Van Story v. Wash. Cnty. Health Dep't, Civil No. ELH-17-3590
| Decision Date | 25 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. ELH-17-3590 |
| Parties | PATRICIA VAN STORY Plaintiff v. WASHINGTON COUNTY HEALTH DEPT, MARYLAND DEPT OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, and LARRY HOGAN, GOVERNOR Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this employment discrimination case, plaintiff Patricia Van Story, D.D.S. sued her former employer, the Washington County Health Department ("WCHD"), as well as the Maryland Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (the "MDH" or the "Department"),1 and Maryland Governor Larry Hogan. ECF 1. In an Amended Complaint (ECF 15), plaintiff asserts a single count of retaliation, "pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 via 42 U.S.C. Section 1983." Id. at 1.2
According to the caption of the Amended Complaint, plaintiff sued WCHD, MDH, and the Governor. Although the text of the suit identifies MDH and WCHD as defendants, the retaliation claim appears to be directed only at WCHD. And, the suit contains no allegations as to Governor Hogan.
WCHD and Governor Hogan have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF 18; ECF 18-1. It is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 18-1) (collectively, the "Motion to Dismiss") and an exhibit. ECF 18-2. Curiously, MDH did not join in the Motion. Van Story opposes the Motion to Dismiss (ECF 24), and WCHD and Governor Hogan have replied. ECF 26.
On January 18, 2019, Van Story filed a "Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint." ECF 21 (the "Motion for Leave"). It is supported by five exhibits. See ECF 21-2 to ECF 21-6. In the Motion for Leave, plaintiff expressly withdraws all claims against defendants Hogan and MDH (identified in the Motion for Leave as the "State"). ECF 21 at 1.3 In light of plaintiff's withdrawal of all claims against Hogan and MDH, WCHD is the only remaining defendant. However, in the Motion for Leave plaintiff seeks to add two defendants: her former supervisors, Rod MacRae4 and Susan Parks, in their individual and official capacities. See ECF 21-1 at 1, 2, ¶¶ 4-5. WCHD, Hogan, and MDH oppose the Motion for Leave. See ECF 25. Plaintiff did not reply, and the time to do so has expired. See Local Rule 105.2.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, I shall deny the Motion for Leave and grant the Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff alleges that WCHD "is an agency of and is governed by" the Department. ECF 15, ¶ 3. Further, she alleges that the Department "is the managing agency of the State of Maryland's health care delivery system . . . ." Id. ¶ 4.
Van Story, a licensed African American dentist, was employed by WCHD from December 7, 2007 to April 2016. ECF 15, ¶¶ 2, 6 n.1. During the relevant time period, she served as the "Dental Director/Program Manager." Id. ¶ 5.
WCHD is one of twenty-four statutorily created county health departments in Maryland. Md. Code , § 3-301(a) of the Health-General Article ("H.G.").6 Each county has a county health officer, who appoints the staff of the county's health department. H.G. § 3-306(b)(2).
In November 2012, Van Story filed a complaint against her supervisor, Rod MacRae, who was the Director of Health Services. Id. ¶ 9. Thereafter, Susan Parks replaced MacRae as Van Story's supervisor. Id. Van Story alleges that after she filed "her complaint against Mr. [MacRae], WCHD retaliated against her by any of [sic] continued harassment and discrimination." Id. ¶ 10. On March 31, 2014, Parks reportedly "disciplined" Van Story. Id. Van Story appealed the discipline. Id.
Van Story complains that her "name and title were omitted from the Department's staff directory while the Department's Medical Director, her white counterpart, Dr. Mark Jameson was included." Id. ¶ 12. On September 4, 2014, Van Story learned that "[e]ven though [she] was the Dental Director, . . . WCHD had previously applied for a dental grant without her knowledge or input." Id. ¶ 11. Instead, Parks, her supervisor, prepared the application with a local entity. Id. Van Story complained about the grant. Id. ¶ 13.
On October 16, 2014, WCHD "informed [Van Story] that an employee complaint had been filed against her, and that she was required to appear at a hearing regarding that complaint" later that same day. Id. The following day, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with both the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. ¶ 14; see ECF 21-3; ECF 21-5.
Almost six months later, on April 9, 2015, "Van Story was terminated from her position at WCHD." ECF 15, ¶ 16. The EEOC concluded its investigation on June 12, 2015. Id. ¶ 17; see also ECF 1, ¶ 17. However, plaintiff did not file suit until December 2017.7
As noted, defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiff's claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See Demetres v. East West Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015); see also The Piney Run Preservation Ass'n v. Cty. Comm'rs of Carroll Cty., 523 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2008); Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may proceed "in one of two ways": either a facial challenge, asserting that the allegations pleaded in the complaint are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction, or a factual challenge, asserting "'that the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true.'" Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); accord Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013). In a facial challenge, "the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. On the other hand, in a factual challenge, "the district court is entitled to decide disputed issues of fact with respect to subject matter jurisdiction." Id. In that circumstance, the court "may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Velasco v. Gov't of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004); see also United States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2009); Evans, 166 F.3d at 647.
Defendants raise a facial challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. As indicated, this challenge is based on the four corners of the Amended Complaint.
The Fourth Circuit recently reiterated that the defense of sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar, stating that "'sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims, and a court finding that a party is entitled to sovereign immunity must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.'" Cunningham v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., 888 F.3d 640, 649 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 207 (5th Cir. 2009)). But, a defendant "bears the burden of demonstrating" sovereign immunity, because it is "akin to an affirmative defense." Hutto v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 543 (4th Cir. 2014).
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factssufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . . ."); see also Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere "'naked assertions' of wrongdoing" are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is...
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