Van Valen v. Lanigan

• Decision Date: 25 March 2019
• Docket Number: Civ. Action No. 18-11441(RMB)
• Parties: REGINALD VAN VALEN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER GARY M. LANIGAN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

REGINALD VAN VALEN, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER GARY M. LANIGAN et al., Defendants.

Civ. Action No. 18-11441(RMB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

March 25, 2019

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

CONRAD J. BENEDETTO, Esq.

Law Offices of Conrad J. Benedetto

1223 Haddonfield-Berlin Road, Suite 1

Voorhees, NJ 08043

On behalf of Plaintiff

MICHAEL EZRA VOMACKA, Assistant Attorney General

New Jersey Office of the Attorney General

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

25 Market St.

P.O. Box 112

Trenton, NJ 08625

On behalf of Defendant Commissioner Gary M. Lanigan

ANNMARIE SIMEON, Esq. and

MARGARET M. RAYMOND-FLOOD, Esq.

NORRIS, McLAUGHLIN & MARCUS, PA

400 Crossing Boulevard, 8^th Floor

Bridgewater, NJ 08807

On behalf of Defendants University Correctional Health Care and University Behavioral Health Care

BUMB, United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Lanigan's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Lanigan's Mot. to Dismiss," ECF No. 10 and "Lanigan's Brief" ECF No. 10-2); Plaintiff's Opposition to Lanigan's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Pl's Opp. To Lanigan's Mot. to Dismiss," ECF No. 15); Defendant Lanigan's Letter Brief in Further Support of his Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Lanigan's Reply," ECF No. 16); Defendants University Correctional Health Care ("UCHC") and University Behavioral Health Care's ("UCBC") (collectively, "the University Health Care Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with Prejudice ("University Health Care Defs' Mot. to Dismiss", ECF No. 17); Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants University Health Care and University Behavioral Health Care's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint ("Pl's Opp. to UCHC's Mot. to Dismiss," ECF No. 21); and Defendants UCHC and UBHC's Reply Brief ("University Health Care Defs' Reply Brief, ECF No. 23.) This Court will decide the motions on the briefs without an oral hearing, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant Lanigan's motion to dismiss and grant the University Health Care Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was incarcerated at Bayside State Prison in Leesburg, New Jersey on August 13, 2016. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶23.) Upon his arrival at the prison, Plaintiff was provided with a wooden cane "through the Defendant UCHC and/orUBHC." (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶24.) Plaintiff was assigned to the general population with a cellmate named "Randals." (Id., ¶¶25-27.) Plaintiff was a documented member of the Crips and Randals was documented as affiliated with the Bloods, a rival gang. (Id., ¶¶26-27.)

On August 13, 2016, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Plaintiff was confined to his cell with Randals. (Id., ¶30.) Randals struck Plaintiff with his fist, and as the two fought, Randals knocked Plaintiff unconscious using his cane. (Id., ¶¶31-34.) The assault lasted for fifteen minutes within the cell and then continued in a common area after the cell doors were opened remotely. (Id., ¶¶32-41.)¹ As a result of the assault, Plaintiff underwent facialreconstructive surgery at Cooper University Health in Camden. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶43-44.) For the entire course of his six-day hospitalization, his hands and feet were shackled, depriving him of sleep and causing physical and mental discomfort. (Id., ¶45.) The Corrections Officers who supervised Plaintiff during his hospitalization kept Plaintiff in shackles in defiance of Plaintiff's attending physician and nurses. (Id., ¶46.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts must accept the Plaintiff's allegations as true "with the important caveat that the presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient "factual matter" to render them "plausible on [their] face." Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The plausibility determination is context-specific and requires a reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citations omitted).

A plaintiff has the burden of pleading sufficient "factual matter" but need not plead "specific facts." Id. (quoting Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 (2007) and Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). "Implicit in the notion that a plaintiff need not plead 'specific facts' to survive a motion to dismiss is thatcourts cannot inject evidentiary issues into the plausibility determination." Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347-38 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court may not dismiss a complaint based on the court's "assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder." Id. at 348 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must first identify the legal elements required to state a cognizable claim. Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 74 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2010.) Second, the court should identify allegations that are no more than conclusions that are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id.

At the second step of reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must identify allegations that are only legal conclusions and not entitled to the presumption of truth. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). Under Twombly and Iqbal, only legal conclusions are discounted, while "even outlandish allegations" are entitled to a presumption of truth unless they are merely "formulaic recitations of the elements of a ... claim." Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.) "[T]he clearest indication that an allegation isconclusory and unworthy of weight in analyzing the sufficiency of a complaint is that it embodies a legal point." Id. at 790 (citing Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592, 595 (1st Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, a court must determine whether the "well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Argueta, 643 F.3d at 74 (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129-30.) The plausibility requirement "'is not akin to a 'probability requirement.'" Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). The plausibility requirement requires a pleading to show "'more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). Allegations that are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability" ... are not enough. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 133 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where there is an allegation consistent with a defendant's liability but there is an "obvious alternative explanation," the inference of the defendant's liability is not plausible. Santiago, 629 F.3d at 133.

III. LANIGAN'S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. The Parties' Arguments

Lanigan presents five arguments in support of his motion to dismiss the claims against him: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a supervisory liability claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because hefailed to plead facts establishing the elements of a claim; (2) he is immune from Plaintiff's state law claims under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act ("NJTCA") for his discretionary acts, citing N.J.S.A. § 59:3-2(a)); (3) the NJTCA bars liability of a public entity and public employee for injuries inflicted on one prisoner by another prisoner, citing N.J.S.A. § 59:5-2); (4) Plaintiff failed to comply with the NJTCA's presentation requirements § 59:8-8; and (5) Lanigan is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. (Lanigan's Brief, ECF No. 10-2 at 13-21.) Lanigan requests a stay of discovery pending decision on the qualified immunity issue. (Id. at 22.)

In opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff states that he brought this action for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and statutory and common laws of the State of New Jersey. (Pl's Opp. To Lanigan's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 4.) In support of Lanigan's supervisory liability under § 1983, Plaintiff argues that "the Court should accept that the Defendants were aware of the Plaintiff's and Randals' gang affiliation. Yet, despite this knowledge place[d] them in the same cell." (Pl's Opp. To Lanigan's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 8.) Further, Plaintiff asserts

it can be inferred that it was the pattern, practice, policy or custom of the Defendants in placing rival gang member [sic] in the same cell, which resulting in [sic] the Plaintiff sustaining injuries in violation of hisconstitutional rights and his rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.

(Pl's Opp. To Lanigan's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 8.)

Plaintiff also contends that he sufficiently pled a negligence claim against Lanigan by pleading that "Defendants" caused members of two rival gangs to be placed in the same cell, and it was foreseeable that this would result in Plaintiff's injury. (Id.) It was also foreseeable that providing Plaintiff with a wooden cane and not placing him in a segregated infirmary unit would result in Plaintiff's injury by a rival gang member. (Id.)

Plaintiff submits that Lanigan is not immune for his discretionary acts under N.J.S.A. § 59:3-2(a) because "it can be inferred that the allegations laid out in Plaintiff's Complaint rise to the level of actual malice or willful misconduct[,]" which are not subject to immunity. (Id. at 9, citing N.J.S.A. § 59:3-14.) Plaintiff also maintains that Lanigan is not shielded from liability under N.J.S.A. § 59:5-2 for an injury caused by another inmate because his actions rise to the level of malice....