Van Teamer v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1D11–3491.,1D11–3491.
• Parties: Kerick VAN TEAMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

108 So.3d 664

Kerick VAN TEAMER, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D11–3491.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

First District.

Feb. 12, 2013.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Richard M. Summa, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Perrone, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

WOLF, J.

Appellee's motion for rehearing filed on January 9, 2013, is denied. The court's opinion filed December 21, 2012, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted for clarification.

Appellant, Kerick Van Teamer, seeks review of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress and his subsequent judgment and sentence for felony drug trafficking. We reverse the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress and certify conflict with the Fourth District's opinion Aders v. State, 67 So.3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). Because we reverse, it is unnecessary to reach appellant's other issues raised on appeal.

On June 22, 2010, at about 3:00 p.m., an Escambia County Deputy Sheriff observed appellant driving a bright green Chevy. The deputy “ran” the license plate tag number through the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). Upon learning that the plate number was registered to a blue Chevy, the deputy pulled the vehicle over based only on the color inconsistency. Upon interviewing the occupants, the deputy learned that the vehicle had recently been painted, thus explaining the inconsistency. During the stop, however, the deputy smelled marijuana emanating from the car and conducted a search of appellant, his passenger, and the vehicle. Marijuana and crack cocaine were recovered from the vehicle, and about $1,100 in cash was recovered from appellant. Appellant was charged with trafficking in cocaine (between 28–200 grams), possession of marijuana (less than 20 grams), and possession of drug paraphernalia, scales.

Appellant filed a dispositive motion to suppress the results of the stop as an unconstitutional search, arguing that the color inconsistency alone was an insufficient basis to justify an investigatory stop. During the hearing on the motion, the deputy explained that the color inconsistency piqued his interest. He acknowledged that, in his training and experience, he encountered individuals who would switch vehicle plates, and he could not confirm whether the vehicle identification number matched the plates without pulling over the vehicle.

On cross examination, the deputy agreed that the only thing that was out of the ordinary was the inconsistency of the vehicle color from the registration. He acknowledged he observed no other traffic violation, suspicious or furtive behavior, nor was he aware of any reports of stolen vehicles or swapped plates in the area.

The trial court denied the motion and in a later statement of proceedings explained that “because the registration was not consistent with the color of the vehicle,” the officer made an investigatory stop. The court determined that the officer “had a legal right to conduct an investigatory stop when a registration search of the automobile license tag reflected a different color than the observed color of the vehicle.”

Appellant was subsequently tried before a jury, convicted of the three counts, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment for the trafficking count and time served for the other misdemeanor counts.

On appeal, appellant argues the mere fact that the color of a vehicle does not match the color indicated on motor vehicle registration records does not establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support an investigatory stop of a vehicle. He further argues this is particularly true in Florida where there is no legal requirement that a vehicle owner inform the DHSMV of a change in the color of the vehicle. The State argues the color inconsistency, despite being the result of innocent activity, represents the potential illegal activity of making a false application on vehicle registration, a violation of sections 320.06 and 320.061, Florida Statutes. Thus, the State argues this is a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop, as determined by the Fourth District in Aders v. State, 67 So.3d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

The appropriate standard of review is summarized in State v. Gandy, 766 So.2d 1234, 1235–36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000):

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress comes to us clothed with a presumption of correctness, and we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions in a manner most favorable to sustaining that ruling. Johnson v. State, 608 So.2d 4, 9 (Fla.1992), cert. denied,508 U.S. 919, 113 S.Ct. 2366, 124 L.Ed.2d 273 (1993). In this case, the facts are undisputed and supported by competent substantial evidence. See Caso v. State, 524 So.2d 422 (Fla.), cert. denied,488 U.S. 870, 109 S.Ct. 178, 102 L.Ed.2d 147 (1988). Accordingly, our review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts is de novo. See United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1115–16 (11th Cir.1991). In addition, we are constitutionally required to interpret search and seizure issues in conformity with the Fourth Amendment of the United States as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. SeeFla. Const. art. I, § 12; Perez v. State, 620 So.2d 1256 (Fla.1993); Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (Fla.1988).

The Fourth DCA summarized the law on traffic stops as follows:

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons' within the meaning of this provision.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the stop must be reasonable for it to comport with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 810 .

“[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)). “Probable cause exists where the totality of the facts known to the officer at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed.” State v. Hebert, 8 So.3d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citing State v. Walker, 991 So.2d 928, 931 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). At the very least, an officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver violated, is violating,or is about to violate a traffic law. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 & n. 11, 661, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391.

Aders, 67 So.3d at 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). In making a reasonable suspicion inquiry, “ ‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.' ” U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, at 243–244, n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). However, an investigatory stop must be predicated on something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

As a preliminary matter, we acknowledge that any discrepancy between a vehicle's plates and the registration may legitimately raise a concern that the vehicle is stolen or the plates were swapped from another vehicle. We must, however, weigh that level of concern against a citizen's right under the Fourth Amendment to travel on the roads free from governmental intrusions. See State v. Diaz, 850 So.2d 435, 439 (Fla.2003) (“The real test is one of reasonableness, which involves balancing the interests of the State with those of the motorist.”). The question before this court, therefore, is whether an inconsistency in color alone is a sufficient basis to support an officer's articulable and reasonable suspicion that a particular person is committing a crime in the absence of any other suspicious behavior or circumstances to allow a temporary seizure of a person for an investigatory stop.

Changing the color of a vehicle is not illegal, and the State does not require an owner to report the change in color to the DHSMV. See Aders, 67 So.3d at 371. The question then is what degree of suspicion attaches to this particular noncriminal act? In Aders and the cases cited therein, a few courts have concluded that the color inconsistency alone created enough suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.

In Aders, the officer testified that after running the tags and discovering a color discrepancy, he decided to stop the vehicle. The circuit court concluded that the officer was justified in the stop because:

[i]t is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to conclude that a registration plate affixed to a vehicle which differs in color from the vehicle described on the registration information from the Florida Department of Highway Safety, Motor Vehicles Division, even if the make and Model are the same or similar, warrants further investigation.

Id. at 371. The Fourth District affirmed the circuit court on the basis of Smith v. State, 713 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) and Andrews v. State, 289 Ga.App. 679, 658 S.E.2d 126, 127–28 (2008), both cases which found that a color discrepancy in the registration was enough to create an articulable reasonable suspicion that the license plate may have been switched from another vehicle. In Smith, however, the vehicle matched the description of another vehicle known to be...