Van Tassel v. Patterson
| Decision Date | 23 November 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 35445,35445 |
| Parties | VAN TASSEL et al. v. PATTERSON. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where evidence as a whole overwhelmingly preponderates in favor of a party so as to leave no doubt as to the factual truth, he is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law, even though some evidence, standing alone, might support a verdict to the contrary.
2. Such rule, which is to be cautiously and sparingly exercised, does not permit either this court or a trial court to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to weigh evidence, or to exercise any discretion, except in those extreme cases where but one factual conclusion in possible.
3. Evidence on issue of identification of defendant's car as that involved in accident Held sufficient to create a jury question thereon.
4. Rebuttal evidence is that which explains, contradicts, or otherwise refutes defendant's evidence. Its purpose is to cut down defendant's case and not merely to confirm that of plaintiff. Proposed testimony of witness called in rebuttal here Held not to constitute an impeachment of plaintiffs' other witnesses and was otherwise proper as rebuttal evidence; hence, it should have been admitted.
Meagher, Geer & Markham, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Faegre & Benson, Paul J. McGough and John A. McEachron, Jr., all of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Three actions for damages and personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident which occurred October 10, 1947. The cases were consolidated for trial, and at the close of the evidence the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict in each case on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to establish that defendant's car was involved in the accident. Plaintiffs have appealed from orders denying their separate motions for a new trial.
Defendant concedes that if the evidence establishes that his car was the one involved in the accident, the question of his negligence is properly one for the jury. We are asked to determine, then, whether the court erred in holding the evidence insufficient to establish this fact, and whether it erred in sustaining an objection to the testimony of plaintiffs' witness Fern Pfeiffer called in rebuttal, based on the ground that her testimony would in substance impeach that of plaintiffs' other witnesses.
The facts are as follows: On October 10, 1947, plaintiff Carlton Parrish was employed by plaintiff Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Company, a corporation, as driver of the latter's tractor-trailer unit. Plaintiff Clyde Van Tassel was likewise employed by plaintiff corporation on the date to assist Parrish in his work. Between 4:30 and 5 p.m. that day, the tractor-trailer driven by Parrish, accompanied by Van Tassel, en route to Minneapolis from Carver, collided with the viaduct abutment on the south side of highway No. 169 immediately east of its intersection with Interlachen Boulevard and Brookside avenue near southwest Minneapolis. The accident occurred as a result of Parrish's effort to avoid striking a car claimed to be defendant's, which abruptly entered highway No. 169 from Brookside avenue from the left and just in front of the tractor-trailer. As a result of the impact, plaintiffs Parrish and Van Tassel were injured and tractor-trailer unit of the warehouse company was damaged, giving rise to these three actions.
The described intersection comprises the junction of the three highways mentioned. Highway No. 169, which extends approximately east and west at this point, is 27 feet wide and constructed of concrete. It contains three traffic lanes. As it passes over the viaduct, it widens to 40 feet between the sidewalk curbs thereof. Brookside avenue extends in a north-south direction and crosses highway No. 169. Interlachen Boulevard is to the north of highway No. 169 and to the west of Brookside avenue. It extends in a northwest-southeast direction and merges with Brookside avenue some 50 feet before they jointly intersect highway No. 169. It does not cross highway No. 169, but ends at this point.
As the tractor-trailer approached this intersection from the west, a dark-colored sedan entered highway No. 169 from Brookside avenue from the north and just west of the viaduct. It proceeded across highway No. 169 until it reached the south lane thereof, at which point it turned to the left to travel in an easterly direction directly in front of the tractor-trailer unit. Believing that a collision between the tractor-trailer and the car was about to result, plaintiff Parrish, to avoid it, first set his trailer brakes, then applied his tractor brakes, and turned the tractor-trailer slightly to the right, whereupon it struck the south abutment near the southeast corner of the viaduct.
There was no contact between the vehicles, but it is plaintiffs' claim that defendant's car came into highway No. 169 in front of the tractor-trailer so quickly that plaintiff Parrish was forced to swerve it to his right to prevent a collision with defendant's car.
On the issue of identification, the evidence submitted may be summarized as follows: Parrish testified that at a point approximately 85 to 100 feet west of the intersection he saw a car coming up the highway from his left on Brookside avenue; that he was then driving approximately 30 miles per hour; that the car described came 'right out on the pavement' in front of him; that he first thought it was going to cross highway No. 169; that when it was 'probably ten foot' in front of the tractor-trailer its driver turned to his left and proceeded down the right lane of highway No. 169 immediately in front of the tractor-trailer; that in consequence he (Parrish) turned sharply to his right off the highway and hit the viaduct abutment as described; that had he not done so the tractor-trailer would have struck the car; that the car was dark-colored, black or green--an old car, a Dodge or Chrysler make; and that the only other car in view at the time was a car parked to the right on the approach to highway No. 169 waiting to enter it.
Defendant admitted that he turned onto highway No. 169 from Brookside avenue as the tractor-trailer approached the intersection just before the accident; that when he first saw it was 400 to 450 feet to his right; that he was driving a 1937 Dodge sedan, dark green in color; that, after observing the tractor-trailer and believing that he had sufficient time to avoid a collision with it, he proceeded into highway No. 169 and turned into the south lane thereof to travel east; that he did not look again in the general direction of the tractor-trailer after first observing it; that he heard the crash of the tractor-trailer as it struck the abutment to the rear of his car; that he saw the car parked on the south approach to highway No. 169 waiting to enter it; that when he heard the crash he pulled over to the south shoulder of highway No. 169, stopped his car, and walked back to the accident; that he waited there for a time, but did not give his name to anyone; that he observed no other car entering highway No. 169 or traveling on it in either direction from the time that he entered it from Brookside avenue until he heard the crash; that three days after the accident Arthur Compton, president of plaintiff corporation, called upon him and, after identifying himself, asked him if he knew anything about the accident; that he replied that he had not been in any accident; that 'nobody has hit me and I haven't hit anybody.' According to Compton's testimony, defendant refused to give him his name, but later admitted to Compton that he had been at the scene of the accident, had driven his car into highway No. 169 in front of the tractor-trailer, had stopped it after the crash and returned to the tractor-trailer, but had not given his name to anyone. After defendant's conversation with Compton, defendant said that he reported his connection with the accident to the Edina police department.
Ray S. Harp, called by plaintiffs, testified that shortly prior to the accident he stopped his car on Brookside avenue just south of highway No. 169 preparatory to entering it and driving east thereon; that as he came to a stop he observed a car approaching highway No. 169 from the north side on Interlachen Boulevard and a tractor-trailer coming from his left and proceeding east on highway No. 169; that the car on Interlachen Boulevard stopped, then proceeded to enter highway No. 169, and continued until it reached the south lane thereof, at which point it turned to the east thereon; that as it entered highway No. 169 the tractor-trailer was approximately 75 to 100 feet west of Harp's car; that the driver of the tractor-trailer sounded the horn, and Harp heard the...
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