Van Tassel v. Hillerns, 46443

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
• Writing for the Court: PETERSON
• Citation: 311 Minn. 252,248 N.W.2d 313
• Parties: Phillip VAN TASSEL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John Marshall HILLERNS, Appellant, Marshall M. Hillerns, Defendant, Timothy Branson, Respondent. and CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent, v. John Marshall HILLERNS, Appellant, Marshall M. Hillerns, Defendant.
• Docket Number: No. 46443,46443
• Decision Date: 10 December 1976

Page 313

248 N.W.2d 313 311 Minn. 252 Phillip VAN TASSEL, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
John Marshall HILLERNS, Appellant,
Marshall M. Hillerns, Defendant,
Timothy Branson, Respondent.
and
CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent,
v.
John Marshall HILLERNS, Appellant,
Marshall M. Hillerns, Defendant. No. 46443. Supreme Court of Minnesota. Dec. 10, 1976.

Page 314

Syllabus by the Court

Although the trial court properly could have instructed the jury on the 'following too closely,' statute, Minn.St. 169.18, subd. 8(a), in a negligence action arising out of a collision between a pursuing police vehicle and the pursued automobile, the refusal to do so was not, under the circumstances, reversible error.

[311 MINN 253] Clarance E. Hagglund and Joel M. Muscoplat, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Walter J. Duffy, Jr., City Atty., Raymond H. Hegna, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

PETERSON, Justice.

Defendant Timothy Branson, a Minneapolis police officer, was driving an unmarked police car in pursuit of an automobile driven by defendant John Marshall Hillerns when the two vehicles collided. Plaintiff Phillip Van Tassel, a Minneapolis police officer and passenger in the police vehicle, was injured and brought suit for his personal injuries, alleging negligence against defendants Branson and Hillerns. ¹ The court directed a finding of negligence as to Hillerns. By special verdict, the jury found Hillerns to be 100 percent causally negligent and found Branson to be free of negligence.

Hillerns appeals from a denial of his motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial on the sole issue of Branson's negligence. He contends that the trial court erred either in refusing to find Branson negligent as a matter of law for violating Minn.St. 169.18, subd. 8(a), ² the 'following too closely' statute, or in refusing[311 MINN 254] at least to instruct the jury on that statute. Branson argues that the statute does not apply to this case but, if it does, that the trial court's instructions adequately covered the substance of Hillerns' requested instruction. ³

The parties concede that the police officers had cause to apprehend Hillerns. The sole question of fact is whether Branson's method of pursuit was reasonable. The final part of the pursuit took place on a four-lane, one-way street. For approximately eight blocks, the officers proceeded in a lane to the left of the one in which Hillerns was driving. When Branson observed an obstruction ahead in his lane, he pulled behind Hillerns, who suddenly applied his brakes. Branson braked but skidded into Hillerns' vehicle.

Testimony conflicted as to the speeds of the respective automobiles during the pursuit and ranged from estimates of 55 to 105 miles per hour. Testimony also conflicted as to the distances between the vehicles. Officer William Champlain, who responded to a call for assistance from the officers, testified that the distance between the Hillerns

Page 315

vehicle and the police vehicle prior to the collision was three or four car lengths, a car length meaning 10 to 15 feet. Branson testified that while following in a different lane, most of the time he maintained a distance of approximately two car lengths behind, a car length meaning about 16 feet, and that at the time Hillerns applied his brakes, Branson was following at a distance of more than two car lengths. Plaintiff testified that the distance was two to three car lengths or possibly more, a car length meaning a little more than 15 feet.

The court instructed the jury on the law of negligence. It began with a general definition:

'* * * Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that care which a reasonable person would use under like circumstances. Negligence is the doing of something which a reasonable person would not do or the failure to do something[311 MINN 255] which a reasonable person would do under like circumstances.'

More particularly, it stated:

'* * * (E)very driver of a motor vehicle upon the streets and highways of this state must keep a proper lookout for other cars and traffic upon the streets and highways and to keep his car under a reasonable control so as to avoid colliding with other vehicles upon the highways.'

The court then read Minn.St. 169.03, subd. 2, and 169.17, the violation of which would constitute negligence in the absence of excuse or justification. These statutes establish...