564 So.2d at 1067-68. We will summarize the facts briefly. In June 1987, Florida inmate James O'Brien — a friend of Petitioner — was scheduled to be transported to a doctor's office by two Florida corrections officers: Steven Turner and Fred Griffis. When the van in which these three men were traveling reached the doctor's office, Petitioner and an accomplice (Frank Valdes) — who were both armed — approached the vehicle. Petitioner took Officer Turner's gun and forced him under the van. While he was under the van, Officer Turner saw Officer Griffis get out of the van and saw Valdes force Officer Griffis to the back of the van. Then, Officer Griffis was shot and killed.

Petitioner was charged with and tried for first-degree murder.3 The prosecution argued two different theories to support the charge: 1) that Petitioner had committed premeditated murder against Officer Griffis and 2) a felony murder theory. The jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder and recommended the imposition of the death penalty. The trial court accepted the recommendation and sentenced Petitioner to death. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court decided that insufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was the one who actually killed Officer Griffis (that is, that he was the "triggerman"). And the Florida Supreme Court decided the conviction on the basis of premeditation could not be sustained. Nevertheless, the court upheld the conviction on the basis of felony murder and the sentence. See id. at 1069.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This petition for habeas corpus was filed on 3 February 1999, well after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a petition for a writ of habeas corpus can only be issued if the state court's ruling "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Unless a state court decision is directly contrary to Supreme Court case law, we review state court findings of fact and conclusions of law for reasonableness. The district court's determination of whether this standard has been met is subject to a de novo review. See Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 930 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1367, 152 L.Ed.2d 360 (2002). A district court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. See Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2000).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase

Petitioner argues that his lawyer ("Counsel") provided ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of his trial. He contends that several omissions by Counsel rendered his assistance ineffective: 1) evidence that Petitioner suffered from a mental disorder; 2) evidence of Petitioner's life history; and 3) evidence that Petitioner was not the triggerman.

The standard for reviewing ineffective assistance claims was well-established when the Florida Supreme Court decided Petitioner's ineffectiveness arguments: a petitioner must show that his lawyer's performance fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" and that the lawyer's deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Establishing these two elements is not easy: "the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between." Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)4 (quoting Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir.1994)).

For assessing a lawyer's performance, Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204, 121 S.Ct. 1217, 149 L.Ed.2d 129 (2001), sets out the basic law: "Courts must indulge the strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable and that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 1314 (internal marks omitted). This presumption of correctness applies when a petitioner is challenging his lawyer's act in not presenting certain mitigating evidence. See Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) ("A lawyer's election not to present mitigating evidence is a tactical choice accorded a strong presumption of correctness which is virtually unchallengeable.") (emphasis added) (internal marks omitted). Our role in reviewing an ineffective assistance claim is not to "grade" a lawyer's performance; instead, we determine only whether a lawyer's performance was within "the wide range of professionally competent assistance." See Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.

The inquiry into whether a lawyer has provided effective assistance is an objective one: a petitioner must establish that no objectively competent lawyer would have taken the action that his lawyer did take. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315. Because the standard is objective, Petitioner's argument that his counsel would have done more investigation if the trial court had granted a continuance between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial5 and that his counsel, during a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, claimed to have been "caught with his pants down" in preparing for the penalty phase is not determinative. See id. at 1313 (stating that "lawyers, in every case, could have done something more"); Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 716 (11th Cir.1999) (stating that lawyer's "admissions of deficient performance" were not persuasive).

A petitioner's burden of establishing that his lawyer's deficient performance prejudiced his case is also high. "It is not enough for the [petitioner] to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test." Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Instead, a petitioner must establish that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the case would have been different if his lawyer had given adequate assistance. See id. at 2068.

A. Mental Health History

Petitioner argues that Counsel was deficient for failing to introduce evidence that Petitioner suffered from various disorders. Petitioner specifically claims that he suffers from "a serious thought disorder," and argues that the jury should have heard evidence of "multiple diagnoses of paranoid schizophrenia, [a] lengthy history of treatment with antipsychotic medications, the two admissions to the Florida State Hospital, and ... attempts at self harm." (Petition for Habeas Corpus at 24.) In addition, he claims to suffer from "a personality disorder with immature and dependent features." (Id.)

Petitioner cannot prevail on these claims. The Florida Supreme Court determined that Counsel "had clear tactical reasons" for not presenting mental health evidence. See Van Poyck II, 694 So.2d at 692. That determination and the conclusion that Counsel's performance therefore was not deficient are not unreasonable.

During a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Counsel identified a number of reasons for not arguing Petitioner's mental health as a mitigating factor. First, Petitioner had spent most of his adult life in prison; and most evidence of Petitioner's mental health would have been based upon prison records. Counsel concluded that the use of such records would have opened the door to a considerable amount of damaging evidence: many disciplinary reports, weapons offenses, and escape attempts. Second, in discussions between Petitioner and Counsel before trial, Petitioner claimed to have faked many of the episodes that led to his being sent to the Florida mental hospital.

These considerations give strong support to Counsel's decision not to present mental health evidence. First, a lawyer need not...

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